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The programme of research which Joseph Alois Schumpeter, as a social 
scientist, tried to carry out throughout his life was an elucidation of not only 
the economic development of capitalism, but also the total development of a 
capitalist society that includes economic development as a part. Schumpeter 
once called the totality of a varied social life “social culture” (or die soziale 
Kultur) of a nation and the totality of development of social life “socio-cul- 
tural development” (or die soziale Kulturentwicklung) (1912, p. 545). How 
was his picture of the total or socio-cultural development of capitalism 
constructed methodologically and substantively?
The characteristic of Schumpeter’s works seems to lie not so much in 
his separate scientific treatment of the component parts of the total picture 
as in his comprehensive design, idea, or insight which gives each component 
its proper place in the total picture. Schumpeter sought for the universal 
truth inherent in the process of capitalistic development: to use his favorite 
words, the “logic of things” (or Logik der Dinge) (1915, p. 102). The 
presumption that such a logic should exist will demand unity and consist­
ency of ideas. One cannot adequately evaluate the significance of Schumpe­
ter’s separate scientific achievement without an appreciation of his compre­
hensive ideas on the socio-cultural development of a capitalist society.
I would like to call for short Schumpeter’s design, idea, or insight his 
“vision”. He himself used this concept as an activity preceding scientific 
cognition. He paid attention to vision because the ideological element 
inescapably intervenes in the formation of vision, and attached a great
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importance to the intertwinement between science and ideology. In his 
personal inclination Schumpeter showed repugnance against value judg­
ments and policy discussions and preferred to talk about the progress of 
science as a purely analytical apparatus. Probably this attitude of Schumpe­
ter has precluded one from noticing an ideological bias in his scientific 
works. It is crucial, however, for an understanding of Schumpeter to make 
clear the influences of ideology, which he stealthily brought in, on his 
construction of an analytical framework.
In this paper we shall first make clear the concepts of science, vision, 
and ideology in the light of the contemporary philosophy of science, and 
then discuss and identify Schumpeter’s ideology which constitutes his basic 
insight sustaining his whole system of thought. At the same time we shall 
examine what will remain as an apparatus of scientific analysis for the total 
development of capitalism if ideological bias could be excluded from his 
system of thought.
II. Philosophy of Science and Sociology of Science
Science, Vision, Ideology, and Value
Since the publication of his first book on economics Das Vliesen und 
der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie (1908) Schumpeter al­
ways kept a deep interest in the methodology of economics, but his discus­
sion of science and ideology was mainly developed late in his life (1946, 
1949, 1954 Part I) \  Schumpeter observed that scientific inquiry, in a 
broad sense, consists of two stages: the formation of vision and the building 
of the scientific model. The first stage is to perceive as an object of inquiry a 
set of related phenomena which we want to analyze. This requires a judg­
ment of what is important, from one’s viewpoint, in understanding natural 
or social phenomena. This prescientific perception is called vision. The 
second stage is to analyze the material prepared by the vision. The recogni­
1 Schumpeter’s early writings relating to the history and the methodology of economics do 
not literally discuss the relation between science and ideology, but reject rather strongly the 
ideological influences: see Schumpeter (1908, 1914). But as far as the issue of ideology is 
substantively a major subject matter of the sociology of science, it is already implied in his 
early discussion of a unified development of science which evidently anticipates his later 
discussion of the scientific filiation: see Schumpeter, Vergangenheit und Zukunft der Sozialwis- 
senschaften (1915), which deals with the history of broader social science. Chapter 4 of this 
book is subtitled “Toward the Sociology of Science” (or “Zur Sociologie der Wissenschaft”).
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tion and collection of facts leads to the building of concepts and analytical 
apparatus, and vice versa. Through the feedback between factual and theo­
retical research scientific hypotheses or models are formulated.
These two stages, vision and analysis, are technically like a syllogism 
consisting of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. In contrast, 
ideology indicates specific elements entering the stage of vision; it is a 
preconception existing in our mind about an object of inquiry. This precon­
ception is no doubt influenced by previous and contemporary scientific 
views. Ideology in this sense is different from value judgments or political 
precepts for two reasons. First, though preanalytic, ideology includes a 
cognitive act and is a prerequisite for indicating an object of research, while 
evaluative and prescriptive judgments are neither cognitive acts nor prerequi­
sites of science. Second, in spite of the above, ideology is beyond our 
control and therefore dangerous to science, while value judgments are not so 
because they can be separated from science. Indeed ideology and value 
judgments are closely related to each other and usually regarded as synony­
mous, but ideology in Schumpeter’s sense should be understood indepen­
dently of value judgments.
Of these related concepts Schumpeter’s major emphasis was on the 
relation between science and ideology; this is the subject matter of the 
sociology of science or knowledge which treats science as a social phenome­
non. Indeed there are some points which might suggest Schumpeter’s taking 
vision and ideology as interchangeable, but in his basic intention they are 
distinct. Vision is a preliminary image of problems and is to be formulated 
analytically in accordance with rules of scientific procedure. The part of 
vision which is not amenable to scientific treatment is merely redundant to 
science and, so to speak, leftover material not processed. Ideology enters the 
process of drawing the image of problems (vision) and is not the image of 
the problems themselves. In the stage of scientific model building ideologi­
cal bias is excluded (hopefully) under the objective control of scientific 
procedure, whereas in the prescientific act of vision it is not so expected.
It is important to note that the part of vision which is not successfully 
formulated in the stage of model building has its own life and plays its own 
role. Such vision might sometimes disappear from science as a mere illusion, 
but sometimes becomes political value judgments or social beliefs and con­
tinues to exist in disguise in science as if it were science. In this case 
Schumpeter speaks of the victory of ideology over analysis.
Although in History of Economic Analysis (1954) Schumpeter alleged 
to write a history of economics as scientific analysis, not as political econ­
omy or economic thought, he was still interested in the relationship be­
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tween science and ideology, i.e. the sociology of science. That Schumpeter 
paid special attention to the sociology of science in his discussion of the 
methodology as well as the history of economics is important for us in 
examining his view of science. He recognized that scientific cognition and 
value judgments are separable in principle but actually connected with each 
other because they are commonly produced from ideology and vision. Sci­
ence, value, vision, and ideology are, so to speak, materials boiled and 
stirred up in the same pan; even a pure consideration of science would not 
allow us to neglect other materials -  in particular, ideology.
Three Major Issues
So much for a set of concepts. Now, in order to illustrate the extent of 
Schumpeter’s view on science and ideology, I would like to raise three 
issues which he discussed in different contexts: relativism, economic devel­
opment, and filiation in the history of science.
First, in discussing the structure and procedure of science, the tradition­
al philosophy of science usually assumed an ideal theory that is already 
completed. By contrast, Schumpeter bore in mind Marx’s theory of ideology 
and Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, though critical of their treatment 
of ideology, and regarded the stage of vision formation explicitly as a part of 
scientific activity. This means bringing the sociology of science into the 
philosophy of science and stresses relativism to the effect that any theory 
must be viewed in relation to a given social environment. Relativism itself is 
not new; the point here is what will be deduced from Schumpeter s version
of relativism:
Roughly up to the middle of the 19th century the evolution of “science” had been 
looked upon as a purely intellectual process- as a sequence of explorations of the 
empirically given universe or, as we may also put it, as a process of filiation of 
discoveries or analytic ideas that went on, though no doubt influencing social 
history and being influenced by it in many ways, according to a law of its own. 
Marx was the first to turn this relation of interdependence between science and 
other departments of social history into a relation of dependence of the former on 
the objective data of the social structure and in particular on the social location of 
scientific workers that determines their outlook upon reality and hence what they 
see of it and how they see it. This kind of relativism -  which must of course not 
be confused with any other kind of relativism -  if rigorously carried to its logical 
consequences spells a new philosophy of science and a new definition of scientific 
truth (1949, p. 348).
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Whereas in the natural sciences relativism asserting the influences of 
social context on theories does not extend over the choice of problems and 
approaches, relativism in the social sciences involves that a particular propo­
sition might depend on beliefs and attitudes of observers and not always on 
universal experience which is invariant to the observers’ social location. 
Relativism meant for Schumpeter not only that, compared with the natural 
sciences, the social sciences were immature, but also that they were by 
nature ideologically biased.
Unfortunately Schumpeter himself did not explicitly establish “a new 
philosphy of science” and “a new definition of scientific truth” with refer­
ence to the social sciences. Although he had to admit relativism, he had 
recourse to the fact that many phenomena still looked alike to everyone, and 
that the methodological rules of procedure prevented ideology from interven­
ing in the stage of model building. But he was not optimistic about the 
possibility of objective social science, so that he in fact pointed out that 
ideology was necessary but dangerous to science.
The significance of Schumpeter’s relativism, however, is not to be 
found in such pessimism or warning, but in the positive claim that science 
should be considered in a historical perspective, as we shall discuss in the 
following two issues.
Secondly, Schumpeter’s view that vision plays a key role when it is 
concerned with the process of long-term economic changes is quite impor­
tant, because he himself tackled this process throughout his life:
[W]hen we are concerned with nothing more ambitious than to formulate the 
way in which — on the plane of pure logic — economic quantities ‘hang together’, 
that is, when we are concerned with the logic of static equilibrium or even with 
the essential features of a stationary process, the role of Vision is but a modest 
one — for we are really working up a few pretty obvious facts, perception of 
which comes easily to us. Things are very different when we turn to the task of 
analyzing economic life in its secular process of change. It is then much more 
difficult to visualize the really important factors and features of this process than 
it is to formulate their modi operandi once we have (or think we have) got hold 
of them. Vision (and all the errors that go with it) therefore plays a greater role 
in this type of venture than it does in the other (1954, p. 570).
As for the long-term economic process where a large number of factors 
are likely to change, there are many alternatives in assuming a causal rela­
tionship and drawing a historical scenario. Moreover, a verification or falsifi­
cation of a theory of economic development requires an accumulation of 
long-term experiences, without which any theory of the long-term process
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would not be more than a vision. Any effort to work on the total develop­
ment of a capitalist society is concerned with the long-term process, and 
Schumpeter admits that in this case vision and ideology might survive 
without a crucial check.
Thirdly, Schumpeter identified the source of ideology with the social 
circumstances of scientists. Scientists do not start from scratch; “we start 
from the work of our predecessors or contemporaries or else from the ideas 
that float around us in the public mind” (1949, p. 350). These things belong 
to the social circumstances given to scientists; in this sense “the original 
vision is ideology by nature” (1949, p. 351; italics original). “Analytic work 
begins with material provided by our vision of things, and this is ideological 
almost by definition” (1954, p. 42). The image of society (vision) starts 
from the preconceptions of scientists (ideology).
Via the retheorizing of successive generations, the historical inheritance 
of theory or “filiation of scientific ideas” (1954, p. 6) constitutes a historical 
continuity in the history of science. If one takes superficially what Schumpe­
ter said, his work in the history of economics appears to pursue only the 
internal development of analytic or scientific systems of thought. But para­
doxically, in order to do that, he required a viewpoint of the sociology of 
science which was concerned with external moments of scientific activity. 
The association of the philosophy of science with the sociology of science 
was, in the case of Schumpeter, actually conceived and practiced in the 
context of the history of science.
The above three issues concerning science and ideology are closely 
related to each other. Our next task is to discuss the significance of Schum­
peter’s position in the light of the recent development of the philosophy of 
science.
Contexts of Discovery and Justification
Logical positivists distinguish between the context of discovery and 
that of justification. These terms were introduced by Hans Reichenbach 
(1938) to mark the distinction between the way a scientific theory is discov­
ered and the way in which it is formulated and justified. It can be argued 
that this distinction corresponds to Schumpeter’s distinction between vision 
and science.
According to the standard account, the contrast between discovery and 
justification is explained in the following way (see Kordig, 1978). Discovery 
concerns the origin and invention of scientific theories and hypotheses.
TH E SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY OF SCHUMPETER 735
Justification concerns their evaluation, test, and confirmation. Problems in 
the context of discovery are the concern of psychology, sociology and his­
tory of science. The context of justification is the subject matter of the 
philosophy of science. Discovery is subjective, but it is only descriptive. 
Justification is objective, but it is normative because a theory must abide by 
its rule. Discovery deals with the initial selection of facts for study. Justifica­
tion evaluates the process of the give and take between hypotheses and 
facts.
Logical positivists were interested only in the context of justification 
and neglected factors concerning the genesis of theories, because they be­
lieved that no logical method could be applied to the discovery of a theory 
and they only dealt with the static structure of a theory as the finished 
product. This point was made by the subsequent criticism against logical 
positivism. According to logical positivism a nonanalytic (factual) statement 
has meaningfulness or cognitive significance only if it is verifiable by obser­
vational evidence. But it is not possible to distinguish strictly between 
theory and observation because we can observe facts only on the assumption 
of a theoretical framework. Moreover, such a statement is not conclusively 
verifiable on account of the famous problem of induction, so that a theory is 
rather accepted in fact on various criteria, undergoes endless modification 
and proliferation, and continues to exist with tenacity even if it is falsified.
From the criticism against the positivistic philosophy of science it has 
been established that the context of discovery dealing with origin, evolution, 
and acceptance or rejection of theories should be a legitimate and essential 
concern of the philosophy of science (see Suppe, 1979, pp. 125-126). The 
most important consequence of this change to the philosophy of science is 
serious attention given to the dynamics of scientific growth and persistence 
and thus to the history and the sociology of science. After logical positivism 
authors such as Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Laudan and others 
contributed to this new stream 2.
In the light of the above it can be said that Schumpeter’s discussion of 
science and ideology anticipated the subsequent development in the philos­
ophy of science. He himself showed deep interest in the history of econom-
2 As to the movements in the philosophy of science and their reflection in the methodol­
ogy of economics, see Caldwell (1982). Caldwell discusses economists such as Robbins, 
Hutchison, Machlup, Friedman, and Samuelson as representing different methodological posi­
tions. But it is quite curious and unfair that he completely neglects Schumpeter; Schumpeter’s 
name appears neither in the index nor the bibliography. This seems to have something to do 
with the fact that Schumpeter’s methodological inquiry Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt has not 
been translated into English.
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ics and introduced the conceptual framework for dealing with ideology 
which used to belong to the context of discovery, thus providing a basis for 
the analysis of the context of justification from the viewpoint of historical 
growth of theories. His position differed from the positivistic view which 
neglected the problems originating in the context of discovery, and also 
from the sociological view which dealt with those problems only as the 
concern of the sociology of science. It is not an incomprehensible inconsist­
ency that while he always alleged to restrict himself to economics as an 
objective science, Schumpeter in fact paid considerable attention to the 
sociological factors which might affect the development of science. We shall 
take a step forward and suggest that his position is appropriately interpreted 
with reference to Lakatos’s methodology of science.
A Comparison with Lakatos
Lakatos’s notion of “scientific research programme” is almost similar to 
Kuhn’s “paradigm”. A scientific research programme consists of two kinds 
of methodological rules, namely, a negative heuristic (which tells us what 
research paths are to be avoided) and a positive heuristic (which tells us 
what research paths are to be pursued). At the same time, a research 
programme is characterized by two components: a “hard core” (which con­
sists of irrefutable general theoretical hypotheses) and a “protective belt” 
(which consists of refutable variants such as auxiliary and observational 
hypotheses, initial conditions, mathematical and experimental techniques, 
etc.) around a “hard core”. While the negative heuristic forbids us to refute 
a “hard core”, the positive heuristic allows us to change, invent, and develop 
a refutable “protective belt” . It is the task of the positive heuristic to take 
charge of meeting criticisms and anomalies resulting from gaps between 
theory and observation, and to extend the scope to which the theoretical 
hypotheses can be applied.
A scientific research programme does not mean a single theory in 
isolation but a series of theories with common rules and values, and it 
allows cumulative expansion and modification within its system defined by 
a “hard core”. In other words, the research programme means a series of 
“protective belts” developed on the basis of a common “hard core”. Lakatos 
defines a series of theories as progressive if it predicts some new, hitherto 
unexpected facts and if it leads to the actual discovery of some new facts. 
The progressiveness of a programme is the criterion to determine the super­
iority of the programme. But since a judgment of progressiveness takes a
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long time, Lakatos stresses the hindsight elements in appraisals of theories 
and regards the existence of competing research programmes as a normal 
affair in science. This consideration leads him to stress the importance of 
“methodological tolerance”.
Thus, Lakatos’s position may be summarized as follows. On the one 
hand, Lakatos denies that science, as Popper presupposed, undergoes per­
manent revolution by ceaseless falsification of theories; instead, he states 
that a series of theories with a common “hard core” persists tenaciously in 
face of unfavorable empirical tests. On the other hand, Lakatos views the 
history of science, contrary to Kuhn, as a history of competing research 
programmes rather than as a sequence of ruling paradigms. O f course, 
Lakatos keeps, by his criterion of progressiveness, elements of Popper’s 
normative methodology of science, on the one hand, and adopts, by his 
concepts of “hard core” and “protective belt”, elements of Kuhn’s sociologi­
cal principle of tenacity, on the other. Therefore, Lakatos’s methodology is, 
in a sense, a compromise between Popper and Kuhn.
On the basis of a brief exposition of Lakatos’s framework, we contend 
that his distinction between a “hard core” and a “protective belt” is similar 
to that of Schumpeter between ideology and science 3. Although Schumpeter 
brought ideology into the consideration of science, his intention was not to 
indulge in relativism of science but still to speak of scientific progress. 
Paradoxically speaking, by explicitly introducing ideology into the realm of 
science he could, though implicitly, speak of progress in the formulation of 
scientific models constructed on presupposed ideology 4. This is practiced in 
the context of the history of science. His key word in that context is the 
“filiation of scientific ideas”, and this could be compared to Lakatos’s concep­
tion of a series of theories developed around a “hard core”. Another key 
word in the methodology of economics put forward by Schumpeter in Das 
Wesen und der Hauptinhalt was “methodological tolerance”, which allows 
the coexistence of competing research programmes, a concept similar to that 
of Lakatos.
If it is right to think in this way, ideology in Schumpeter is not an ad
3 As far as I know, a similar contention is provided by Blaug (1976, p. 157). He cursorily 
writes that “Lakatos’s ‘hard core’ expresses an idea similar to that conveyed by Schumpeter’s 
notion of ‘vision’”.
4 In the realm of analytic work, Schumpeter says, there is a widely accepted standard, so 
that one can speak of scientific progress between Mill and Samuelson in the same sense in 
which there has been technological progress in the extraction of teeth between the time of Mill 
and our own (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 39). Although Schumpeter does not explicitly define the 
standard of scientific progress, he seems to have in mind a criterion concerning “analytic 
perfection” within a presupposed paradigm or research programme.
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hoc factor that merely precedes a theoretical model and can be dispensed 
with once a model is formulated. Ideology stays as an irrefutable “hard 
core” at the center of a scientific research programme and gathers several 
auxiliary hypotheses around itself, thus contributing to the structured sys­
tem of science. We shall attempt to interpret Schumpeter’s structure of 
thought using Lakatos’s methodological concepts.
III. An Interpretation of Statics-Dynamics D ualism
Statics vs. Dynamics
Schumpeter’s model of economic statics is a version of the neoclassical 
equilibrium theory. His static model basically relates to an economic equilib­
rium established under certain given conditions, but, if time is taken into 
account, it relates also to a stationary state or a circular flow which repeats 
itself year after year on the same scale and with the same pattern. His 
notion of economic statics includes not only the circular flow but also the 
growth process with steadily increasing population and capital. Under 
steady economic growth changes are limited to the quantitative expansion of 
an existing economy and distinguished from doing something new and dif­
ferently.
Thus Schumpeter selects only those essential factors which he insists 
characterize economic dynamics, and includes all the rest in the scope of 
economic statics. In this sense his method is a purification of dynamic 
phenomena, which he calls “economic development”. His theory of econom­
ic development was given in Theorie der wivtschaftlichen Entioicklung 
(1912). Economic development is caused by “innovation”, broadly defined 
as the introduction of new products, new methods of production, new 
markets, new sources of supply, and new forms of industrial organizations. 
The significance of innovation is that it changes the data from within the 
economic system and shifts the system from an old to a new equilibrium.
Although Schumpeter sharply distinguishes economic development 
from the circular flow and the steady growth because economic develop­
ment cannot be analyzed by the model of economic statics, he neither denies 
nor excludes the model of economic statics from his analysis of economic 
development. The issue of statics and dynamics in Schumpeter is not that 
the former should be replaced by the latter, but that both are required to 
describe the reality on account of a special connection between the methods 
and the objects of inquiry. Thus he writes:
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[OJne sees that dynamics should destroy and modify a lot of things. The core of 
the static theory should not be replaced by a conception which is concerned with 
development. Only for a total analysis of economic phenomena in general and for 
social philosophy statics is not applicable (1912, p. 511).
Specifically, four pairs are discussed by Schumpeter as the interpreta­
tions of statics-dynamics dualism 5. First, two theoretical apparatuses: static 
theory and dynamic theory. Secondly, two real processes: the circular flow 
and the steady growth, the tendency toward equilibrium, the adaptation to 
innovation, on the one hand, and a change in the circular flow and in the 
growth process, the deviation from equilibrium, a spontaneous and discon­
tinuous innovation, on the other. Thirdly, two periods in economic life: the 
depression period when the liquidation and reorganization of an economic 
system takes place, and the boom period when the deviation from an exist­
ing economic pattern takes place. Fourthly, two types of individual: mere 
manager and entrepreneur, or more generally speaking, ordinary man and 
leader; in terms of the motives of human conduct, the satisfaction of hedo­
nistic wants and the pursuit of supreme activity, creation and victory. Two 
different theoretical apparatuses are to explain three pairs of different facts.
Schumpeter’s distinction between static circular flow (and steady 
growth) and dynamic economic development has incurred the criticism that 
his approach suffers from dualism or dichotomy 6. It is not necessarily open 
to criticism to say that different methods should be devoted to different 
problems. The point of the criticism would be that the relations between 
statics and dynamics are not sufficiently clarified in terms of problems and 
methods.
We claim that the theorizing of statics-dynamics relations would in­
volve an important link between science and ideology in Schumpeter. Such 
double theorizing primarily determines the image of the objects to be 
grasped by science and then the structure of science. It is ideology in 
Schumpeter’s sense that governs the process preceding a scientific analysis. 
In the following we shall point out that the relation between statics and 
dynamics is not a simple dichotomy but a structure. A structure of statics- 
dynamics dualism will be examined by three observations.
’ Of these pairs the second, third and fourth are mentioned in Schumpeter (1912, pp. 
512-513), and the first, second and third are in Schumpeter (1926a, pp. 120-122; tr. 1934, pp. 
82-83).
6 This sort of criticism was initiated by Beckerath (1929).
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Equilibrium Theory as Magna Charta
First of all, it is noteworthy that Schumpeter states that the proof of 
equilibrium is the magna charta of economic theory as an autonomous 
science (1939, vol. 1, p. 41). In neoclassical economic theory, given some 
exogenous data, prices and quantities of various goods and factors of produc­
tion -  i.e. the pattern of resource allocation -  are uniquely and mterdepend- 
ently determined. Schumpeter observed that if in a certain area of socia 
life a state of equilibrium can be determined corresponding to exogenous 
data, the area in question is logically so self-sufficient that one can legiti­
mately assume an autonomous and independent science for that area, ihe 
subject matter of an area can be taken to be a cosmos and not a chaos on y 
if a unique equilibrium can be proved for a given situation. The subje 
matter of equilibrium economics is an orderly world in this sense .
Then, Schumpeter’s view that, although static phenomena have an 
equilibrium, dynamic ones have not, offers an important key to an un er- 
standing of statics-dynamics dualism. He wrote:
It follows from our entire thought that a dynamic equilibrium does not exist 
Development in its ultimate nature consists in disturbances of an existing static 
equilibrium and does not have a tendency to return to a previous or any othe 
equilibrium. Development changes the data of a static economy Development 
and equilibrium are opposite phenomena excluding each other. Not that a sta 
economy is characterized by a static equilibrium and a dynamic economy by 
dynamic equilibrium; on the contrary, equilibrium exists only in a static 
Economic equilibrium is essentially a static equilibrium (1912, p. 489, italics
added).
The notion of equilibrium growth or dynamic equilibrium, much dis­
cussed in the post-Keynesian growth theory, should belong to statics accord­
ing to Schumpeter because an equilibrium growth is proved under some 
exogenously given conditions such as growth of labor capital, and technical 
progress. Innovation, which is a disturbance of equilibrium by definition is 
not amenable to equilibrium analysis. If there is no equilibrium in e 
sphere of innovation and economic development as such, it follows from 
Schumpeter’s reasoning that economic development cannot be regarde as 
the object of science unless it is somehow linked with a mechanism of 
equilibrium and order. Indeed an investigation of economic development
M ^kTmportant idea was expressed fully in chapter 7 of the first edition of Entwicklung 
(Schumpeter, 1912), but this chapter was omitted in the later editions as well as in the 
English translation.
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expands the scope of economics in comparison with static theory; the new 
sphere or “extended building” includes a basically different type of man 
(entrepreneur) and a new type of activity (innovation). This new sphere, 
however, cannot stand by itself; static theory is indispensable to theory of 
economic development.
Innovation means changes in the data, and statics can only deal with 
its effects on an economy in terms of the equilibrating mechanism, which 
will work so as to adapt the economy to innovation or to absorb innovation 
into the economy. As seen as the objects of inquiry, statics and dynamics are 
two separate phenomena, but as seen as the methods of inquiry, they are not 
independent; it is statics that makes economics, including theory of econom­
ic development, possible as an autonomous science. Dynamics can add new 
propositions about economic development only with the aid of statics. 
Schumpeter, therefore, does not have dual methods of statics and dynamics; 
he has only the method of statics, i.e. equilibrium analysis, although he has 
dual phenomena of static and dynamic economies.
It is Léon Walras who first established equilibrium analysis in econom­
ics. Schumpeter all along regarded Walras as the greatest theoretical econo­
mist. In the preface to the Japanese edition of his Entwicklung Schumpeter 
writes:
To Walras we owe a concept of the economic system and a theoretical apparatus 
which for the first time in the history of our science effectively embraced the pure 
logic of the interdependence between economic quantities (1937, p. 2).
Schumpeter himself discusses in greater detail the reasons why equilib­
rium analysis is essential to the understanding of an economy. His discus­
sion is summarized in the following points (1939, vol. 1, pp. 69-70). (1) 
However abstract the equilibrium theory may be, it gives “the bare bones of 
the economic logic” . (2) The equilibrium theory gives the description of a 
response apparatus of an economic system to changes in the data, whether 
exogenous or endogenous. (3) The concept of equilibrium is indispensable 
as the standard of reference, whether for an analytical or diagnostic purpose. 
(4) The most important relevance of the equilibrium concept depends on 
the possibility of a tendency in the real world toward equilibrium. While 
points (l)-(3) relate to the significance of the equilibrium theory as an 
analytical tool, point (4) is concerned with the equilibrating capacity of the 
real world and must be distinguished from (l)-(3).
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Walras as Ideology
Secondly, let me move to Schumpeter’s outlook on the real world. His 
view on the methods of analysis mentioned above is reflected in the view on 
the objects of analysis through point (4), i.e. the relevance of the equilib­
rium concept to the real world. In his masterpiece on statics Das We sen 
und der Hauptinhalt he described statics not as a discussion in a vacuum but 
as the statement of a universal existence. He wrote:
Our system [the static theory] ... covers a great deal of facts and has closer 
relations with reality than an opponent of the theory seems to believe... The 
opponent of the theory overlooks only too easily that the facts which conform to 
its scheme are quite extraordinary in number (1908, p. 564).
In his empirical analysis of the business cycles he stresses the fact that 
the capitalist economy, while embodying within itself factors of disturbance, 
is self-adjusting by the device of boom and depression:
What matters to us is precisely the presence or absence of an actual tendency in 
the system to move toward a state of equilibrium: if this concept is to be useful 
as a tool of business-cycle analysis, the economic system must strive to reestablish 
equilibrium whenever it has been disturbed or, ... it must tend to move, in 
reaction to every disturbance, in such a way as to absorb the change... Common 
sense tells us that this mechanism for establishing or reestablishing equilibrium is 
not a figment devised as an exercise in the pure logic of economics but actually 
operative in the reality around us (1939, voi. 1, p. 47; first italics original, second 
and third italics added).
In contrast to speculating on the logic of static equilibrium analysis 
merely in the world of ideas, it is essentially ideology (in Schumpeter’s 
sense) that will mold the image of reality by a fixed theory and presume the 
existence of a tendency toward equilibrium. Schumpeter learnt this ideology 
from Walras; we call it Walras’s ideology W  in Schumpeter.
Theory of Innovation as Protective Belt
Thirdly, considering the emphasis which Schumpeter placed on the 
static theory, we have to ask what the significance of his dynamic theory is. 
We raise an objection to the general understanding of Schumpeter that he 
simply rejected the traditional static theory and established a dynamic 
theory in order to explain dynamic phenomena which are not covered by
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statics. Such an understanding might have been simply misled by his dramat­
ic stress that capitalism is by its nature a process of constant change.
Moreover, it is most often asserted that Schumpeter introduced the 
process of circular flow into the theory of economic development only for 
the purpose of making the process of dynamic change conspicuous in con­
trast to stationary conditions, or for the purpose of making a useful mental 
experiment by asking what a capitalist economy would be like if the dynam­
ic changes were absent8. Samuelson in the same vein called the exposition 
of the circular flow in the first chapter of Entwicklung a “parable” (1943, p. 
61). But such an appraisal, too, overlooks the methodological demand of 
dynamic theory for the device of equilibrium theory.
Stolper’s view (1982, pp. 30-33) varies from the ordinary ones: he is 
quite right in emphasizing that understanding the nature and role of equilib­
rium is as central a part of understanding Schumpeter’s approach to eco­
nomic development as is the nature and role of innovation; specifically he 
does justice to Schumpeter’s view that the adaptive forces of an economy 
toward equilibrium are very strong. But Stolper seems to go astray toward 
stressing the destructive power of innovation, which is required in order to 
get rid of an equilibrium which is so adaptable.
In Schumpeter both equilibrium and disequilibrium are important 
parts of reality and located in the business cycle. Paradoxically speaking, 
because Schumpeter believed in the inherent stability and thus the order-con­
ferring capacity of the capitalist economy, he could deal with the dynamic 
phenomenon, the destruction of the existing equilibrium, the aberration 
from the existing order of the economy. Whatever destructive forces may 
emerge in the economy, the market can be relied on to adapt to them and 
absorb their effects to establish a new order. This is Schumpeter’s notion of 
economic order, and on its basis economics as an autonomous science is 
guaranteed.
Now let us summarize the relationship between statics and dynamics in 
Schumpeter from the methodological point of view. The Walrasian static 
theory gave Schumpeter the basic ideology W  which takes reality as an 
orderly system. We can regard the static theory as a “hard core” in Lakatos’s 
sense, which is maintained by those who, like Schumpeter, accept neoclassi­
cal economics as a grand “scientific research programme”. Schumpeter’s 
theory of economic development can be interpreted as a “protective belt” 
around this core, because his dynamics is properly conceived as an auxiliary 
hypothesis added to the Walrasian statics. Far from denying the static
Among many arguments to this effect, the most recent one is made by Elliott (1983).
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theory, Schumpeter’s theory of economic development, which we now call 
W', stands on it and carries the function of forbidding criticism against it. 
Moreover, statics and dynamics should not be treated separately like two 
watertight compartments; they are complementary to each other as a “hard 
core” and a “protective belt” and have different functions, i.e. the negative 
heuristic and the positive heuristic. This is our interpretation of the statics- 
dynamics dualism.
Some Drawbacks
Schumpeter’s dynamics interpreted as the “protective belt” around the 
general hypothesis of statics is not free from drawbacks. In his view innova­
tion is historically individual and disorderly; economic development 
brought about by innovation is not an organic unity, so that a high degree of 
theorizing of innovation and economic development is extremely difficult. 
Furthermore, the logic of economic analysis he was convinced of was the 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory. Under these restrictions Schumpeter 
struggled hard to develop a theoretical apparatus of dynamics after he 
grasped the crucial importance of innovation in economic development. His 
theorizing suffers from two drawbacks.
First, although Schumpeter paid special attention to innovation as the 
cause of economic development, it was the phenomena accompanying inno­
vation that he actually engaged himself in theorizing; he failed to provide an 
analysis of the manner in which innovation takes place on the historical 
scene. His Entwicklung was criticized for neglecting all historical factors of 
change except entrepreneurial innovation in general. To this criticism he 
rightly replied:
My representation is not at all concerned with the factors of change, but with the 
methods by which these work, with the mechanism of change. Even the “entrepre­
neur” is here not a factor of change but merely the bearer of the mechanism of 
change (1926a, p. 93; tr. 1934, p. 61; italics original)9.
He always emphasizes that innovation is an endogenous factor responsible 
for changes in the data. Actually, however, he does not analyze innovation 
in detail, but only describes various phenomena accompanying innovation,
i.e. business cycle. Although one may say that innovation is endogenous in 
the sense that it is carried out by the entrepreneur, it is no less than an
’  I slightly modified the English translation so as to be closer to the original German.
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exogenous factor in the sense that it is an ultimate factor not susceptible to 
further analysis.
Secondly, another drawback is that Schumpeter failed to provide a 
manageable model of economic development. This is due to his belief that 
economic development is not an organic unity, and has also something to do 
with his hostility against Keynesian macroeconomic analysis. For he be­
lieved that innovation occurs in limited industrial sectors and thus economic 
development is in essence a microeconomic process:
Since this relation [between saving, investment, and the rate of interest] is the net 
result of the interaction of all the variables of the system, it can be expressed only 
in terms of the Walrasian apparatus. From the attempt to do so by means of two 
independent single-value functions of the rate of interest nothing but caricature 
can result (1939, vol. 1, p. 78).
It is, therefore, misleading to reason on aggregative equilibrium as if it displayed 
the factors which initiate change and as if disturbance in the economic system as a 
whole could arise only from those aggregates. Such reasoning is at the bottom of 
much faulty analysis of business cycles. It keeps analysis on the surface of things 
and prevents it from penetrating into the industrial processes below, which are 
what really matters (1939, vol. 1, pp. 43-44).
In order to develop fully his original vision of economic development 
his theory should have satisfied three requirements: first, it must be a 
monetary theory of production which takes into account the impact of bank 
credit on the structure of a real economy; secondly, it must have a frame­
work of interindustry analysis which deals with the impulse of leading 
industries; thirdly, it must explain the trend and cycles of economic activity 
simultaneously. The goal was too ambitious and he could not work out such 
a theoretical model.
What actually characterizes Schumpeter’s development theory is rather 
a sociological description of the motive and type of an entrepreneur as the 
bearer of innovation, on the one hand, and an impressionistic description of 
the business cycles caused by innovation, on the other. Although the latter 
description in Entwicklung is usually taken as the presentation of a dynamic 
process, the fact is that it does no more than indicate a series of causes and 
effects such as innovation, credit creation, forced saving, entrepreneurial 
profit, entry of competitors, overproduction, and depression.
Schumpeter’s Business Cycles (1939), a huge theoretical, historical, and 
statistical analysis of the capitalist process, was not successful as Kuznets 
(1940) adequately evaluated. While Schumpeter’s primary factors and con­
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cepts such as entrepreneur, innovation, and equilibrium were extended to 
explain in an impressionistic way the above-mentioned series of events, he 
failed to forge the necessary links between the primary factors and the 
statistical observations of business cycles. These links should have been 
given by a theoretical model which is concerned with interindustry relations, 
monetary disturbances, and the three-cycle schema (the cycles of Kondra- 
tieff, Juglar and Kitchin).
Schumpeter’s observations of economic process, imperfect as they are 
in themselves, cover only a half of his world. Another half, a historical 
socio-cultural picture, consisting also of a certain “hard core” and a protec­
tive belt”, must be jointed to it. We now proceed to this.
IV. Economic Development and Socio-Cultural D evelopment
Limits of Theory of Economic Development
Starting from Das We sen und der Hauptinhalt, which is a recapitulation 
of economic statics, Schumpeter explored the area of economic dynamics in 
Entivicklung and Business Cycles. In view of his programme of social scientif­
ic research however, theory of economic development only marked a half­
way position toward the goal. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) 
established as the object of inquiry a wider area including politics, society, 
and culture as well as economy and discussed the historical evolution of the 
capitalist system in terms of the interrelations between economic and non­
economic areas. This wider perspective gave Schumpeter an opportunity for 
completing a more satisfactory theory of evolution. In this sense the theory 
of economic development in Entivicklung and Business Cycles might be 
called a halfway house between Das Wesen and Capitalism.
In Entivicklung Schumpeter already realized that his approach was 
preliminary. The overall perspective of social life was fully described in the 
last chapter (chapter 7) of the first edition of Entivicklung. This chapter 
entitled “The Total Picture of Economy” (or “Das Gesamtbild der Volkswirt- 
schaft”) consists of 86 pages and is extremely important in understanding 
Schumpeter’s overall research programme; unfortunately it was omitted in 
the later editions and the English translation for a reason which will be soon 
mentioned. This chapter should be regarded as a proper theoretical basis of
Capitalism published thirty years later.
In that chapter he contrasted total or socio-cultural development with
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economic development. But usually in Germany at that time (under the 
influence of the Historical School) the overall historical process was equated 
to economic development. On the contrary, Schumpeter in Entwicklung 
started from the abstract static theory and tried to construct a theory of 
economic development as its “protective belt”. His theoretical approach was 
at first not properly taken; instead people’s concern was mostly digressed to 
the description in chapter 7, which he later called “a fragment of the socio­
logy of culture” (or “das Bruchstiick von Kultursoziologie”) (1926a, p. XI). 
Therefore, Schumpeter completely eliminated this interesting chapter from 
the second edition of Entwicklung in order to indicate the locus of his own 
emphasis in that book. Although he certainly hoped to approach the wider 
area in the future, he temporarily abstained from placing economic develop­
ment in a wider perspective of socio-cultural development when he virtually 
intended, as the task of higher priority, to construct a theory of economic 
development on the basis of static theory.
On the other hand, he was also criticized for neglecting social and 
historical factors of change. In a passage quoted above he stressed that in 
Entwicklung he was not concerned with factors of change, but with the 
mechanism of change; he really meant that in the discussion of development 
within the area of economy innovation could be dealt with only as an 
ultimate factor of change, i.e. exogenously. Thus in Entwicklung he regarded 
the discussion of changing economic organization and practice as a separate 
problem, which should be treated appropriately in a wider perspective.
As seen incidentally from these evaluations, the theory of economic 
development in Entwicklung was looked upon as unsatisfactory. In fact 
Schumpeter’s mind was always ambivalent with regard to pure economic 
theory and socio-cultural history. Although he called entrepreneurial innova­
tion an endogenous factor which changes the data from within an economy, 
this is not exact. It is a limit of his theory of economic development that 
innovation is as a matter of fact exogenous to economic analysis.
Only in the overall perspective an endogenous explanation of economic 
development could be available. When Schumpeter limits himself to the 
economic area, he defines capitalism as a system of economic institutions, 
i.e. private ownership, motive for private profit, and bank credit. On the 
other hand, when he takes a broader view, capitalism is conceived as a 
civilization including also political institutions, the class structure, a way of 
thinking, value systems, science and art, styles of life, etc. It is presumed 
that among various areas of social life there are interrelations so as to form a 
grand general equilibrium. The theory of economic development conceived 
in the economic area is not sufficient to indicate the historical behavior of
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the capitalist society as a whole and is therefore no match for Marx’s
analyst^ of ^  the total development of capitalism would require two
things- first to estimate the influences of economic development on noneco­
nomic areas and second, to estimate the reverse influences of noneconomic 
factors on the emergence of innovation. Entwicklung found innovation a 
the cause of development in the economic area, but failed to explain w 
circumstances determine innovation; therefore, innovation remained ar. ex­
ogenous factor to an economic system in spite of his contrary assertio . 
Explan t on of innovation is made possible in a wider context comprising 
economic as well as noneconomic areas. A more or
discussion of capitalism in such a context is finally provided in Capitalism.
Marx as Ideology
When Schumpeter grappled with the process of change in the capitalist 
society as a whole with a perspective wider than the economic one he learnt 
the ideology of endogenous evolution and self-destruction of capitalism from 
Marx. It is “a vision of economic evolution as a distinct process genera
bv the economic system itself” (1937, p. 2). , ,  .
V According to Marx’s materialisrlc or economic interpretauon of htstory
the forces of social evolution should be found in a confltct between t a  
and relations of production. Schumpeter appreciated this view as of 
rank importance” and put its essential points into the propositions (1954, p.
439): (1) .All the cultural manifestations of a society are uhimately fancnons
of its class structure. (2) A society’s class structure is ultimately and ch y 
o v e r i S b  T e  structure of production. (3) The social process of p r c d ^  
Z  displays an immanent evolution. These propositions are formulated by 
Schumpeter so that the Marxian color should be minimized.
Although Schumpeter repeatedly praised Marx’s analysis of social evo­
lution and emphasized the similarity of his own view and PurPose ^' th 
Marx, he denied all the analytical apparatus and historical scenario of Ma 
Tt was onlv an extremely general view of an immanent evolution and self-de­
struction of capitalism summed up in proposition (3) that Schumpeter vir­
tually inherited from Marx. This I call Marx’s ideology M in Schumpeter. 
Schumpeter wrote on Marx’s vision:
m h e  grand vision of an immanent evolution of the economic process -  that 
working somehow through accumulation, somehow destroys the economy as well 
r K T c f  competitive capitalism and somehow produces an untenable
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social situation that will somehow give birth to another type of social organization 
— remains after the most vigorous criticism has done its worst. It is this fact, and 
this fact alone, that constitutes Marx’s claim to greatness as an economic analyst 
(1954, p. 441; italics added).
Schumpeter intended to describe the total process of capitalistic devel­
opment by a different apparatus and a different scenario but still on the 
basis of Marx’s ideology. He regarded as non-Marxian all of the “some- 
how’s” italicized in the above quotation. We call Schumpeter’s theory of 
socio-cultural development AT, which should be consistent with Marx’s 
ideology Af; here too, AT' is to Af what a “protective belt” is to a “hard core” . 
How does Af' differ from the Marxian theory? It is convenient to use 
Schumpeter’s three propositions as a frame of comparison.
With regard to proposition (1), Schumpeter denied the Marxian causal 
relation that the superstructure is unilaterally determined by its economic 
foundation and class structure, and merely admitted the functional relation 
between them. Rather in his analysis of capitalist evolution the reverse 
relation that the superstructure governs the economic process is crucial. 
Since Marx could discuss changes in the economic system within the orbit 
of the understructure, any analysis of the superstructure was merely a corol­
lary of the main themes about the understructure. But Schumpeter tended to 
argue changes in the economic system in terms of the interrelations between 
the superstructure and the understructure. I would say that the notion of 
socio-cultural development based on the general interdependence of multi­
farious areas of social life is Schumpeter s substitute for the Marxian 
economic interpretation of history.
As for proposition (2), Schumpeter claimed that the class structure is 
also determined by diverse factors other than economic ones, and particular­
ly paid attention to the dynamic phenomenon that the contents of classes are 
changing like “a hotel or an omnibus, always full, but always of different 
people” (1951a, p. 165). His theory of social classes does not occupy such a 
pivotal position linking the superstructure with the understructure as Marx s 
theory. Instead it represents a final summary of social investigation in terms 
of the general interdependence.
Let me start from the interesting fact that Schumpeter regards the class 
phenomenon as one of the areas of social life, described in chapter 7 of the 
first edition of Entwicklung. In his view of the comprehensive social sciences 
a certain area of social life can establish itself as the object of an autono­
mous science by identifying three things: (1) a type of man which is specific 
to the area, (2) equilibrium under certain data which exogenously define the
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area and (3) the developmental activity which endogenously destroys the 
existing equilibrium. In the light of these criteria the phenomenon of soc a 
classes indeed involves groups of men, but they are di e r e n t ™  
specific types of persons which characterize each area of social lite. 1 erso 
in the phenomenon of social classes are a total set of persons who work in 
various areas of activity; as it were, people from different local areas meet
together in a hotel or an omnibus. . . , , , ■ „ / 1 i a D
The social function of class structure is social leadership (1951a, p 
210) in a general sense. In each area of social activity there is a distinct sort 
of leadership, i.e. the ability of carrying out innovation and people are 
ranked ultimately according to their different aptitudes with respect to le 
ership. Social classes are the compound results of various k m b  ofkader- 
shin and a play of leadership brings about changes in social classes.
If a compound of performance in various areas of social life is the c as 
phenomenon it would not be adequate to explain socia classes by the 
functional categories peculiar to the economic area, particularly by the tv 
categories o labour and capital as Marx did. In Marx the concept of soaal 
classes played a pivotal role because in his view social classes are deter- 
mined exclusively by the structure of production, and also because m 
view the superstructure is a reflection of class structure. Since Schumpeter 
denies both views, his theory of social classes does not mediate between the 
supersttucture\nd the understructut.; the class phenomenon ,s rather an 
iippreaate summary of performance in all areas of social n ■
As for ^reposition (3), Schumpeter accepts only its general vision of 
the immanent social evolution. The Marxian substance of that Pr° P ° s'tlon 
was jettisoned because propositions (1) and (2) were denied. Schumpeter 
Tarried out such an ingenious recast of Marx’s economic interpretation o 
history by introducing Walras’s ideology into a wider perspective of socia 
life. We must now move to this problem.
Coordination of Walras and M.arx
Schumpeter's Capital»»,discussed the interrelations between economk 
and noneconomic areas of the capitalist society fro^  a l^  '™  account 
view and reached the conclusion 
of its economic success. The way or his reasoning
ic development has influences on noneconomic areas which produce in 
tmfavorabie effects on innovation in economic area. Schumpeter s analysts o 
social evolution in this perspective ,s what we called M . He raised
TH E SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY OF SCHUMPETER 751
following factors as unfavorable reactions on the economic area: (1) the 
obsolescence of entrepreneurial function due to mechanization and routiniza- 
tion of innovation, (2) the disappearance of favorable factors due to the 
development of rationality, (3) the growth of a critical attitude among 
intellectuals against capitalism, (4) the decline of private vitality due to 
government intervention, and (5) the decay of the capitalistic moral values.
In appraising Schumpeter’s argument we claim that the method of 
analysis which he put forward is much more valuable than the conclusion 
about the future of capitalism which he projected. His method is to inquire 
into the relationship, i.e. consistency or inconsistency, between the econom­
ic and noneconomic spheres, between the economy and the civilization.
The vision which lies at the basis of this analysis is given partly by 
Walras’s ideology that the capitalist market system is essentially stable, and 
partly by Marx’s ideology that capitalism will break down by its immanent 
development. The apparent contradiction of these two ideologies is saved by 
the idea that the very success of the capitalist economy will produce the 
noneconomic factors which are inconsistent with it; that these factors will 
then worsen the economic performance of capitalism. In short, although the 
economy can work successfully by itself, the impacts of external factors will 
ultimately spoil it; but taking account of the fact that the reactions of the 
noneconomic factors were the results of economic development, we can only 
assume a grand general equilibrium between the economic and noneconomic 
spheres.
We have said above that Schumpeter’s theory of economic develop­
ment W  is structured as a “protective belt” to Walras’s ideology W  (i.e. a 
belief in the inherent stability of capitalism), which gives a “hard core” to 
Schumpeter’s system. We now have Schumpeter s analysis of historical de­
velopment M' as another “protective belt” to Marx’s ideology M (i.e. a belief 
in the self-destruction of capitalism), which gives another hard core . How 
should we interpret the two sets of theories in Schumpeter?
For the sake of convenience, let us represent innovation as I, the state 
of the economic area as E, and the state of the noneconomic area as N. 
Therefore,
E =  F (I)
stands for the total process described in Entwicklung', the economy will 
converge, by experiencing the business cycle, on a certain equilibrium state 
in response to innovation. Then,
I =  G (N)
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gives a specification of the effects which the noneconomic factors have on 
innovation. If innovation can be seen as an institutional factor determining 
the economic area, this equation properly belongs to economic sociology 
where innovation as one of the determinants of economic changes is in turn 
explained endogenously in a wider context. Combining two functions, we
can write
E =  F [G  (N)] =  H  (N).
In the economic area where the function G is unknown, innovation plays an 
important role as an exogenous factor, but in a wider perspective innovation 
is after all a factor which can be eliminated by substitution. As far as the 
economic area is concerned, only important is the mechanism of passive 
adaptation to the noneconomic factors, and this mechanism is indicated by
the function H  which is the compound of F and G.
On the other hand, the consequences of economic development will
affect the noneconomic area, which can be shown as
N  =  J(E)
In .Marxian terms this function would indicate a theory of the super-
StmCtThe functions H  and J with the variables E and N  form a grand 
general equilibrium which covers the economic and noneconomic areas. 
Schumpeter did not analyze these functions in detail or comprehensively; 
the factors (l)-(5), which he mentioned in Capitalism and can be interpreted 
as an analysis of the functions H  and / ,  are not necessarily inclusive. Rather 
it is important with respect to his analysis that these functions are of a 
historical nature and do not have theoretical reversibility.
The essence of the historical scenario in Schumpeters view on the 
future of capitalism is an approach to the “ socio-cultural development” as a 
whole, i.e. what might be called the interdependent interpretation of his­
tory which takes the place of the economic interpretation of history, lhe 
economic mechanism of capitalism is in itself a good-working machinery 
but those who manipulate it are not abstract economic men but are placed 10
10 Schumpeter distinguishes four techniques of economic analysis: history statistics, theory 
and economic sociology. While economic theory deals with the behavior of people and its 
effects, “economic sociology deals with the question how they Lpeople] came to behave as they 
do” (S c h u m p e t e r , 1954, p. 21). In other words, in economic theory actions, motives and 
properties are given under given social institutions; economic sociology is concerned with the 
institutional data of economic theory.
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in a political, social and cultural context. As long as men with such a style of 
life undergo a long-term transformation in the epoch of economic abund­
ance, they will become unfit for handling the machinery of capitalism, and it 
is inevitable for a society to get rid of such an ill-fitting skin.
Methodologically speaking, the coordination between Schumpeter’s 
theory of economic development, on the one hand, and his theory of socio­
cultural development, on the other, can be attained by combining two 
hitherto independent auxiliary hypotheses W' and M' to produce the func­
tions H  and J, which specify the interrelations between the economic and 
noneconomic areas. Symbolically, the coordination can be represented in the 
following figure.
Walras’s ideology is indicated by the “hard core” W, which is surrounded by 
its “protective belt” W', i.e. Schumpeter’s theory of economic development. 
According to his programme of social scientific research, this theory was not 
self-contained. Then, Marx’s ideology is indicated by another “hard core” M, 
which is likewise surrounded by its “protective belt” AT, i.e. Schumpeter’s 
theory of socio-cultural development. These two sets of theories are jointed 
to form a grand equilibrium system of social analysis. The joint system, we 
imagine, is constructed in such a way that the two “belts” are not separate 
but are extended bilaterally, as it were, as “conductive belts” into another 
system. V.
V. Concluding Remarks 
Innovation and Ideologies
The concept of innovation plays such a conspicuous role in Schumpeter 
that the general understanding of his theory is centered around the concept 
of innovation. Indeed innovation is undoubtedly an evident phenomenon 
characterizing the dynamism of capitalism. But attention to this fact does
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not in itself give any uniqueness to Schumpeter 11. We shall see how the 
alleged importance of innovation in Schumpeter’s scientific system recedes 
into the background in comparison with the functions of two ideologies W
For all his apparent emphasis on innovation the framework of Schum­
peter’s system essentially consists of two general metaphysical propositions 
which would paradoxically reduce the substantive importance of innovation. 
The first proposition is that, in spite of the destroying and destabilizing 
effect of innovation, the capitalist system has a remarkable capacity of 
adaptation. The second proposition is that, in spite of growth performance 
of innovation, the capitalist system cannot survive infinitely. These two 
propositions are not basically different from what we have called Walrass 
and Marx’s ideologies respectively, except that they now include the term 
innovation explicitly. In each case of the two propositions it is claimed that 
in spite of the effects of innovation, other forces presented by Walras s and 
Marx’s ideologies will eventually govern the process because after all the 
auxiliary assumptions must be consistent with the basic ideologies. Ihe 
elimination of the innovation variable I in the above equations seems to
mean the same result. . , ,
The flamboyance of Schumpeter’s emphasis on innovation is largely 
due to the sociological description of successful leadership; the economic 
description in his theory of economic development was no more than an 
explanation of phenomena concomitant with innovation by reference to the 
adaptive mechanism of the economy. To use a metaphor, Schumpeter acted 
like a magician performing a conjuring trick, who, in order to distract the 
attention of the audience from the trick, always attracts their attention 
deliberately to spectacular pops and gestures and thereby creates a false
illusion about where the essential process is.
In the following we shall see two characteristic features of ideologies 
in Schumpeter: nonempirical and nonpolitical orientation. Both features are 
in striking contrast to the case of Keynes. We shall also make clear some 
specific consequences of ideologies on Schumpeter’s framework of thought.
Nonempiricistn
What Schumpeter depended on in drawing a vision of the capitalist 1
11 Thus Keynes unreservedly accepted Schumpeter’s explanation of economic fluctuations 
in terms of entrepreneurial innovation (Keynes, 1930, voi. 2, pp. 85-86). Keynes implied that 
such a fact is a matter of course; that it would be no creditable theory merely to attribute the 
dynamism of capitalism to the fluctuations in the marginal efficiency of capital, to use Keynes’s 
terminology.
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economy as a prescientific act were the ideas of two predecessors, Walras 
and Marx. This is deeply connected with his view of science: he emphasized 
that the development of science creates, beyond ostensible discontinuity, a 
unified picture through “an incessant struggle with creations of our own and 
our predecessors’ minds” (1954, p. 4). Various scientific efforts are tried to 
search for some fundamental views, which would eventually be found and 
recur to scientific minds in the long run in the history of ideas. This is 
Schumpeter’s notion of “filiation of scientific ideas”.
He regards as given data not only the object of science but also the 
tool of science, which, once established as an objective existence and thus as 
a part of social environments surrounding scientists, would not simply be 
neglected. With a belief in the continuity of great ideas Schumpeter himself 
showed an example of the inheritance of preconceptions or visions about the 
economic process from Walras and Marx.
This way of acquiring a preconception is different from the case of 
Keynes, who entertained a vision from observation of actual facts and broke 
away from the traditional view. That is to say, Keynes’s vision started from 
incompatibilities in the actual economy with the traditional view. He came 
to the perspective that capitalism, if left alone, could not escape from 
difficulties. As Schumpeter said, this vision of the inherent instability of 
capitalism was in common with Marx’s and different from Schumpeter’s in 
that the economic machinery of capitalism is diagnosed as suffering from 
inherent defects.
In general, the classical economists viewed reality with the preconcep­
tion of the inherent stability of capitalism, as Schumpeter did with Walras’s 
ideology. In order to contend the self-destruction of capitalism consistently 
on the basis of a belief in its inherent stability, Schumpeter recast Marx’s 
theory, as we have seen, so that he could deduce the decline of capitalism 
through the unfavorable impacts of noneconomic factors, not through the 
malfunctions of the capitalistic economic machinery.
The idea of the self-destruction of capitalism in Schumpeter did not 
originate in the observation of empirical facts such as the Great Depression; 
it was inferred as a logical consequence of successful capitalistic develop­
ment. The argument developed in Capitalism concerning the decay of capital­
ism and the march to socialism goes back to his earlier writings such as Die 
Krise des Steuer staats (1918) and “Sozialistische Möglichkeiten von heute” 
(1920). The crisis of the tax state means a breakdown of a big government 
in the capitalist economic system. Schumpeter wrote about the future of the 
tax state, or of the mixed economy, to use the current usage:
If the will of the people demands higher and higher public expenditures, if more 
and more means are used for purposes for which private individuals have not
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produced them if more and more power stands behind this will, and if finally all 
parts of the people are gripped by entirely new ideas about P»vate Property and 
the forms of life -  then the tax state will have run its course and 
to depend on other motive forces for its economy than ^if-mterest. Thi 
and with it the crisis which the tax state could not survive can certainly be 
reached. Without doubt, the tax state can collapse (1918, PP- 31-32, tr. 197 , p.
24).
Furthermore, the 1920 paper on socialism already dealt with most of the 
factors which are mentioned in Capitalism as leading to socialism.
His argument on the decay of capitalism is independent an a^ aref 
ness of economic crisis or a political interest and belongs to the habit ot 
thought taken by the stage theory of development in the German Historical 
School, according to which in this case the stage of sociahsmwould 
hypothesized as the successor of capitalism. His interpretation of the Histori­
cal School, especially of Gustav Schmoller provided a basic method for 
coordinating a theoretical model W' and a historical model M .
Nonpolitical Orientation
Exclusion of normative discussion constitutes Schumpeter s scientific 
work. We shall explore this characteristic with reference to his ideology. 
The important distinctions between Schumpeter and Keynes have also bear­
ing on this respect. In the 1920s and the 1930s both were engaged in the 
studies of economic fluctuations but with different perspectives.
Schumpeter distinguished between economic theory as science and eco­
nomic policy as practice and asserted that “no science thrives... in the 
atmosphere of direct practical aim, and even practical results are but the 
by-products of disinterested work at the problem for the problems sake 
(1933, p. 6). Although economics was born out of discussions of practica 
issues the progress of economics as science was made possible by an escape 
from politics and ethics. Schumpeter was convinced of such a view of 
science from his extensive studies in the history of economics.
When Keynes’s General Theory was published, Schumpeter did not 
seem to understand correctly its theoretical points, but he had a keen nose 
for distinguishing a political orientation in Keynes’s theory. In his review of 
the General Theory Schumpeter regarded Keynes’s attempt as offering, in 12
12 In this respect S c h u m p e t e r ’s long article on Schmoller (1926b) is important, but it is 
not possible to discuss it here.
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the garb of general scientific truth, policy recommendations which carry 
meaning only with reference to the practical exigencies of the unique histori­
cal situation, and stated:
This sublimates practical issues into scientific ones, divides economists... accord­
ing to lines of political preference, produces popular successes at the moment, and 
reactions after -  witness the fate of Ricardian economics -  neither of which have 
anything to do with science (1936, pp. 791-792).
This appraisal anticipated the immediate triumph of the Keynesian econom­
ics and the controversy between the Keynesians and the Non-Keynesians in 
our time.
It is a mistake, however, that Schumpeter was not interested in policy 
issues. He warned economists against indulging in hasty policy discussions 
without a fundamental understanding of situations; he did not deny at all 
applying science to recommendations. He even said that “I am speaking of 
science which is technique that turns out the results which, together with 
value judgments or preferences, produce recommendations, either individual 
ones or systems of them” (1949, p. 349). He thought that science, as can be 
seen in natural science, should be neutral technique which must be applied 
to whatever objective man may choose. But as we have argued, science is 
affected by ideology at a prescientific stage; ideology does not appear first at 
a stage of application of science, but exists already before scientific activity 
starts, and determines the direction and pattern of science. Keynes’s case is a 
typical example that a policy orientation has essentially affected the ways of 
model building. As Schumpeter himself expected, however, in the stage of 
scientific cognition ideology should be eliminated by the tests of factual 
observation and logical analysis, although this is an open question in the 
philosophy of science.
Schumpeter criticized Keynes on two major points. The first criticism 
is against Keynes’s aggregate method. As we have seen, an economic system, 
according to Schumpeter’s preconception, can only be analyzed in terms of 
general interdependence. From this point of view Keynes s method is consid­
ered as picking up some variables which are directly relevant to practical 
problems and freezing all others for the sake of simplicity; thus it estab­
lishes simple macro relations among selected variables to get the conclu­
sions which are desired 13.
In Schumpeter’s interpretation Keynes’s vision was that although in­
vestment opportunity declines, saving habits persist so that capitalism will
13 Schumpeter called this method the “Ricardian Vice” and stressed the similarity between 
the aims and methods of Keynes and Ricardo (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 473).
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fall into functional disorder. In order to develop this vision theoretical y 
Keynes constructed a model by means of three schedules: the consumption 
function, the efficiency-of-capital function, and the liquidity-preference func­
tion Schumpeter admired the skill of Keynes: “what a cordon bleu to make 
such a sauce out of such scanty material!” (1951b, p. 281). But this was 
clearly a touch of irony. His skepticism of macro economic analysis was 
consistent, and he stated about the saving-investment relation that “the 
saving-investment mechanism, as such, does not produce anything that 
could qualify for the role of an explanation of crises or depressions” (1939,
vol. 1, p. 78). .
His second criticism is concerned with Keynes’s short-term analysis.
While Keynes dealt with some aggregate variables, freezing all other factors, 
what was most intolerable to Schumpeter was Keynes’s assumption that 
methods of production and the quantity and quality of capital equipment are 
not allowed to change. In Keynes’s theory “all the phenomena incident to the 
creation and change in this [industrial] apparatus, that is to say, the phenome­
na that dominate the capitalist process, are thus excluded from considera­
tion” (1951b, p. 283; italics original).
For Schumpeter himself the waves of boom and depression are natural 
in the capitalist economy like the beats of the heart or the ebb and flow of 
the tide, and it'is silly to let oneself affected by temporary economic fluctua­
tions without realizing the mechanism of capitalist development at work. 
Unemployment is essentially a temporary phenomenon which characterizes 
the period of adaptation subsequent to the prosperity phase. Whereas 
Keynes took this phenomenon seriously and made the vanishing of invest­
ment opportunity a vital point of his argument, his explanation of the 
investment process seemed to Schumpeter entirely unrealistic; Keynes s ex­
planation that the lack of inducement to invest will produce unemployment 
had no greater practical importance to Schumpeter than a statement that 
“motor cars cannot run in absence of fuel” (1936, p. 794).
Schumpeter’s criticism does not mean that aggregate and short-term 
analysis is in itself defective or meaningless. Schumpeter admits that, as far 
as Keynes’s vision is given, his theory is ingeniously and adequately devised: 
“they [Keynes’s conceptual arrangements] fit his purpose as a well-tailored 
coat fits the customer’s body” (1951b, p. 287). It is to this extent that 
Schumpeter praised Keynes as a brilliant economist.
It is thus clear that Schumpeter’s objection to Keynes was based on his 
own ideology. But the fact that Keynes does not start from Schumpeterian 
or Walrasian ideology cannot lead to the conclusion that Keynes s theory 
suffers from errors, in so far as it is constructed in accordance with scientific 
procedures. In opposition to Keynes’s aggregate and short-term analysis,
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Schumpeter himself adopts a general equilibrium approach with a long-term 
perspective. Schumpeter’s analysis of “ social culture” as a whole is, as it 
were, an enlarged version of the general equilibrium analysis. The strength 
and weakness of Schumpeter lies in the work emphasizing the interdepend­
ence of all relevant factors. Walrasian general equilibrium of an economy 
and total socio-cultural development of a society are, for Schumpeter, equal­
ly the products of the same mind. H is analysis of capitalism in the enlarged 
perspective is so extensive as to include policies and ideals as endogenous 
variables. In this framework it is logically not possible to derive practica 
recommendations because all elements in it are endogenously determined. 
This is the logical reason why Schumpeter averted from policy recommenda­
tions. The aversion to policy orientation now stems not so much from his 
own inclinations as from his model which works by itself independently o 
an initial ideology.
The usual procedure in a policy model is to select the policy or action 
variables as exogenous to the model in question: for example, Keynes’s 
money supply and M arx’s revolution are exogenous variables in this sense. 
On the contrary, in Schumpeter’s comprehensive model of socio-cultural 
development a society is viewed as moving by its own momentum. H is 
model has provided a unique framework for finding the logic of things in 
the total or socio-cultural development of capitalism, i.e. a framework or 
analyzing the coordination between economy and civilization (social system, 
style of life, system of values, etc.) of capitalism.
Beside its perspective of general interdependence another feature o 
Schumpeter’s model is its long-term perspective; this is also a corollary of 
his ideology that in the long run the capitalist economy is stable. However, 
verification or falsification of a theory of socio-cultural development is not 
easy because under his long-term perspective “a century is a ‘short run” 
(1950, p. 163). Therefore, one cannot always expect that the underlying 
ideology will become extinct in the capacity of ideology as far as a long-term 
theory is concerned. It follows that when Schumpeter in the name of science 
criticized Keynes for his practical orientation and specifically for his aggre­
gate and short-term analysis, he himself was not free from the ideologica 
bias underlying his own general equilibrium approach with a long-term 
perspective. H is criticism of Keynes cannot be understood apart from his
ideology. . c
As to the scientific contribution of Schumpeter, his framework ot 
analysis is more important than his conclusions reached with regard to the 
future of capitalism. Whether or not we agree with Schumpeter’s ideologies 
W  and M , we can take seriously his analytical framework consisting of W  
and M ', because he has provided us with a framework of thought to cope
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with the grand problem of interaction between economy and civilization. 
Schumpeter’s ideology must be appraised not in itself but as a prescientific 
act for producing such a framework.
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SCIENZA E IDEOLOGIA IN SCHUMPETER
Nei suoi studi di metodologia e di storia dell’economia Schumpeter sottoli­
nea il posto dell’ideologia nella conoscenza scientifica. La sua impostazione intro-
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duce la sociologia della scienza nella filosofia della scienza e anticipa l’impostazio­
ne post-positivistica e in particolare la concezione di Lakatos. , .
I concetti di Lakatos di « hard core » e di « protective beh » sono utilizzabili 
al fine di comprendere la natura di scienza e ideologia nel sistema di pensiero 1 
Schumpeter che intende occuparsi dello sviluppo socio-culturale del capitalismo
Schumpeter ebbe una duplice radice ideologica con un conflitto interno: 
l’ideologia walrasiana (ossia il convincimento della fondamentale stabilita e 
capitalismo) e l’ideologia marxista (ossia la fede nella autodistruzione del sistem 
capitalista). La sua teoria dello sviluppo economico può essere interpretata qua e 
« protective bell » attorno alla teoria statica walrasiana che si afferma quale sua 
ideologia nella forma di « hard core ». Malgrado la sua insistenza sullo sviluppo 
economico e l’innovazione, egli non nega mai la teoria statica; al contrario 1 
concetto statico di equilibrio gli permette di venire a capo degli effetti disordinati 
dell’innovazione. Proprio perché Schumpeter credeva nella stabilita sostanziale e 
nella capacità di aggiustamento dell’economia capitalista egli fu ln 
trattare il fenomeno dinamico che consiste nella distruzione dell equilibrio esisten­
te Egli però non riuscì a elaborare un modello utilizzabile di sviluppo economico, 
in parte perché si limitò a descrivere gli effetti dell’innovazione e in parte pere e 
era troppo ambizioso circa gli obiettivi della dinamica economica.
La?  teoria dello sviluppo economico di Schumpeter copre soltanto una meta 
del suo mondo. L ’altra metà, ossia il mondo dello sviluppo storico socio-cultura e, 
si basa sopra la visione generale di Marx sulla evoluzione endogena immanente 
della società. Schumpeter non accettò mai sostanzialmente 1 analisi di Marx, eg i 
accettò soltanto l’ideologia marxista della evoluzione endogena autodistruttiva del 
capitalismo. La teoria schumpeteriana dello sviluppo socio-culturale rappresenta 
una « protective beh » attorno alla ideologia marxista come altro « hard core »
del sistema schumpeteriano. • - „„„
In questo più largo modello di sviluppo capitalistico 1 innovazione e ora
soiesata endogenamente in termini di fattori non economici un modello che 
incidentalmente pone rimedio ai difetti propri del modello di sviluppo che si
limita ai fattori puramente economici.
Così come appare nella Entwicklung la teoria dello svi u p p o  economico non
è autonoma e completa nei termini del programma scientifico di ™ ^ £  
dell’autore; si tratta piuttosto di una costruzione a mezza strada tra 
statica del Wesen e la teoria della stona economica dei Business Cycles
L ’apparente contraddizione, tra le ideologie marxiana da un lato e walrasiana 
dall’altro viene risolta all’interno di un più grande equilibrio generale tra larea 
economica e l’area non economica. Questa superiore concezione traduce il contri­
buto scientifico di Schumpeter alla comprensione della interazione tra economa e 
civilizzazione. La sua ideologia, in se stessa nonempmca e nonpolitica, deve 
essere valutata, non tanto in se stessa, ma quale atto prescientifico capace 
generare quella concezione.
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SCHUMPETER ON WALRAS, MARSHALL, AND BEYOND
by
G e o r g e  R. F e i w e l  *
Abstract
Schumpeter’s different and, to a considerable extent, diverging apprecia­
tions of Walras on one side and Marshall on the other do illustrate how an 
economist of grand vision and multifaceted interests, as he was, was prepared 
to attach an extraordinary weight to the ’engine of economic analysis’ and to 
advances in the mathematization of economics. May be he was too ready to 
admire in others what he himself had not.
Schumpeter extolled Walras as the greatest of all economic theorists 
and his theory of general economic equilibrium as his claim to immortality 
and the Magna Carta of scientific economics. While praising Marshall’s 
achievements, Schumpeter denigrated him as a pure economic theorist. As is 
well known, Schumpeter viewed progress in economics essentially as 
improvements in the analytical apparatus (a view particularly stressed 
nowadays by Lucas). Indeed, the following passage, alluding to Marshall, 
is revealing of Schumpeter’s (1954, p. 954) stance:
The truth that economic theory is nothing but an engine of analysis was 
little understood all along, and the theorists themselves, then as now, obscured it 
by dilettantic excursions into the realm of practical questions.
His attitude, of course, prompts us to ask two more basic questions: 
namely Schumpeter’s frame of reference and the legacy that he left for 
contemporary economics. In this paper the vast territory can be traversed 
only selectively and more questions will be asked than we can answer.
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn. (U.S.A.).
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Basically, I shall concentrate on what Schumpeter thought of Walras and 
Marshall, why he thought that way, and how his thinking has influenced the
economics of our age.
1. Schumpeter on Walras and Some Subsequent Evaluations
As mentioned, Schumpeter placed Walras at the apex of the totem pole 
of theoretical economists. It is for his static general theory of the economic 
universe and particularly for his mathematical approach and his comprehen­
sive equations of general equilibrium that Schumpeter accorded Walras this 
place. Schumpeter (1955, p. 74) praised W a lr a s ’s single-mindedness m his 
devotion of all his concentration to the problems of pure economics, without 
any deviation, so that the unity of the whole picture remains intact. It seems 
that Schumpeter (1955, p. 75) was particularly attracted to Walras s method, 
his manner of looking at things, rather than the vision of general economic 
equilibrium. He (1954, p. 1004) points explicitly to Walras s awareness o 
the need to establish every point in his analytical construct by formal proof 
(whatever the success or defects of his proofs) which made him the teac e 
of all theorists of the future”.
Schumpeter (1954, p. 827) sees economics as a large vehicle whose 
passangers^are^ endowed with incommensurate abilities and interests:
However, so far as pure theory is concerned, Walras is in my opinion the 
greatest of all economists. His system of economic equilibrium uniting, as it 
does the quality of ‘revolutionary’ creativeness with the quality of classic synt: -
sis ’is the only work by an economist that will stand comparison with the 
achievements of theoretical physics. Compared with it, most of the thcoretira 
writings of [the 1870-1914 period] ... -  and beyond -  however valuable 
themselves and however original subjectively, look like boats beside a kner hke 
inadequate attempts to catch some particular aspects of Walrasian truth It is die 
outstanding landmark on the road that economics travels toward the status of a 
rigorous or exact science and, though outmoded by now, still stands at the bac 
of much of the best theoretical work of our time.
The fundamental grasp of the pervading mutual interdependence of all 
economic phenomena (prices and quantities) and the investigation of how 
things hang together had its predecessors, but Schumpeter (1954 p. 242) 
credits Walras with its complete discovery. He describes the Walrasian 
“system of equations, defining (static) equilibrium in a system of interdepend­
ent quantities... [as] the Magna Carta of economic theory -  the technical
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imperfections of that monument of constitutional law being an essential part 
of the analogy”. In a sense Schumpeter (Ibid.) perceives the history of 
economic analysis as divided into two periods: the pre-scientific (or pre-Wal­
rasian) and the scientific (or post-Walrasian). He points out that the history 
of economic analysis or at least of its “pure kernel” could be conceived of as 
a gradual emergence into the light of consciousness.
Schumpeter (1954, p. 968) correctly recognized that the Walrasian 
system “brought in a host of new problems of a specifically logical or 
mathematical nature that are much more delicate and go much deeper than 
Walras... had ever realized. Mainly they turn upon determinateness, equilib­
rium, and stability” .
Without anticipating here the modern developments, it should be 
noted that Schumpeter (1954, p. 1006) considered it unjust and meaning­
less to object to Walras’s work on the grounds that “Walras... believed that 
this existence question is answered as soon as we counted ‘equations’ and 
‘unknowns’ and have found that they are equal in number”. One can only 
applaud Schumpeter’s extraordinary generosity to the pioneer, particularly 
in view of some modern economists denigration of their predecessors and 
mentors on the grounds of lack of sophistication of their mathematics. Thus 
Schumpeter (Ibid.) argues that, though Walras’s mathematical equipment 
was obviously deficient, he sensed almost all the relevant problems and 
almost always achieved the appropriate answers. “If he failed to answer all 
questions satisfactorily, there was immortal merit in his having posited 
them. If his work is not the culmination of this type of analysis, it certainly 
is its foundation”.
Furthermore Schumpeter (1954, p. 1007) asks the pertinent question 
whether modern economists cannot do better than Walras. Referring to the 
work done in the 1930s and 1940s (by Wald and the Vienna group), 
Schumpeter recognizes that, though more rigorous statements of the condi­
tions on which the existence and the like of the theoretical solutions were 
provided, nevertheless “Walras’ analysis emerges substantially unimpaired”.
Schumpeter (1954, p. 1008) sees one of the greatest merits of Walras’s 
work in the distinction he drew between the issues of existence and stabili­
ty:
[Walras] treated the problem of stability in a peculiar way, because it posed itself 
to him in connection with what in strict logic is an entirely different problem, 
namely, the problem of the relation between the mathematical solution of his 
equations and the processes of any actual market: first and foremost he was 
anxious to show that the people in the market, though evidently not solving any
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equations, do by a different method the same thing that the theorist does by 
solving equations; or, to put it differently, that the ‘empirical’ method used m 
perfectly competitive markets and the ‘theoretical’ or ‘scientific method of the 
observer tend to produce the same equilibrium configuration. Posing this problem 
then naturally puts the question of stability into the foreground, that is, the 
question how the mechanism of competitive markets drives the system toward
equilibrium and keeps it there. , •
Since it is clear from the outset that the markets of real life never do attain 
equilibrium, this question can only be posed for markets that are still nothing but 
highly abstract creations of the observer’s mind.
At this point one can only allude to the two modern streams of general 
equilibrium analysis; one concerned with the problems of stability and the 
laws of working of the general equilibrium system (primarily associated 
with Hicks and Samuelson) and the other concerned with existence and the 
like (primarily associated with Arrow, Debreu, and McKenzie). (Cfr. Arrow,
1984; Arrow and Hahn, 1971). <<u
Though he grants that W alras left us an unfinished product -  a huge 
research program” -  Schumpeter (1954, p. 1026) is prompt to stress that ‘ it 
still is, owing to its intellectual quality, the basis of practically all the best
work of our own time” . , ,. c
Schumpeter (1954, p. 1015) grants the potential students discomfort
with the descrepancies between W alras’s construct and real life processes, 
but, drawing his analogy from physics, Schumpeter asks “whether he ever 
saw  elastic strings that do not increase in length when pulled or frictionless 
movements, or any other of the constructs commonly used in theoretical 
physics; and whether, on the strength of this, he believes theoretical physics 
to be useless” . In the same breath, however, he (Ibid.) stresses that it 
remains true that both W alras himself and his followers greatly underesti­
mated what had and has still to be done before W alras’ theory can be 
confronted with the facts of common business experience . Here Schumpe­
ter (Ibid.) draws an all too obvious parallel between W alras and Marshall: 
“We can learn from Marshall how to put flesh and skin on Walras skeleton 
although it does remain true that a more realistic theory raises a world of 
new problems that are beyond W alras’ (and also M arshalls) range (Cf.
Marshall, 1920; W alras, 1954). f
Schumpeter extolled W alras’s “brilliant” development of the theory of 
competitive exchange of two commodities and posed the question of an 
alternative mechanism of reaction than that considered by W alras. He 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1012) correctly emphasized the deficiency of Wal­
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ras’s approach to production theory, and his imposition of “heroic” assump­
tions to reduce the problem of production to manageability.
We may balk at the assumptions. We may question the value of a theory that 
holds only under conditions, the mere statement of which seems to amount to 
refuting it. But if we do accept these qualifications and assumptions, there is little 
fault to be found with Walras’ solution.
Schumpeter adds:
Those who, like myself, do not go so far, must rate the pioneer performance as 
such very highly and see a merit precisely in the fact that Walras chalked out the 
work that had (in part still has) to be done in the future.
It is noteworthy that Schumpeter (1954, p. 1006-1007) emphasized 
the strictly static structure of Walras’s theory and pointed out that
Walras treated only a problem in the pure logic of simultaneous determination 
of variables, and therefore neglected, e.g., all lags of any kind, the explanatory 
value of this part of his argument does not go beyond clearing up one of the 
many aspects that even pure theory must attend to.
Walras’s scheme of instantaneously equilibrating markets and free com­
petition is of great interest not only for its own sake, but also because it 
sheds light on some recent developments in general equilibrium theory and 
in equilibrium business cycle theory. Schumpeter (1954, p. 1002) clearly 
realized that Walras’s static logical skeleton of economic life is a highly 
artificial methodological fiction. Walras attempted to construct an equilib­
rium state from its inception, in such a manner as “if smooth and instanta­
neous adaptation of all existing goods and processes, to the conditions 
obtaining at the moment, were feasible”.
It is of some interest to point out that with considerable prescience of 
recent developments in macroeconomics, Schumpeter (1954, p. 999) strong­
ly, and in my view incorrectly, emphasized “that it is not correct to contrast 
income or macroanalysis of, say, the Keynesian type with the Walrasian 
microanalysis as if the latter were a theory that neglects, and stands in need 
of being supplemented by, income and macroanalysis”.
Walras’s interpretation of pure competition includes the parametric 
function of prices (excludes price strategy) and Jevons’s Law of Indiffer­
ence. With his profound insights into how our economy works, and a cany 
anticipation of later controversies about efficacy of adjustment and learning
768 GEORGE R. FEIW EL
processes, operation of markets, competition, rationality of agents, future 
markets, and the like, Schumpeter (1954, p. 973) observes:
But exclude ‘strategy’ as much as you please, there still remains the fact that this 
adaptation will produce results that differ according to the range of knowledge, 
promptness of decision, and ‘rationality’ of actors, and also according to the 
expectations they entertain about the future course of prices, not to mention the 
further fact that their action is subject to additional restrictions that proceed from 
the situations they have created for themselves by their past decisions.
Though Walras was aware of these difficulties and in certain places (particu­
larly in the concluding part of the Elements — what Jaffe calls Coda) foresaw 
the future need for building dynamic schemata to take them into account, 
his self-appointed task, as Schumpeter (1954, p. 974) points out, was to 
simplify heroically. (Cf. Walker, 1983; Walras, 1954).
Reading Walras and Jaffe’s scholarly commentaries one is under the 
impression of an integral unity of Walras’s analytical structure and social 
vision, commitment to distributive justice, and the like. Walras himself did 
not seem to consider his mathematical approach as his principal mission; 
rather he looked at it as subjugated to his vision of social justice. On the 
other hand, Schumpeter (1954, p. 827-28) deplored the fact that Walras 
attached so much importance “to his questionable philosophies about social 
justice, his land-nationalization scheme, his project of monetary manage­
ment, and other things that have nothing to do with his superb achievement
in pure theory”. ,
Here we can only allude to the Jaffe-Morishima controversy about the 
ultimate aims of Elements, the relation of the latter to the entire corpus of 
Walras’s writings, what the kernel of Elements consists of, and Morishima’s 
contention that Walras’s general equilibrium construct was founded on a 
four-class view of society and Jaffe’s retort that this is a figment of Morishi­
ma’s imagination, as well as a number of other issues. Only two points can 
be made here: (1) One needs to distinguish between the historian’s interpre­
tations of what Walras actually aimed at or meant (Jaffe’s search) and the 
approach that attempts to extend, amend, and refine Walras’s pioneering 
analytical construct to make it more dynamic and bring it closer to real life 
(Morishima’s quest) (Morishima, 1977). (2) Whatever the truth about Wal­
ras’s four-class conception of society, I would only like to stress that his 
conception of the entrepreneur appears to be emaciated and the diametric 
opposite of that of Schumpeter, J.M . Clark, Frank Knight, and others (see 
Schumpeter, 1954, p. 893).
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2. Schumpeter on Marshall and Some Subsequent Evaluations
Reflecting on the early development of neoclassical economic theory 
(ca. 1870-1914), Schumpeter (1954, p. 952) stressed the questionable pro­
position of fundamental unity:
...numerous differences in details notwithstanding, Jevons, Menger, and Walras 
taught essentially the same doctrine. But Jevons’ and Marshall’s analytic struc­
tures do not, in essence, differ more than the scaffolding differs from the com­
pleted and furnished house, and note XX I in the Appendix to Marshall’s Princi­
ples is conclusive proof of the fundamental sameness of his and Walras’ models.
He (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 953) then asks: why do the structures of 
these dominant figures look so different? Characteristically he attributes the 
differences to the many differences in techniques. As the key difference he 
identifies the use or the failure to use calculus and the system of simultane­
ous equations. He (Ibid., p. 956) notes that both Walras and Marshall had a 
regular mathematical training. But whereas the former had more of it than 
he disclosed, the latter had less than he needed.
Schumpeter (1954, p. 836) spoke of Marshall as “not only a high- 
powered technician, a profoundly learned historian, a sure-footed framer of 
explanatory hypotheses, but above all a great economist. Unlike the techni­
cians of today who, so far as the technique of theory is concerned, are as 
superior to him as he was to A. Smith, he understood the working of the 
capitalist process. In particular, he understood business, business problems, 
and businessmen ... He sensed the intimate organic necessities of economic 
life even more intensively than he formulated them” . But Schumpeter 
(1955, p. 92) did not hold Marshall in high esteem as a theoretical econo­
mist and often spoke of Marshall’s “subjective originality”. In a passage to 
which many of us may object, Schumpeter wrote in 1941 that “ in some 
sense Marshallian economics has passed away already. His vision of the 
economic process, his methods, his results are no longer ours” . Whatever 
the great merits of Marshall’s accomplishments, “what matters is that his 
analytical apparatus is obsolete and that it would be so even if nothing had 
happened to change our political attitudes. If history had stood still and 
nothing except analysis had gone on, the verdict would have to be the 
same”.
Schumpeter (1955, p. 106) deplores the fact that though Marshall 
“grasped the idea of general equilibrium he yet relegated it to the back­
ground, erecting in the foreground the handier house of partial or particu-
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lar analysis” . He (Ibid., p. 99) speculates whether Marshall was fully aware 
of the grave shortcomings of partial equilibrium analysis and how dangerous 
it might be in unwary hands. Still he (Ibid., p. 100) adds, when critically 
evaluating Marshall’s handy tools “we cannot fail to be struck by the realism 
of his theoretical thought. Particular equilibrium analysis brings out the 
practical problems of the individual industry and of the individual firm. It is 
much more, of course, but it is also a scientific basis for business eco­
nomics”. , . . „   ̂ .
Athough the analytic kernel of Marshall’s Principles is essentially static,
as he worked out his theory, he always looked beyond it. As Schumpeter 
(1955, p. 100) points out, Marshall “ inserted dynamic elements whenever 
he could, more often, in fact, than was compatible with the static logic he
nevertheless retained”. _  .
To do justice to the Principles, Schumpeter (1955, p. 94) observes, one
has to look beyond the kernel of the analytic apparatus:
For behind, beyond, and all around that kernel there is an economic sociology of 
nineteenth century English capitalism which rests on historical bases of impres­
sive extent and solidity. Marshall was, in fact, an economic historian of the firs 
rank... And his mastery of historical fact and his analytic habit of mind did not 
dwell in separate compartments but formed so close a union that the live fact 
intrudes into the theorem and the theorem into purely historical observations.
What really restricts Marshall’s creative achievements in pure theory is, 
according to Schumpeter (1954, pp. 836-37) the dichotomy between Mar­
shall’s strictly static theoretical apparatus and his thoughts running in terms 
of evolutionary change -  in terms of an original irreversible historical proc­
ess. In fact,
“Marshall was one of the first economists to realize that economics is an evolution­
ary science... and in particular that the human nature he professed to deal with is 
malleable and changing, a function of changing environments” (Schumpeter,
1955, p. 93).
Schumpeter (1954, p. 985) does not consider most of the leading 
economists of the early neoclassical period as “unquestioning addicts of 
laissez-faire”, nor does he view them as “unconditional eulogists of pure 
competition”. He (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 104-105) contends that Marshall 
was the first to show that perfect competition will not always maximize 
output. This, so far as I know the first breach in an ancient wall, yielded the 
proposition that output might be increased beyond the competitive maxi­
SCHUMPETER ON WALRAS, MARSHALL, AND BEYOND 771
mum by restricting industries subject to decreasing, and expanding indus­
tries subject to increasing returns”.
Schumpeter (Ibid. p. 105) questionably considers Marshall to be the 
father of the theory of imperfect competition. He also notes that the Mar­
shallian concept of elasticity of demand may not quite merit all the praise 
that has been heaped on it. And he emphasizes the Marshallian principle of 
substitution as the chief purely theoretical difference between Marshall’s 
and Walras’s constructs.
At this point we cannot go into Schumpeter’s evaluation of the particu­
lar tools that Marshall used or his achievements. Of course, Keynes, Stigler, 
Friedman, Joan Robinson, Beach, Jensen, Lucas, and Whitaker differ sharp­
ly from Schumpeter in their evaluations of Marshall. (Cf. Friedman, 1955; 
Morishima, 1977; Samuelson, 1966; Walker, 1983).
3 .Contemporary General Equilibrium Theory (g.e.t.)
Here we can only briefly trace the influence of Schumpeter’s views on 
the development of contemporary economics. As is well known, his most 
famous student, Samuelson, has had a strong impact on modern economics. 
Here let us simply note that Samuelson (1966, pp. 1501-2) seems to share, 
albeit with reservations, Schumpeter’s evaluation of Walras as “the greatest 
economist of all times”. Similarly Samuelson perceives Walrasian general 
equilibrium as the peak of neoclassical economics and believes that Marshall 
delayed its understanding. He views Marshall as the most overrated econo­
mist, who was so afraid of being unrealistic that he ended up fuzzy, con­
fused, and confusing. He claims that Marshall’s ambiguities paralized the 
best economic brains on both sides of the Atlantic for decades. His conten­
tion that the problem of modern economics is to exorcize the Marshallian 
incubus has hardly endeared him to those who claim that it is all in Mar­
shall. I have argued elsewhere that Samuelson himself is not free of the 
“Marshallian incubus”. In fact, some of the younger generation economists, 
for whom g.e.t. is the only game in town, have criticized Samuelson for 
being too Marshallian. However, the mixture of Walras and Marshall, 
which manifests itself in varied configurations in time and subjects, and not 
always as compatible elements, provides one clue to the thinking of this 
great eclectic.
In the last three decades or so Walrasian g.e.t. has almost completely 
conquered the bastion of mainstream economic theorizing and many applied 
fields. Here the highly influential Arrow-Debreu model successive develop-
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merits stand out. Marshall wisely said that any short statement in economics 
is wrong with the exception of this one. With this in mind, but compelled 
by space limitations, the following attempts to convey the essence of mod­
ern g.e.t. and to briefly point to some unresolved problems, leaving the 
exploration of opposing views to another occasion.
G.e.t. clarifies, inter alia, the extent to which a social disposition of 
resources can be attained in a highly decentralized economy by a multiplicity 
of independent decisions (each agent pursuing only private values) coordi­
nated and rendered mutually consistent through the market process. As 
Arrow and Hahn point out in their standard treatise (1971, p. 1) General 
Competitive Analysis, whatever the origin of the concept of equilibrium, “the 
notion that a social system moved by independent actions in pursuit of 
different values is consistent with a final coherent state of balance, and one 
in which the outcomes may be quite different from those intended by the 
agents, is surely the most important intellectual contribution that economic 
thought has made to the general understanding of social processes”.
And, it may be added, that no matter what its shortcomings, g.e.t. is a 
major analytical feat in rigorously modelling the interaction of economic 
agents. Indeed, many of us respect and appreciate the quite surprising 
nature of this result and the elegant means by which it is proved. It estab­
lishes the astonishing claim that it is logically possible to describe an 
economy in which millions of agents, motivated only by self-interest and 
responding to a no more comprehensive information system than prices, can 
nevertheless achieve a coherent economic disposition of resources. The 
claim is really astonishing for intuitively one would expect that the multiplic­
ity of uncoordinated self-seeking actions would lead to chaos.
It was a major contribution of Arrow, Debreu, McKenzie, and others 
not only to demonstrate that a coherent and orderly economic allocation can 
be theoretically achieved and to specify precisely what conditions must be 
satisfied to reach this result, but also to show that the outcome has the 
added property of being Pareto efficient. Indeed, the close relations between 
Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium is the central result both on 
theoretical and policy planes. The equivalence of the two concepts is known 
as two fundamental theorems of welfare economics: (1) Every competitive 
equilibrium is Pareto efficient. (2) For every Pareto efficient allocation there 
is a redistribution of endowments such that the given Pareto efficient alloca­
tion is a competitive equilibrium for the new endowment distribution. The 
first theorem does not imply that such a state is optimal. On the other hand, 
the second implies that the questions of distributional judgments can be 
separated from efficiency considerations. If a decentralized market solution
SCHUMPETER ON WALRAS, MARSHALL, AND BEYOND 773
is adopted and alteration of existing distribution is desired, the analysis 
implies that the modification proceeds by varying the initial distribution of 
endowments and then allowing the market to function unhampered — thus, 
not interfering with the market process.
Naturally, the two theorems are valid only if certain crucial and highly 
exacting hypotheses are met, such as completeness of all intertemporal and 
contingent relevant markets (including those for externalities) and absence 
of significant economies of scale in production. In the real world these 
hypotheses are frequently invalidated. The issue in point, however, is that 
by elucidating the required set of conditions, the theory not only shows us 
what the world would have to be like for the results to be achieved, but it 
also allows us to focus on the absence of these conditions in the real world 
and to attempt to take remedial steps. The theory clarifies the potentials and 
limits of economic analysis.
In terms of some of the questions that it tries to answer, g.e.t. is highly 
manipulable and flexible. However, when confronted with such problems as 
historical development, evolution, and fluctuations it is dramatically at a 
standstill. Indeed many g.e.t. theorists recognize the major unresolved prob­
lems which they face. Namely, the relations between microeconomics and 
macroeconomics, the failures to incorporate imperfect competition, and the 
failures to account for costs of transactions (essential to the theory of money 
and asset holding generally). Moreover, the integration of the demand and 
supply of money with g.e.t. remains incomplete despite attempts beginning 
with Walras himself. And g.e.t. has been criticized for ignoring other argu­
ments in the utility function, power, status, social approval, or what not that 
also motivate individuals as well as for ignoring some constraints, capacity 
for calculation, and political controls.
One of the important questions is whether g.e.t. theorists, while cor­
rectly emphasizing the benefits of efficient resource allocation, have neg­
lected the innovative and entrepreneurial spirit and conditions conducive 
to dynamic efficiency which are the real driving forces of the capitalist 
economy.
Another essential stream of criticism is concerned with g.e.t.’s reliance 
on the interactive behavior of rational agents. But rationality is only one of 
the many facets of human behavior and no monistic theory can be expected 
to yield reliable predictions. Indeed, the crucial problem is that we do not 
yet know how to combine “rational” sciences like g.e.t with “non-rational” 
sciences like psychology and sociology to arrive at accurate predictions.
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4. frame of Reference
Schumpeter belonged to a select group of economists of grand vision 
and multifaceted interests. He had a great appreciation not only for econom­
ic analysis, but also for economic history, econometrics, and social econom­
ics. His own contributions range through many areas of the vast territory. 
Yet it is puzzling that he attached such an extraordinary weight to the 
“engine of economic analysis” and to advances in mathematization of eco­
nomics when his own comparative advantages lay elsewhere. This puzzle 
might well be the key to the answer, but my conjectures on this subject are 
merely preliminary. Schumpeter clearly admired in others what he himself 
was not. To some extent Samuelson, that astute observer, supports this 
contention (Samuelson, 1981, pp. 1-2). Moreover, Schumpeter’s admiration 
for mathematical economics may also have been somewhat influenced by 
Samuelson’s early work on Foundations which at the time was obviously 
dazzling in its technical sophistication.
While Schumpeter once observed that most creations of intellect or 
fancy fade away after a time that varies in interval between an after-dinner 
hour and a generation, his reputation in the profession seems to be on the 
rise. Yet he did not achieve the “creatively destructive” impact on the 
dynamics of economics to which he probably aspired. There is a story that 
Schumpeter used to tell that is very revealing of his aspirations: It is about 
his three wishes in life -  to be the greatest economist in the world, the 
greatest lover, and the greatest equestrian -  and his disappointment in 
failing to fulfill the last wish. I recall a statement issued by the Harvard 
economics department upon Schumpeter’s death. It recognized him as one 
of the four or five great economists of the century (privately some members 
considered it an exaggeration). Whatever the final verdict, his place in the 
history of economic thought (and I use the latter term advisedly, rather than 
analysis) is ensured and the important question is why his influence appears 
to have been smaller than deserved.
We ask more questions than we can answer.
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SCHUMPETER SU WALRAS, MARSHALL E OLTRE
Schumpeter appartenne al ristretto gruppo di economisti di ampia visione e 
di interessi molto diversificati. La sua stima e il suo continuo apprezzamento per 
il sistema walrasiano possono essere messi a confronto col suo atteggiamento più 
misurato nei confronti di Marshall, del quale egli loda le realizzazioni, pur non 
attribuendogli collocazione troppo elevata quale teorico puro.
Il fatto che Schumpeter sia stato uomo di grande cultura (in campo economi­
co ma anche storico e sociologico, ad esempio) rende un poco sorprendente la 
centralità che egli assegna al suo famoso concetto di analisi economica e l’impor­
tanza che egli sembra attribuire ai progressi matematici nella scienza economica. È 
chiaro che con ogni probabilità Schumpeter obbediva alla legge psicologica che 
induce ad ammirare incondizionatamente negli altri, specie nei giovani, quel che 
noi stessi non abbiamo. Qualche recente osservazione di Paul Samuelson pare 
confermare questa tesi. Si noti che le inclinazioni di Schumpeter nella direzione 
qui accennata possono ben avere tratto incoraggiamento e nuovo alimento dal 
lavoro giovanile dello stesso Samuelson sulle Foundations.
L ’influenza di Schumpeter in economia non è stata adeguata alla sua statura 
intellettuale e questo saggio intende mostrare con numerosi esempi la profondità 
di molte delle osservazioni dello Schumpeter autore della History e delle celebri 
biografie scientifiche (Ten Great Economists).
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ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE CAUSES OF 
IRREGULAR ECONOMY
Some preliminary questions for an East-West comparison * 
by
B r u n o  D a l l a g o  *
Abstract
The irregular economy is a composite phenomenon which is o f growing 
concern in both capitalistic-type and Soviet-type economies. Five main com­
ponents of the irregular economy are singled out in the paper on the basis of 
three criteria. The five components are present within each economic system, 
but in a different assortment and with different specific features.
Among possible causes of the irregular economy, the paper discusses those 
linked to the economic system, which, in the last analysis, are the most 
important. In a capitalistic-type economy, the root cause of the irregular 
economy is the attempt to directly and indirectly diminish production costs or 
consumption prices and to increase demand for the firm ’s own production. In a 
Soviet-type economy, it is shortage which stimulates the development of an 
irregular economy, both for enterprises and households.
In recent years a growing interest and concern in the existence and 
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nature of the irregular economy has characterized economic, political, and 
sociological research in the West and the East. Two factors have led to the 
“discovery” of an irregular economy in Western countries: the realization 
that the standard of living has been improving during the past decade 
despite a declining economic growth rate; and the existence of a wide area 
of tax evasion which has caused major difficulties to fiscal policies. In 
Soviet-type economies, the irregular economy has been acknowledged due to 
economic difficulties of the seventies and the realization that the regular 
economic system has been too rigid to overcome them.
Research and analysis was initiated in both groups of countries during 
the past decade, with some time-lag, because official admission of the exist­
ence of an irregular economy in socialist countries came later; and research 
is still largely incomplete '. Moreover, research has centered either on indivi­
dual countries or on a single economic system, with no serious attempt to 
compare the two systems. Since there exists, here, a typical example of 
different systems giving rise to apparently similar phenomena, comparative 
analysis can be most fruitful in the examination of both the characteristics 
and working of economic systems in general, and of the irregular economy 
in particular.
In this paper, a comparative approach has been adopted to examine the 
reasons for the existence of the irregular economy, having to do with the 
prominent features of the two economic systems: the capitalistic-type 
economic system predominant in Western countries, and the Soviet-type 
economic system prevalent in Eastern European countries. Other aspects 
will be considered only marginally. 1
1. Regular and Irregular Economy
Each economic system is characterized by a set of economic, social, and 
political relations, which are in part settled through a code of law. These 
relations stem from an historical development in which the majority of 
people operate within economic institutions and organizations characterized 
by and working according to these relations. The most important are: owner­
ship, market and plan (resource allocation mechanisms), decision-making, 
and government relations. Various obligations for the participants are im­
plied in exchange for direct and indirect advantages.
Both regular and irregular economies operate within the same socio-eco-
1 For a survey of major research cf. G rossman (1977); Pommerehne and Frey (1981); 
Tanzi (1982); Witte (1986).
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nomic environment. They, therefore, interact with each other; the same 
people often have both a consumer and/or producer relationship with both; 
they compete for the same buyers, etc. At the same time, the regular econo­
my is by far more important, both in its dimensions and relationship with 
society and societal institutions. For this reason, it can be asserted -  all the 
more so if we leave aside the traditional sector — that the fundamental 
causes for the existence and development of an irregular economy are strict­
ly connected with the nature of the regular economy. The irregular econo­
my, in turn, exerts an often remarkable influence on the regular economy.
By irregular economy, is meant the deliberate attempt to avoid or 
evade established relations and their implied consequences. Avoidance and 
evasion may be illegal and the relative activities, “underground”, or may be 
simply unofficial; may assume a direct monetary character, or violate regula­
tions and have only indirect monetary consequences. As a consequence, the 
irregular economy exists only within the modern, non-traditional sector of 
the economy. Accordingly, therefore, the “traditional” informal economy, 
which includes domestic activities and self-consumption in the traditional 
agrarian sector, is not part of the irregular economy.
These traditional activities, in fact, are due merely to the survival of 
traditional socio-economic relations, i.e. to the fact that generalized market 
or plan relations do not exist. Here, producers act in an informal way, not 
because they want to avoid entering into such relations, but because they 
have no options other than the direct consumption or exchange of products. 
The same applies to both the supply of goods and services within a tradi­
tional society as well as to domestic activity (including “do-it-yourself”
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activities). With this, of course, the existence and importance of a relation­
ship between irregular and informal economy is not denied.
The general classification of an economy here adopted is sketched in 
Fig. 1.
2. An Outline of the Capitalistic and Soviet-type Economic Systems
There are three main points particularly relevant to the comparison of 
economic systems. The first is the organization of the economy. By this is 
meant ownership relations of the means of production, institutions and units 
in charge of the direction of the economy (economic policy and planning, as 
well as administrative direction), and finally, the role and characteristics of 
individual enterprises. As differences between the systems in this field are 
well known, the subject will not be dwelt on. The other two points concern, 
first, the way demand and supply arise and regulate each other (i.e., re­
source-allocation), and, second, the way resources are normally utilized. 
Actually, these two points are just different sides of the same coin and 
together form what can be defined as production relations.
The formation of supply and demand and their mutual relationship 
depend mainly upon the sensitivity of enterprises to costs and to other 
regulating factors, both monetary and real (physical) in character. Basically, 
this can be expressed through the concept of a budget constraint2 *5which 
strictly reflects the overall organization of the economy.
In the private sector of a capitalistic economy, the fundamental unit is 
the (oligopolistic) private enterprise, which depends for its survival largely 
upon its economic performance. Economic policy is basically of functional, 
typically monetary character J. As a consequence, the demand exerted by 
private enterprise depends primarily on its financial means; i.e. its budget 
constraint is (almost) hard. As a result, the normal situation in the private 
sector is characterized by limited demand; and resource utilization within
2 The “budget constraint” is an ex ante category that denotes a behavioral regularity of an
economic unit: household, enterprise, institution. It denotes, therefore, all those rules that jointly 
restrict the behavior of the economic unit. Depending on how effective these rules are, there exists
a “hard” or a “soft” budget constraint or one of many possible combinations of these two pure 
cases. Cf. Kornai (1980a and 1980b).
5 By functional direction I mean that functional organs and policies prevail in the direction of 
the economy. Functional organs exert a particular function (e.g. management of labor, taxes, 
prices, credit, etc.) over the entire economy. The main goal here is a balanced situation for the 
function of which they are in charge.
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enterprises is taut. However, for this very reason, a capitalistic economy 
generally operates with idle resources at a macroeconomic level.
In Soviet-type economies, on the other hand, a situation prevails in 
which enterprises have an (almost) soft budget constraint. In fact, the enter­
prise is not independent but is basically a section of the state budget. It is 
not important for the enterprise to obtain an economically positive result 
with given means, but to gather as many resources as possible in order to 
implement a specified target. As a result, there is general pressure on de­
mand at a microeconomic level. The prevailing sectoral direction 4 of the 
economy reinforces this tendency and, above all, is responsible for the 
diffusion of excess demand to a macroeconomic level. The traditional So­
viet-type economy is consequently characterized by a situation of generalized 
shortage, especially of investment goods and manpower. The normal situa­
tion of the economy is, therefore, one of limited resources-, that is, resource 
utilization is taut at a microeconomic level, even if — or precisely because — 
within enterprises, there exist idle resources (e.g. the well-known phenome­
non of “unemployment behind doors”).
3. Irregular Economy: A Classification
A third basic point is the working out of a viable classification scheme 
for inter-system comparison. To this end, three different criteria have been 
adopted. The first is the criterion of production, i.e. the way in which 
irregular activity takes place. Irregular activity may consist in actual produc­
tion that increases national income without the possibility of registration in 
national accounts, or may appear in national accounts in the form of produc­
tion costs, higher than real costs. Alternatively, irregular activity may consist 
in an irregular exchange of goods and services or income redistribution. 
With regard to social components of the irregular economy, either the whole 
or part of the production unit may be irregular. For instance, only a fraction 
of the workers are irregularly employed, or part of the legal production 
hidden in order to avoid taxes 5.
The second criterion, the criterion of exchange and distribution, refers 
to the manner of exchange of irregularly produced goods and services within 4*
4 When a sectoral direction prevails, sectoral organs (in particular the various industrial 
ministries) bear the main responsibility for the direction of the economy. Their chief goal is to 
increase resources for their sector as much as possible.
For an interesting survey of the definitions and components of the irregular economy cf 
Wiles (1986).
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the overall economy (regular +  irregular). It refers also to the way in which 
income redistribution takes place. Accordingly, we have irregular production 
that remains within the irregular economy, irregular production that enters 
the regular economy, as well as regular production that enters the irregular 
economy. Income redistribution may take place in the same way.
The third criterion, the criterion of legality, regards the relationship 
between the irregular economy and (regular) social, political, and economic 
institutions. Accordingly, irregular production, exchange, and redistribution 
may be legal (but unofficial) or illegal.
By utilizing these three criteria, four major groups of irregular activi­
ties can be isolated. The inclusion of many activities in one group or another 
depends largely on the point of view adopted. This classification is not the 
only one possible, but it seems the best suited for a comparative approach. 
Figure 2 summarizes the taxonomy adopted.
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Here, the first component of the underground economy will not be 
dealt with, i.e. the production of illegal goods and services such as drugs, 
prostitution, illegal gambling, etc. As regards these activities, the situation is 
quite similar in both systems, since their illegality generally comes from 
traditional, political, social, and moral motivations; and any connection with 
the economic system is rather weak.
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The four groups here considered are:
a. Irregular or illegal production of goods and services supplied also by 
the regular sector. This forms a part of the underground economy. Goods 
and services in this category are perfectly legal and are usually produced in 
the regular economy. They are part of the irregular economy because of the 
way they are obtained: generally the producing enterprise is underground; 
i.e. either it does not exist officially or part of its production is officially 
unknown. This is usually the case when operation of a certain type of 
enterprise is prohibited by law (private enterprises in Eastern Europe, in 
particular). Here the form of production conflicts with the economic system 
itself.
Activities such as these may take place independent of the regular 
economy or may be parasitic to it, working with productive facilities of 
state-owned or co-operative enterprises and with material inputs and stolen 
labor. The goods produced may be sold and utilized completely under­
ground or may represent an essential input to the regular economy. Ad­
ditionally, they may be exchanged for money or in kind 6.
From a strictly economic point of view, this production generally re­
presents a net contribution to the national income. Yet since it is obtained 
by utilizing the regular economy’s manpower as well as its productive assets, 
raw materials and work time, regular economic costs are artificially raised. 
In any case, tax evasion occurs.
b. Irregular or illegal utilization of legal productive factors. This re­
presents the first of three components of the unofficial economy. In contrast 
to the underground economy, neither the economic units nor their activity is 
hidden. Irregular economic units operate openly; irregularity derives from 
the fact that either production factors or their origin is irregular; otherwise, 
there may be an irregular redistribution of income or exchange of goods and 
services, regular from any other point of view.
This second group comprises those unofficial activities, the most rele­
vant consequence being an increase in production of goods and services. 
Activities in this group do not harm — at least directly — other activities in 
the regular economy. Sometimes — as in the case of unofficial activities 
which serve the achievement of official goals, widespread in the East though 
known also in the West -  they directly improve the situation of the regular
° For a remarkable analysis of the irregular economy in the Soviet Union, cf. Grossman 
(1977). Cf. also Mars and Altman (1984) for Soviet Georgia and Gabor and Galasi (1981) for 
Hungary.
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activity involved; but they worsen the overall situation and working of the 
economy. In other cases, they increase the supply of inputs to the economy.
Examples of the former case are the employment of illegal aliens, 
moonlighting, and the employment of the officially inactive or unemployed. 
Involved here are tax evasion and unrequired government expenditures (e.g. 
undue unemployment benefits). Capital obtained from criminal or other 
illegal activities and invested in the regular economy serves as another 
example. A prime promoter of this investment activity is the Mafia. Final 
consequences of this group of unofficial activities are not completely clear.
When methods like those of the Mafia are involved in legal economic 
activity, the result may be either a higher final price of goods and services or 
a higher personal or corporate income with lower costs. Most often, a 
combination of these is found. When workers are controlled by Mafia 
methods, they have to work for lower than normal wages and are not 
allowed to strike. Such is the case when a legal activity of a Mafia enterprise 
(e.g. transportation) is illegally imposed upon another enterprise . Utiliza­
tion of illegal aliens decreases wage costs directly, and also indirectly, by 
increasing competition among workers. It has, as a further consequence, the 
evasion of taxes and social contributions7 8.
In some cases, there may be a net increase in the supply of goods and 
services to the economy with no additional cost to other activities. An 
example is the unofficial renting or subletting of rooms and apartments. 
Here, only tax evasion is involved.
c. Avoidance and evasion of costs resulting in irregular income redistri­
bution. This category includes avoidance and evasion of taxes and social 
contributions. The goods and services produced may be perfectly legal. They 
become part of the irregular economy because the derived net income is 
undeclared or underestimated in order to reduce payments to the gov­
ernment. This may be directly achieved simply by hiding an activity. Two 
indirect methods of evading taxes and social contributions are particularly 
prevalent, namely artificially increased expenses and enrollment of workers 
in a category different from their actual one, leading to lower social contribu­
tions by the enterprises 9. Due to decreased production costs, enterprises
7 O n  the economic consequences of the Mafia in Southern Italy, cf. A r l a c c h i (1983).
8 On the phenomenon of illegal aliens in the United States, cf. N o r t h  and H o u st o u n  
(1976); W e in t r a u b  and Ross (1982).
9 This is, for instance, the case of Italy, owing to the wide gap between contributions paid by 
employees and the enterprises to which they belong, on the one hand, and autonomous workers on 
the other.
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obtain higher profits; and less efficient enterprises are able to survive com­
petition from more efficient and law-abiding firms.
In any case, this group of irregular activities directly impairs official 
institutions, mainly by decreasing payments to the government. Activities in 
this group may, however, increase national income when — thanks to tax 
evasion or negligence of contribution — such production survives that would 
ordinarily be pushed out of the market by foreign competition (or firms of 
the most developed region of the country, in case of relevant regional 
dualism). Another way to avoid taxes is the exchange of goods and services 
directly in kind (barter). In some countries, the U.S.A. in particular, specia­
lized enterprises exist for putting sellers and buyers in contact with one 
another 10 1.
This case also applies internationally where enterprises or financial 
institutions operating in one or more countries choose as their legal seat 
another country where taxes are lower and regulation looser. The same 
applies to ship transportation and ship registration. Relevant to capitalistic 
economies, this practice is virtually non-existent in Soviet-type economies.
d. Irregular income distribution and exchange of goods and services. 
The main component here is bribery for the sake of circumventing competi­
tion or other constraints like shortage, which enterprises and individuals 
must normally confront. The productive or exchange activity in question is, 
in general, perfectly legal. The end result of bribery is that legal income, (a 
good or a service) is obtained at a production cost (a price) higher than were 
it obtained with completely legal means (economies of scale not involved). 
The difference corresponds approximately to the amount of the bribe paid. 
Instead of a sum of money, there may be an exchange in kind. In this case, 
the activities may be less efficient, owing to the absence of competition 11.
Other important components are: work performed elsewhere during 
the official working time (absenteeism), speculation on goods and services 
in shortage for private and personal gain, the black market, industrial espio­
nage, and the stealing and pilfering of goods and services from the regular 
economy.
In any case, such activities cause expenses to the regular economy 
which have no relation to the economy’s regular activity. Thus, costs appear 
higher, and personal incomes lower than they actually are. This phenome­
non is present in both economic systems, though presumably with differing
10 Cf. P o e  (1981).
11 On this, cf. R o s e -Ac k e r m a n n  (1978) as well as M o n t ia s  and R o s e -Ac k e r m a n n  (1981). 
On the role of bribery in the Soviet Union, cf. S im is  (1982).
786 BRUNO DALLAGO
intensity: industrial espionage among enterprises is probably most prevalent 
in capitalistic economies; while black market, stealing and pilfering are 
more prevalent -  at least in peace time -  in Soviet-type economies 12.
4. Motivations of the Irregular Economy and Personal Incomes
Causes of irregular economy can be divided into subjective and system­
ic causes. By subjective causes we mean those factors which directly 
motivate individuals to participate in the irregular economy; by systemic 
causes, those factors which create an environment permitting and/or foster­
ing the development and operation of an irregular economy.
The fundamental subjective cause of irregular economy in both systems 
is that the present and future consumption of individuals, their role in the 
society, the possibilities offered to their families and finally their own psy­
chological satisfaction depend largely upon earned income. These monetary 
as well as non-monetary compensations constitute a powerful incentive to 
increase that income through means available. In both systems, the irregular 
economy offers such an opportunity.
Subjective causes vary, however, according to the characteristics of the 
economic system. The income incentive is usually stronger in a capitalistic 
society, because the household’s possibilities depend in larger part upon 
direct earnings. This lends a strong incentive to the seeking of irregular 
income. In a Soviet-type economy, on the other hand, the wider role of 
government and social policy decrease the role of personal and household 
income in determining levels of consumption. Moreover, the possibilities for 
spending one’s income on goods and services are traditionally more re­
stricted.
It is to be noted that the Soviet-type economy is a shortage economy. 
This means there exist wider opportunities for the operation of an irregular 
economy. It also means that the developmet of an irregular sector is needed 
in order that the regular sector function effectively, i.e. for an acceptable 
supply of inputs, goods and services to both the socialized sector and con­
sumers. There exists, therefore, a “suction” effect that becomes a powerful 
direct incentive to the development of an irregular economy and that empha­
sizes an increase in goods and services rather than income.
The connection of irregular economy to family income and corporate
12 For a well-documented analysis of this phenomenon in the United States, cf. S im o n  and 
W i t t e  (1982). Cf. also M a r s  (1982). The basic source for the Soviet Union is G r o ssm a n  (1977). 
For Hungary cf. G a bo r  and G a l a si  (1981).
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profit deserves mention. In a capitalistic society, a higher corporate profit is 
often a strong direct motivation for the development of an irregular econo­
my. It encourages the cutting of costs (evasion of social security payments, 
lower wages, tax evasion) and the artificial rising of prices and/or demand 
(corruption). As a result, profits may be higher or inefficient firms permitted 
to survive. This indirectly exerts a positive effect on personal income: 
higher incomes for managers and owners, and an income, however modest, 
for employed workers. In cases such as stealing on the job, it is personal 
income which is directly affected.
In a Soviet-type economy, irregular economic activity directly affects 
personal income and is strongly tied to the achievement of planned targets. 
Given the shortage economy, enterprises generally have many problems 
meeting their planned targets because of lack of spare parts, raw material, 
labor, etc. Thanks to the irregular economy, they often are able to solve 
their problems. Personal incomes are, thereby, increased, in particular those 
of managers, insofar as they are linked to the enterprise’s achievements.
5. Economic System and the Development of the Irregular Economy
Differences between the two systems find expression not so much in 
their quantitative as in their structural aspects. The influence of the specific 
features of each economic system on the irregular economy is twofold: first, 
they permit or foster the development and functioning of the irregular 
economy; second, they determine its structure. In the following discussion, 
the most typical components of both economic systems shall be considered: 
namely, private enterprises and households in the capitalistic-type economic 
system and state enterprises and households in the Soviet-type economic 
system.
The subjective causes discussed in the previous section can be seen as 
the supply side of the irregular economy: they stimulate and determine the 
supply of labor (including managerial activity) and capital to the irre g u la r  
economy. In contrast, system causes (that is, the specific features of the 
economic system) can be seen as the demand side of the irregular economy.
For enterprises in a capitalistic economy, which face an (almost) hard 
budget constraint, the fundamental aims are profit and growth (generally 
closely connected). This is especially true of large, oligopolistic enterprises. 
As for small enterprises, their first concern is often survival. Naturally, there 
are many which fall between these two extremes. The relatively important 
role of government in the economy somewhat softens the budget constraint
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of enterprises. At the same time, it enlarges the role of corruption as a 
means to increase demand and thereby expand the enterprise and its profita­
bility. In some cases, corruption serves to increase the rate of profit through 
a price increase. Even in this case, however, the firm must rely largely on its 
own performance.
It can be seen that the existence of the irregular economy is fundament­
al to the performance of the economy. It makes possible cost reduction 
(through evasion of taxes and social contributions, employment of illegal 
aliens, moonlighting, and an increased flexibility in the utilization of labor). 
It increases demand (but not aggregate demand) through corruption. It 
makes possible monopolistic positions through the use of Mafia-like meth­
ods. And, finally, it weakens trade unions by dividing workers, making 
their income strictly dependent upon their performance in a situation where 
trade unions, as a rule, are not permitted. Consequently, the economic 
situation of certain enterprises improves along with the income and power 
of managers and owners and perhaps, also, with the overall income and 
employment of workers.
Notwithstanding the importance of the irregular economy to the opera­
tion of the regular economy, there exist fundamental negative effects as 
well. The workers’ social situation probably weakens. The overall condition 
of government deteriorates: tax evasion and withholding of contributions 
decrease governmental income; while pilfering and, above all, corruption 
tend to increase its costs. The increase in costs occurs through increased 
prices of utilized goods and services. The difference between government 
receipts and expenditures widens and can become a major problem. In 
recent years, irregular economic activity has clearly become an important 
cause of the state fiscal crisis in many countries. Last but not least, irregular 
competition by certain enterprises (through the utilization of Mafia-like 
means, in particular) may worsen the situation of regular enterprises.
As for enterprises in a Soviet-type economy, the main reason for partici­
pation in the irregular economy is undoubtedly the general shortage typical 
of these economies both at a macro and microeconomic level. However, 
Soviet-type economies are also characterized by an accumulation of idle 
resources within firms. The reason for this is the shortage, itself, plus soft 
budget constraint: enterprises try to obtain as many resources as possible in 
order to prevent bottlenecks in production. While hoarding resources, they 
hardly need be concerned by cost considerations. This tendency to accumu­
late idle resources within enterprises further exacerbates the shortage of 
other resources. Such hoarding forms the basis for a widespread irregular 
exchange of goods among enterprises. Each enterprise manages to obtain
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the resources it needs but is usually unable to find, paying with its idle 
resources.
There are also cases of irregular productive activities within regular 
enterprises, that take place with the use of idle labor and other resources. 
Resulting products may be given to other regular enterprises in exchange for 
needed inputs. In this case, there is a reallocation of resources and produc­
tive activity differing from that scheduled by the economic plan. The worst 
effects of shortage in the productive sector are hereby partially alleviated. 
Idle resources can also be used for speculative purposes, however. Such is 
the case when workers of a state firm are sent by its manager to build his or 
her private house, or when production in excess of the plan target (made 
possibile by hoarded resources) is sold on the irregular (“black”, “gray”, etc.) 
market 13. In this case, costs and production waste in the regular economy 
appear higher than they actually are while efficiency appears lower. 
However, such irregular activities may have harmful consequences on regu­
lar production (lower efficiency, lower quality), because enterprises concen­
trate efforts on the irregular activity.
Overall, two different types of irregular activity in the enterprise sector 
of a Soviet-type economy can be distinguished. One is for personal gain, 
mainly by managers, at the expense of public resources. This is made possi­
ble by the power position of the manager in a situation of general shortage. 
The other irregular activity is imposed directly by shortage, its goal being 
the functioning of an enterprise (and, hence, of the productive system) in 
spite of the sjhortage. Of the two, the latter is by far more important.
The situation of households is partly similar, partly different in the two 
systems. In both cases, the budget constraint of households is hard: they 
must rely upon income for consumption. As a consumer unit, the household 
in both systems has a strong incentive to use lower-priced, higher-quality 
goods and services offered by the irregular economy. The result is an in­
crease in the household’s welfare. In a Soviet-type economy, this incentive is 
stronger. Owing to the general shortage, the irregular economy is often the 
only (or main) supplier of certain goods and services. For this reason, prices 
may be even higher than those in the regular economy, though this is often 
compensated for by higher quality. In a capitalistic society, on the other 
hand, where a wider variety of consumer goods and services is generally 
available, purchase of irregular goods and services at a lower price permits 
the purchase of a greater quantity of goods.
Due to the lack of information and analysis, it becomes very difficult 
to determine which economic system offers the stronger motivation for
On the various types of markets existing in the Soviet-type economies, cf. Katsenelin- 
BOIGEN (1977).
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purchase of irregular goods and services. Different causes are, nonetheless, 
well-defined: in a capitalistic economy, it is mainly the difference in prices 
between regular and irregular sectors of the economy; in a Soviet-type 
economy, the chief cause of this type of purchase is shortage.
As regards households as a supplier of irregular inputs (especially la­
bor), the two systems present both similarities and differences. The common 
denominator is undoubtedly the possibility of earning a higher income. In a 
capitalistic economy, participation in the irregular economy is often a substi­
tute for absence of a job in the regular economy and the irregular income 
compensates for this lack. Moreover, participation in the irregular economy 
may be a second job. In a Soviet-type economy, on the other hand, irregular 
activity is generally a complement to the regular activity, as are derived 
incomes. However, in the case of marginal workers (retired workers, house­
wives, students), the irregular activity may be the only economically-re- 
warded activity. In this case, it can be supposed that workers are willing to 
offer labor only in the irregular economy, where they can gain higher wages. 
In both systems, the irregular labor supply can actually be a substitute for 
the regular one, as in the case of absenteeism where workers are absent 
from their official jobs in order to take part in irregular work, while increas­
ing their incomes.
In a capitalistic economy, unemployment is a strong direct incentive 
for the supply of labor to the irregular economy: the irregular activity 
becomes a substitute for lack of opportunity in the regular labor market. 
Here can be ascribed the phenomenon of foreigners taking part in the 
irregular economy, mainly as illegal aliens. The overall result to households 
in both systems is the fuller utilization of the available labor force and a 
higher level of consumption. However, in capitalistic-type economies, an 
irregular labor supply also increases employment; while in Soviet-type econ­
omies, the over-utilization of labor (moonlighting) is the most evident 
consequence. In both systems, the reallocation of labor, from the regular 
economy to the irregular one (absenteeism), prevails. 6
6. The Structure of the Irregular Economy
The specific features of the economic system determine the predomi­
nant forms of the irregular economy, i.e. its structure. In a capitalistic 
economy, irregular activity consists, above all, in undeclared legal production 
(evasion or avoidance of costs) at diminishing costs while giving more 
flexibility to the economy. Aside from moonlighting production of legal
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goods and services in irregular ways only attains a modest scale. In a 
capitalistic country, in fact, there are very few goods and services the produc­
tion of which is forbidden to private firms, as when a monopoly is legally 
granted to a particular private or state enterprise (e.g. spirits, cigarettes, 
mass transportation of goods and services, certain forms of communication).
The main form of corruption is bribery of public officials by private 
enterprises in order to increase demand for production (to gain contracts in 
the public sector), to decrease costs (exemption from payments and other 
duties and regulations), to increase prices and to be allotted public contribu­
tions. Corruption in various forms is also present in international trade. 
Other forms of bribery may involve personal gain (e.g. in order to get a job, 
mainly in the state sector); these take on a similar form in both systems. 
Owing mainly to the relatively smaller dimensions of the public sector and 
to the absence of shortage, however, this form of bribery seems to be 
relatively less important in capitalistic countries.
In Soviet-type economies, the main components of the irregular econo­
my are: irregular production of goods and services both by state-owned and 
private underground enterprises and persons, and corruption (in particular, 
bribery of government officials to provide enterprises with supplementary 
inputs; that is, to obtain a reallocation of resources). Irregular economy is, 
therefore, a means to relieve the shortage of resources at a microeconomic 
level. Shortage also fosters corruption for private gain and in particular, for 
obtaining consumer goods and services in shortage. Another important form 
of bribery of public officials is carried out by underground private enter­
prises that, through bribery, are able to diminish risks associated with their 
irregular situation.
Evasion of taxes and social contributions, in contrast, is virtually non­
existent — with the exception of the private sector — not only because of a 
stronger central control over enterprises and the fact that almost every 
worker is a state worker, but also because of the soft budget constraint 
facing enterprises. Consequently, taxes and contributions are not real costs 
for the enterprises. The very opposite practice may arise: wages, salaries and 
bonuses may be artificially increased — both per capita and in the aggregate 
— and then kept in a secret fund by the enterprise (e.g. through the well- 
known method of the “dead souls”) 14. This fund is then used to buy 
much-needed resource from other enterprises.
14 On this, cf. Simis (1982).
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7. Some Conclusions
In the foregoing sections, a tentative approach has been taken towards 
describing the relationship between the economic system and its irregular 
economy by concentrating upon the underlying causes of irregular economic 
activity. It can be seen that this relationship is highly intricate, even from a 
limited perspective. Moreover, features of the economic system, alone, can­
not account for every aspect of the irregular economy. Certain components 
of the irregular economy, such as illegal activities, have not been considered 
nor have political factors, such as increasing distrust in government. Cultu­
ral and political differences among countries belonging to the same basic 
economic system and differences in the level of economic development 
have, likewise, been excluded from discussion. Despite all this, the central 
focus on the causal relationship between the fundamental features of an 
economic system and its irregular economy allows for some tentative con­
clusions.
Given a common substratum of each economic system — i.e. an institu­
tional framework and organization of economic activity similar to all coun­
tries belonging to the same economic system — certain constants can be 
found that point to intersystem differences. Underneath apparently similar 
phenomena in the two systems lie different causes of irregular economy as 
well as a different internal structure. As a result, the consequences and role 
of the irregular economy within the overall (regular and irregular) economy 
are also different. Obviously, the economic policy for the irregular economy 
would have to be different in the two systems, varying according to the 
various components of the irregular economy. These are issues, however, 
that lie outside the scope of this paper. Considered here will be only the 
enterprise sector, where the difference between the two systems is particular­
ly relevant.
As a general conclusion, it can be stated that the fundamental determi­
nant of the irregular economy in the enterprise sector of a capitalistic econo­
my is the attempt to diminish costs of an enterprise, and, as a consequence, 
increase corporate profit, power and personal income of managers. Irregular 
economic activity can be used to diminish costs directly: through tax eva­
sion, withholding of social contributions, use of Mafia methods, and em­
ployment of illegal aliens and moonlighters. Irregular economic activity can 
also be used to cut costs indirectly, shifting some production processes to 
small underground firms, increasing flexibility in the utilization of produc­
tion inputs (in particular, of labor), and evading regulation. In this way, the 
position of workers is generally weakened, especially through expelling
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trade unions from firms. The irregular economy may also be useful in 
increasing the demand and market share of enterprises. Vertical integration 
of a regular enterprise with one or more irregular firms can have as an aim, 
mainly in countries less developed from a capitalistic point of view, im­
proved international competitiveness. From this point of view, irregular 
economy resembles capital export to less developed countries by enterprises 
of stronger countries 13. Finally, irregular economic activity can be used to 
increase the demand for goods and services supplied by individual enter­
prises (bribery).
As for workers, there may be an increase in their disposable income as 
well as a rise in employment in firms making use of irregular methods. At a 
macroeconomic level, however, an overall rise in employment as a result of 
the irregular economy is highly unlikely. On the contrary, the most likely 
consequence is a reallocation of labor to the advantage of irregular activities 
and enterprises. A clearly positive effect on employment and on the aggre­
gate production of goods and services -  at least in the short run -  can only 
come from international relations, when the irregular economy permits an 
increase in competitiveness, and when a capital intensive regular activity is 
replaced by a labor-intensive irregular activity. Left open here is the ques­
tion of a general multiplicative effect of the irregular economy: i.e. whether 
the decrease in costs and, maybe, prices and the increase in profits and 
flexibility can give rise to an expanded level of activity in the overall 
economy.
For the firms in a Soviet-type economy, the fundamental motivation for 
irregular activity is shortage. In a situation in which costs do not totally 
form an active economic category, development of the enterprise, income of 
its employees -  particularly of its managers -  and their “quiet” life all 
depend mainly upon the fulfillment of the enterprise plan targets. To fulfil 
plan targets, the enterprise has to stock idle resources in order to exchange 
them for needed resources. This activity forms a fundamental part of the 
irregular economy in Soviet-type societies.
The irregular economy may be seen, therefore, as a lubricant for the 
official economy. The irregular economy increases the supply of goods and 
services, even within the official sector. This increase appears yet more 
substantial if one takes into account the irregular production in underground 
firms, where more intense and efficient labor utilization results in a higher 
labor intensity and productivity in the overall economy. However, the price 
level, too, is likely to be higher than in the regular economy, even if
15 For this interpretation in the case of Italy, cf. Cantelli (1980).
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production costs in the irregular economy are proportionally lower due to 
stolen goods. (However, production costs are increased by the necessity of 
paying bribes). Additionally, higher prices result from shortage. For many — 
if not for gll — goods, demand is, in fact, higher, sometimes much higher, 
than supply. There is, therefore, no problem in selling irregular supplies of 
goods and services, quite aside from the fact that the quality of irregular 
goods and services is generally higher than that of regular ones.
Overall, the irregular economy is simultaneously useful and harmful to 
the overall economy. It is useful insofar as it attenuates shortage and there­
by provides for a better functioning of the economy. It is harmful insofar as 
it contradicts and counteracts the logic of the economic system. The exist­
ence of an irregular economy probably has a negative impact on the regular 
economy’s efficiency, which may increase shortage: costs are directly in­
creased (stolen goods and services) and labor productivity decreased (absen­
teeism). Last but not least, the development of the economic system, itself, 
especially its institutional structure, is hindered.
It is thus possible to understand why the irregular economy, an old 
phenomenon with many new forms, has known a relatively rapid growth 
since the sixties. In capitalistic countries, this decade has seen a rush of 
indirect (social) costs of economic activity. Rapid growth of infrastructure, 
welfare state and higher standard requirements by consumers and other 
social groups, increased strength of trade unions and increased pollution 
have caused a rise in taxes and social contributions and expanded the role of 
trade unions and regulation. The wider economic role of the government 
has promoted the use of bribery as a means of competition among enter­
prises. The irregular economy has, therefore, become a means to: cut indi­
rect and, where possible, direct costs (e.g. wages); constrict the role of 
trade unions; obtain state orders for goods and services; increase the 
competitiveness of small versus large enterprises; and finally, cut regulation, 
thereby increasing the flexibility of the system.
In Soviet-type economies, the expansion of the irregular economy has 
been fostered by the abandonment of highly centralized economic manage­
ment, increasing the autonomy of individual enterprises. A more complex 
economy and increased consumer demand have intensified the economic and 
social impact of shortage, in spite of a detensification in relation to overall 
production. This has fostered expansion of the irregular economy into the 
state sector as well. On the other hand, since the Sixties, growth of the 
private irregular sector has also been encouraged due to increased availabili­
ty of goods and services (e.g. foreign tourism).
Given the foregoing analysis, it is likely that the irregular economy in
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both systems will endure for a long time. Increased research effort is now 
needed to better understand the nature, characteristics, and consequences of 
the irregular economy as well as to formulate an adequate social policy. In 
both cases, the irregular economy presents a somewhat confusing picture. In 
fact, in neither situation can it be considered a unique sector. Differences 
among its components are such that a serious research effort cannot dis­
pense with a separate analysis of major components.
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SISTEMA ECONOMICO E CAUSE DELL’ECONOMIA IRREGOLARE
L’articolo discute le fondamentali cause economiche dell’economia irregolare, 
intesa come il deliberato tentativo di evadere o evitare le conseguenze e gli 
obblighi che derivano dall’operare in un ambiente in cui prevalgono rapporti 
sociali generalizzati, di mercato o di piano. Vengono presi in considerazione i due 
sistemi economici fondamentali al giorno d’oggi, quello di tipo capitalistico e 
quello di tipo sovietico, e viene esaminato il ruolo che hanno le caratteristiche dei 
sistemi economici nel causare l’economia irregolare.
L’economia irregolare viene suddivisa in cinque gruppi sulla base di tre 
criteri, e vengono brevemente discusse le caratteristiche fondamentali e la compo­
sizione specifica dei cinque gruppi.
Le cause dell’economia irregolare sono suddivise in cause soggettive e di 
sistema. Le cause soggettive che spingono ad offrire fattori produttivi nell’econo­
mia irregolare derivano dal fatto che il livello di vita dei singoli dipende dal loro 
reddito personale. L ’economia sommersa permette di accrescere tale reddito e, nel 
caso delle economie di tipo sovietico, permette di aggirare la scarsità di beni e 
servizi che domina sul mercato regolare.
Le cause di sistema derivano invece dalle caratteristiche strutturali dei due 
sistemi economici. Queste hanno due conseguenze: da un lato permettono o 
incentivano lo sviluppo di un’economia irregolare e dall’altro ne determinano la 
struttura. In un’economia di tipo capitalistico è la possibilità di diminuire diretta- 
mente e indirettamente i costi di produzione delle imprese (attraverso l’evasione 
fiscale e contributiva, l’evasione della regulation, la diminuzione del potere dei 
sindacati, l’utilizzazione di fattori di produzione meno costosi come nel caso del 
lavoro a domicilio) o di allargare la quota di mercato (attraverso la corruzione) a 
costituire il più potente fattore di stimolo al ricorso ad attività irregolari da parte 
delle imprese.
Nelle economie di tipo sovietico invece la motivazione fondamentale per le 
imprese è data dalla necessità di evitare o almeno attenuare la scarsità di fattori di 
produzione che caratterizza l’economia regolare. In ambedue i casi è evidente 
come l’economia irregolare sia una caratteristica strutturale del sistema economico, 
destinata quindi a rimanere a lungo.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali
Voi. 33 (1986), N. 8, 797-812
ALCUNI EFFETTI DELL’INTERDIPENDENZA TRA PAESI 
PRODUTTORI DI PETROLIO E PAESI 
INDUSTRIALIZZATI: UN’ANALISI MACRODINAMICA
di
Massimo D i Matteo *  e Maria Laura Ruiz * *
Introduzione
Nell’ultimo decennio abbiamo assistito in rapida successione ad una 
serie di rilevanti aumenti prima e riduzioni poi del prezzo del petrolio; lo 
scopo del lavoro che presentiamo è di analizzare gli effetti di tali mutamenti 
mettendo in evidenza l’interdipendenza esistente tra il gruppo dei paesi 
industrializzati e il gruppo dei paesi produttori di petrolio. In particolare si 
vuole mettere in rilievo che il potere dei paesi petroliferi, come è stato 
evidenziato dalle recenti riduzioni del prezzo del petrolio, è limitato dalle 
possibilità di reazione dei paesi produttori di manufatti.
Verrà presentato un modello dinamico che descrive un sistema econo­
mico in cui il prezzo del petrolio viene determinato endogenamente. Si 
assume per semplicità che in tale sistema si possano distinguere due gruppi
*  Università di Siena, Facoltà di Scienze Economiche, Siena.
* *  Università di Cagliari e Università di Siena.
Gli autori desiderano ringraziare C. Casarosa, F. Casprini, M. De Cecco, F. Filippi, G. 
Gandolfo e A. Montesano per le numerose osservazioni critiche che hanno rivolto a precedenti 
stesure del lavoro.
Inoltre gli autori hanno beneficiato della discussione con i partecipanti al I Convegno 
Scientifico Annuale dell’Associazione Italiana per lo Studio dei Sistemi Economici Comparati, 
tenutosi a Torino il 25-26 Ottobre 1984, e con i partecipanti al Seminario di Ricerca 
Economica della Università di Vienna, tenutosi a Vienna il 17 ottobre 1985, a cui il lavoro è 
stato presentato. La ricerca di cui qui vengono presentati alcuni risultati è stata finanziata con 
fondi 60% del M.P.I..
Sebbene tale lavoro sia frutto di una attività di ricerca comune, la stesura dei paragrafi 1, 
4 è stata curata da M. Di Matteo, mentre la stesura dei paragrafi 2, 3 è stata curata da M. L. 
Ruiz. Introduzione e conclusione sono state redatte congiuntamente dai due autori.
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di paesi: quelli che producono beni manufatti e quelli che producono pe­
trolio.
Il modello presentato è solo un primo passo verso la costruzione di un 
modello più ampio in cui l’economia dei paesi produttori del petrolio sia 
descritta in maggiore dettaglio ed in cui vengano esaminate anche le bilance 
dei pagamenti dei due gruppi di paesi. Abbiamo tralasciato del tutto, nel 
lavoro che qui presentiamo, di considerare le bilance dei pagamenti in 
quanto ci sembra che negli ultimi anni i problemi ad esse relativi abbiano 
occupato un posto preponderante nell’attenzione sia degli economisti che 
dell’opinione pubblica, mentre minore spazio abbiano avuto i problemi relati­
vi all’economia nel suo complesso, cioè all’andamento di occupazione, produ­
zione, prezzi e salari. Speriamo che questa pur importante omissione possa 
essere colmata da un successivo lavoro ancora in preparazione.
Il piano del lavoro è il seguente. Nel primo paragrafo si espongono e 
commentano le equazioni di cui si compone il modello. Nel secondo e terzo 
vengono esaminate la soluzione di equilibrio e le condizioni di stabilità del 
modello.
Vengono poi proposte nel quarto paragrafo alcune estensioni dell’anali­
si riguardanti il ruolo anticiclico della manovra della spesa pubblica.
1. Il modello










Dm =  k +  0 »  + K  + G
k =  p {Kd - K)
Kd =  vS"m
Z II P l Z )
cm = c\ $m 1 •S + G P p +  Co
G =  G
C? = F (Sm, Pp, Pm) dF/dSm >  0,
9F/dPp <  0, dF/dPm >  o
z  = (W /n +  aPp + c) (1 +  ni)1.9.
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1.10. SC — -  gg +  g\ L /N  +  g2 Pm
1.11. L =  (1 /n ) Sm
1.12. Dp =  a Sm
1-13. Sp =  - p Q +  (1/ft) Pp - p 2 Pm
1.14. Dp +  Cp =  Sp
dove tutti i coefficienti sono positivi e dove l’interpretazione dei simboli è la 
seguente (m e p  si riferiscono rispettivamente al bene manufatto ed al 
petrolio) :
G spesa pubblica per m 
fC investimenti netti,
Cm domanda di consumi per m, 
v rapporto capitale prodotto,
Snm livello normale atteso della produzione di m,
Sm livello effettivo della produzione di m,
Pm prezzo del bene manufatto,
Pp prezzo del petrolio, 
m mark-up sui costi totali, 
n produttività media e marginale del lavoro,
W  salario monetario,
a coefficiente di uso industriale del petrolio, 
c costi fissi unitari,
L domanda di lavoro,
N  offerta di lavoro,
Cp domanda di petrolio da parte delle famiglie,
Dp domanda di petrolio da parte delle imprese,
Sp offerta di petrolio,
x dx/dt.
Le variabili endogene sono le seguenti: Dm, Sm, K, Cm P/m, Kd, Snm, Pm, 
Pp, Cp, W, L, S, Dp, Sp.
L ’equazione 1.1. rappresenta la condizione di equilibrio tra domanda e 
offerta aggregata di merci manufatte nei paesi industrializzati. Si assume, 
quindi, che non esistano ritardi nell’aggiustamento tra le due quantità: que­
sta ipotesi, che non è affatto realistica, specie in un modello dinamico, 
tuttavia si giustifica con la necessità di non incrementare l’ordine del sistema 
e di non usare equazioni miste differenziali alle differenze finite.
La 1.2. definisce la domanda aggregata di merci manufatte come com­
posta di consumi, investimenti, spesa pubblica esogena ed esportazioni.
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La funzione degli investimenti netti è modellata (equazioni 1.3. e 1.4.) 
sul principio dell’aggiustamento dello stock di capitale . Si ritiene tuttavia 
che lo stock di capitale desiderato, data l’unica tecnica esistente 1 2, non sia in 
relazione con il livello della domanda corrente, come ipotizzato da coloro ì 
quali per primi hanno introdotto questa formulazione, ma piuttosto con il 
livello della domanda normale. Con questa ultima espressione intendiamo 
un livello di domanda (e di produzione) che si ritiene possa permanere 
abbastanza a lungo nel tempo da far ritenere opportuno un mutamento della 
quantità di capitale a disposizione. Il riferimento ad una quantità normale 
serve per tener conto del fatto che, poiché il mutamento del parco macchine 
è in larga parte una decisione irreversibile, una variazione della domanda 
ritenuta transitoria non genera lo stesso comportamento da parte delle
imprese. . ,
C’è, in altre parole, una asimmetria tra decisioni di produzione e deci­
sioni di investimento: nel primo caso, infatti, la produzione viene istante per 
istante aggiustata alle variazioni della domanda; nel secondo caso, invece, 
solo le variazioni della domanda normale conducono ad un mutamento dello 
stock di capitale. Infatti variazioni transitorie della domanda hanno il loro 
effetto sul grado di utilizzo della capacità produttiva che quindi varia duran­
te il ciclo.
Si assume inoltre, per semplicità, che non vi sia ritardo tra le decisioni 
di investimento e la variazione dello stock di capitale, anche se, come è stato 
sottolineato, questo ritardo non è trascurabile e, anzi, è rilevante per il 
periodo del ciclo economico 3. Il parametro /?, che indica la velocità di 
aggiustamento, dovrebbe essere considerato endogeno ma lo si ipotizza co­
stante per evitare l’introduzione di non linearità nella formulazione del 
modello.
Il processo di formazione delle aspettative sul livello della domanda 
normale è di tipo adattivo. Si ritiene infatti che tale meccanismo rappresenti 
una utile approssimazione al complicato processo di formazione delle aspetta­
tive da parte degli agenti economici. È noto che in questo caso le aspettative 
non sono mai perfettamente realizzate eccetto che in un punto di equilibrio. 
Tuttavia questa situazione, che pure non è soddisfacente, lo sembra più 
dell’altra, cioè di quella in cui il valore atteso e valore effettivo di una 
variabile sono sempre uguali fra di loro ed uguali al valore di equilibrio
1 Cfr. G oodwin (1948, pp. 108-132) ed anche Matthews (1959, Cap. 3, par. 3-4).
2 Si assume che il rapporto v incorpori anche un grado, ritenuto normale, di capacità 
inutilizzata. Si ipotizza inoltre che la capacità produttiva sia sempre sufficiente ad assorbire gli 
aumenti di domanda prima della conseguente variazione dello stock di capitale.
3 Cfr. Kalecki (1966, pp. 3-15) ed anche G oodwin (1946, pp. 95-104).
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dedotto dal modello teorico. Come è noto ciò implica la conoscenza corretta 
della struttura del sistema economico e del valore dei suoi parametri: in un 
modello deterministico l’ipotesi di aspettative razionali sembra implicare la 
antica nozione di previsione perfetta 4.
Nell’equazione 1.6. si ipotizza che la domanda di beni manufatti per il 
consumo dipenda direttamente dal livello del reddito reale in termini del 
bene m, e dal prezzo del petrolio ed inversamente dal prezzo del bene 
manufatto 5, 6.
Nell’equazione 1.7. si ipotizza che la spesa pubblica sia esogena.
Nella 1.8. si assume che la domanda di petrolio da parte delle famiglie 
dipenda dal prezzo del petrolio e dei beni manufatti e dal reddito reale.
Nell’equazione 1.9. è incorporata una regola di formazione del prezzo 
basata sui principio del costo pieno nella formulazione elaborata da Sylos 
Labini7. Le variazioni del prezzo vengono calcolate aggiungendo alle varia­
zioni del costo del lavoro, del petrolio e del costo fisso per unità di prodotto 
un margine di profitto; tale margine, viene considerato costante nell’arco di 
tempo preso in considerazione.
L ’equazione 1.10 è derivata da una curva di Phillips in forma lineare, 
corretta per tener conto delle variazioni del prezzo dei beni manufatti8.
L ’equazione 1.11 indica che la domanda di lavoro non dipende dal 
salario reale ma da un coefficiente tecnico di impiego che è considerato 
costante.
La domanda di petrolio per la produzione di beni manufatti (equazione 
1.12) dipende, tramite il coefficiente di utilizzazione, dalla produzione cor­
rente dei beni stessi.
La 1.13 ipotizza che l’offerta di petrolio dipenda positivamente dal 
prezzo del petrolio e negativamente dal prezzo dei beni manufatti. La relazio­
ne crescente tra l’offerta e il prezzo del petrolio si può giustificare assumen­
do che i paesi produttori di petrolio siano disposti ad aumentare il ritmo di 
estrazione della propria risorsa in un dato periodo per soddisfare la doman­
4 Su cui vedi le illuminanti osservazioni di Morgenstern (1969, pp. 50-77).
5 Si tenga presente che il vincolo di bilancio per l’intera economia è:
Pm =  Pm Cm +  Pm (k  +  G) +  Pp (DP +  Cp).
6 Dalla teoria del consumatore deriva solo che c2 e c5 hanno segno opposto. È anche 
possibile che 3Cm/dPm >  0 e dCm/dPp <  0 ma solo se le importazioni di petrolio sono 
abbastanza grandi rispetto al valore del reddito, cosa che non ci sembra di poter assumere.
7 Cfr. Sylos Labini (1967, pp. 74-93).
8 Vedi Phillips (1958, pp. 283-299), e Lipsey (1960, pp. 1-31).
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da (e, quindi, ad esaurirla in più breve tempo) solo se sono compensati in 
quel periodo da un più alto prezzo .
L ’equazione 1.14 garantisce l’equilibrio tra domanda per uso finale e 
industriale e offerta di petrolio. Si può notare che, poiché la componente Cp, 
sensibile al prezzo, è di gran lunga più piccola della componente Dp, indipen­
dente dal prezzo, la domanda complessiva di petrolio è praticamente rigida; 
pertanto non sono le variazioni di prezzo che portano in equilibrio il merca­
to, ma le variazioni della quantità offerta dai paesi produttori. In effetti si 
potrebbe pensare che con una domanda poco elastica alle variazioni di 
prezzo non ci sia nessun limite alle pretese in termini di prezzo dei paesi 
produttori di petrolio; in realtà vi sono considerazioni di lungo periodo che 
fissano la posizione nel piano della relazione tra Sp e Pp oltre ai costi fissi. In 
particolare un livello troppo alto del prezzo favorirà l’entrata di nuove 
imprese e lo sfruttamento di nuovi giacimenti petroliferi e, quindi, una 
riduzione del potere monopolistico. Inoltre con un prezzo molto alto si 
accelererebbe moltissimo il sia pur lungo e costoso processo di sostituzione 
del petrolio con altre fonti di energia e i paesi produttori di petrolio correreb­
bero il rischio che questo processo fosse completato ben prima dell’esauri­
mento della risorsa da essi posseduta.
Le considerazioni appena fatte ci sembra che siano sufficienti per giusti­
ficare perché all’aumentare della domanda a seguito dell’aumento del livello 
di attività dei paesi industrializzati, i paesi produttori di petrolio aumentino 
il prezzo in misura limitata; per riduzioni della domanda, invece, i paesi 
produttori potrebbero lasciare il prezzo invariato e produrre in modo da 
soddisfare la domanda. Per l’insieme dei paesi produttori questo comporta- 
mento sarebbe certamente più vantaggioso in termini di ricavi, almeno ne 
breve periodo, ma è poco probabile che esso si verifichi in presenza di un 
basso livello della domanda. In altre parole l’unità di comportamento dei 
paesi produttori è facile da ottenersi e da mantenersi durante periodi di 
domanda alta; al contrario, durante i periodi di bassa domanda è probabile, 
ed è in realtà accaduto, che ogni paese adotti una visione particolare, anziché 
generale, e quindi cerchi, abbassando il prezzo, di sottrarre quote di doman­
da agli altri paesi produttori.
Benché il comportamento descritto non sia simmetrico di fronte a 
variazioni della domanda, tuttavia, per semplicità, assumiamo che pl abbia 
un valore costante.
Infine, a parità di tutto il resto, i paesi produttori fissano un prezzo piu 9
9 Nel testo si assume che i costi siano costanti; nella misura in cui un maggior ritmo di 
estrazione comporti costi crescenti, questa affermazione risulta ancora più confermata. Per una 
rassegna della letteratura sui costi nell’industria petrolifera cfr. Roncaglia, (1983, cap. III).
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o meno alto a seconda del livello più o meno alto dei prezzi dei beni 
manufatti nell’acquisto dei quali intendono riversare gran parte dei propri 
redditi.
Siamo consapevoli che la formulazione adottata per la determinazione 
del prezzo del petrolio non è che una delle molte possibili; ci riserviamo, 
successivamente, di esplorare anche altre ipotesi di comportamento 10.
2. Equilibrio di lungo periodo
Il modello presentato nel paragrafo precedente si compone di un bloc­
co di undici equazioni che descrivono in modo completo, ancorché semplifi­
cato, il funzionamento dell’economia dei paesi industrializzati nel loro insie­
me, e di un sottosistema di tre equazioni da cui si ricava il prezzo del 
petrolio.
Nel modello vengono trascurate alcune forme di interazione tra i due 
gruppi di paesi e, quindi, manca una descrizione più dettagliata dell’econo­
mia dei paesi petroliferi poiché si ritiene che eventuali modificazioni del 
livello del reddito e, quindi, delle importazioni di tali paesi, non producano 
modificazioni di entità rilevante sull’economia dei paesi industrializzati nel 
loro complesso.
Le equazioni 1.1-1.7, 1.9-1.4 n, 12 possono essere ridotte ad un sistema 
in quattro equazioni differenziali lineari del primo ordine 13.
10 Per una trattazione della teoria del prezzo delle risorse esauribili, in particolar modo nel 
caso di concorrenza perfetta, vedi Dasgupta-Heal (1979).
11 Nel seguito trascuriamo la domanda di petrolio proveniente dalle famiglie poiché 
consideriamo rilevante una curva di domanda completamente rigida, in quanto, come già detto 
a p. 802, la domanda di petrolio proveniente dalle famiglie è molto piccola rispetto alla 
domanda per usi industriali. Per questo motivo l’equazione 1.8 viene lasciata per il momento da 
parte. Tuttavia l’inclusione di Cp non modificherebbe qualitativamente i risultati dell’analisi in 
quanto farebbe variare solo i coefficienti della funzione del prezzo del petrolio che si può 
ricavare dalla 1.12-1.14.
12 D’ora in avanti assumeremo che le esportazioni di beni manufatti Dim, siano un dato. 
Tale assunzione è motivata dal fatto che il modello descrive il comportamento dell’insieme dei 
paesi industrializzati che producono un’unica merce, manufatti, pertanto la domanda di esporta­
zioni proviene dall’insieme dei paesi non industrializzati ed è una quantità molto piccola 
rispetto al totale del reddito, le cui variazioni possono essere trascutate.
13 II sistema 2.1-2.4 si può ulteriormente ridurre sostituendo la 2.4 nella 2.1 e nella 2.3 ed 
è quest’ultimo sistema che verrà studiato per trovare la soluzione particolare e le condizioni di 
stabilità. Il sistema nella forma 2.1-2.4 viene qui presentato in quanto rende più agevole 
l’interpretazione economica dei risultati.
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2.1 Z  =  [y/( 1 -  CX) ]  \P v Z  -  p k -  c2 Pm +  C} Pp +  C \ ~ yZ
2.2 k  =  P ( v Z  -  K)
2.3 Pm =  [(1 +  /») & /» ]  Z  +  [ d  +  w) N
[pvZ -  P K -  c2 Pm +  c3 Pp +  C] -  (1 +  w) go/n +  
+  (1 +  w) aPp
2.4 Pp =  [>! tf/(l -  Cj)] [ £  -  Pw +  c3 Pp +  C] +
+  Pi Pi Z  +  Pi Po 
dove C =  Z m +  G  +  C0
Le relazioni esistenti in equilibrio tra Z> Z  Z  e Pp si possono rappre­
sentare con le seguenti equazioni14 :
2.5 X  =  & n N/&i
2.6 k  =  v Z
2.7 Pm =  (l/c2) C -  [(1 -  q)A 2] X  +  (<*/<*) Pp
2.8 ^  =  Pi +  Pi P2 +  Pi Ai-
dove ° sta ad indicare per ciascuna variabile la soluzione particolare del 
sistema e, quindi, il valore dell’equilibrio stazionario. Il sistema si può 
ulteriormente semplificare esprimendo Pp e Pm in funzione solo dei pararne- 
tri e di per il momento abbiamo preferito non procedere alla semplifica- 
zione per*sottolineare l’interdipendenza tra i due prezzi di equilibrio; infatti 
si vede immediatamente che il sistema è decomponibile: il primo blocco, 
costituito dalla eq. 2.5, determina X  in funzione solo dei parametri; il 
secondo blocco, la 2.6, determina k  in funzione di \  e dei parametri, infine 
il terzo blocco (la 2.7 e 2.8) determina simultaneamente Pm e Pp in funzione 
delle variabili stesse, di Z  e dei parametri. Infatti nel modello esiste un 
meccanismo di reazione che da Pm va a Pp e viceversa; la soluzione di 
equilibrio ci mostra che tale meccanismo nel lungo periodo non ha nessuna 
influenza sulle quantità di equilibrio ma solo sui prezzi.
Le 2.7 e 2.8 si possono ridurre alle seguenti15.
14 Per la determinazione della soluzione di equilibrio vedi G a n d OLFO (1980, parte II).
15 Dalle 2.9 e 2.10 si ricava che condizioni sufficienti di significatività per Pm e Pp sono 
rispettivamente la 2.I la  e 2.11b.(La nota segue a p. 805).
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2.9 Pm =  [ -  1 /{c2 -  px p2 c} )]
~  C — Ct, pl />0]
2.10 Pp =  [1 /{c2 -  Pi p2 c j )] {c2 p i a \  +  c2 p i po -
Pì P2 [ ( ì - C ì ) ^ - C ] } .
Dall’esame delle 2.5-2.8 si nota che il valore d’equilibrio del prodotto 
normale e, quindi, del prodotto effettivo, è determinato, in presenza di un 
valore costante della produttività del lavoro, dai parametri della curva di 
Phillips; quanto più grande, in valore assoluto, è la componente esogena 
delle variazioni del salario (¿q) rispetto alla componente che dipende dalla 
pressione sul mercato del lavoro (&), tanto più elevato sarà il livello del 
prodotto di lungo periodo.
In equilibrio, poiché gli investimenti sono nulli, il capitale sarà al 
livello desiderato, cioè in rapporto costante con
I valori di equilibrio di Pm e Pp dipendono dai parametri delle 1.6, 
1.12 e 1.13; ci soffermiamo qui solo sulle relazioni esistenti tra i valori di 
equilibrio dei due prezzi e il coefficientep2 16; dalle 2.9-2.10 e dalle condizio­
ni di significatività 2.11 si può vedere che, mentre ambedue i prezzi aumen­
tano all’aumentare d ip2, invece il rapporto Pm/Pp aumenta solo se (1 — cx)
— C è positivo.
Inoltre facciamo notare che Pm e Pp dipendono in modo diretto dal 
valore della domanda autonoma C. Si può mostrare facilmente che variazioni 
di quest’ultima, tramite le variazioni indotte dei prezzi, si riflettono intera­
mente in una variazione di uguale ampiezza e di segno opposto della doman­
da del bene di consumo manufatto.
Sostituendo le 2.5-2.6 e 2.9-2.10 nelle equazioni del modello si posso­
no trovare i valori di equilibrio di tutte le variabili. Ci interessa qui notare 
che il valore d’equilibrio del salario monetario è:
2.14 $7 — [Pm n/(l  +  m)] -  naPp -  nc,
(c2 -  c} Pi p2 >  o 
2 .Ila  <_
(c  >  -  C3 Pi p0 +  (1 -  c, -  c} Pi a) i nm
2n b  j c 2 - c ì P i P 2 >  0
(C  >  -  c2 (p0/p2) +  (1 /p2) [(1 -  t j)  p2 -  Ci a]
Nel seguito assumeremo che tali condizioni siano verificate.
16 Aumentando (diminuendo) il parametro p2 i paesi produttori di petrolio aumentano 
(diminuiscono) il grado di indicizzazione del prezzo del petrolio rispetto al prezzo dei beni 
manufatti.
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che è una funzione inversa del margine e del prezzo del petrolio; la distribu­
zione del reddito viene fissata dal margine m una volta conosciuti i valori 
d’equilibrio dei prezzi e della produzione.
3. Analisi della stabilità
L ’analisi della stabilità del modello ci permette di ricavare condizioni 
necessarie e sufficienti di stabilita. Poiché esse sono di difficile interpretazio­
ne economica, ci limitiamo qui ad esaminare un insieme di condizioni suffi­
cienti che siano plausibili dal punto di vista della teoria economica. Le 
seguenti condizioni garantiscono che il modello presentato sia stabile:
3 .la  0 <  1/(1 -  q  -  c3 pi a) <  (y +  P)/rP v
3 .lb  p2 (1 -  q )  -  c2 a <  0
3 .le  1 >  (1 +  m) g2/n
Per meglio comprendere il significato delle 3.1 diamo nella Fig. 1 una 
rappresentazione grafica semplificata del modello mediante un diagramma a 
blocchi che mette in rilievo la struttura logica delle interrelazioni esistenti 
tra le varie parti dello schema teorico.
Seguiamo ora cosa accade nel sistema economico rappresentato dal 
modello quando si verifichi un aumento della domanda esogena di beni 
manufatti, cioè di C. Poiché si è assunto che variazioni di domanda si 
riflettono istantaneamente in variazioni della produzione, si avrà un aumen­
to della produzione effettiva, ottenuta con un aumento del grado di utilizza­
zione della capacità produttiva al di sopra di quello considerato normale. In 
previsione che almeno una parte dell’aumento di domanda perduri nel tem­
po, le imprese cercheranno di adeguare lo stock di capitale effettuando 
nuovi investimenti. Questo aumento degli investimenti provoca un ulteriore 
aumento della domanda per il bene m e del prodotto. Il processo appena 
descritto è rappresentato nel diagramma dal circuito che va da ÌC a Sm e C s e 
viceversa. Gli aumenti della produzione di manufatti e, quindi, della doman­
da di petrolio per uso industriale, provocano un aumento del prezzo del 
petrolio che, per l’effetto sostituzione, si ripercuote ancora in modo positivo 
sulla domanda e la produzione di beni manufatti (nel diagramma il circuito 
da Sm a Cm a Pp e viceversa).
Possiamo allora dire che la condizione 3. la  impone che tutto il circuito 
K -  S -  C -  P  e ritorno sia stabile, cioè che l’intero meccanismo1V m p
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“moltiplicatore” — adeguamento dello stock di capitale non sia esplosivo.
Il termine moltiplicatore è stato incluso tra virgolette perché, in realtà, 
si sta qui facendo riferimento ad un moltiplicatore che tiene conto anche 
degli effetti indotti da variazioni dei prezzi; possiamo ricavare, infatti, un 
moltiplicatore d’impatto del reddito dovuto a variazioni delle componenti 
autonome della domanda e degli investimenti, che include gli effetti indotti 
delle variazioni di Pp, ma esclude variazioni di Pm.
Sostituendo la 1.2, 1.6, 1.12-1.14 nella 1.1 si ottiene:
Sm =  [1/(1 -  -  c3 />! zz)] [k  +  C - ( c 2 -  c} p x p2) Pm\,
La condizione 3 .la  non solo assicura che il moltiplicatore sia positivo,
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ma pone anche un limite superiore allo stesso, limite che dipende dai para­
metri del meccanismo di adeguamento dello stock di capitale.
Un moltiplicatore positivo implica che l’effetto congiunto sulla produ­
zione dell’incremento di consumo e dell’incremento di Pp tenda a diventare 
sempre più piccolo fino ad annullarsi; a tale scopo si richiede che, data la 
propensione marginale al consumo, sia sufficientemente piccola la variazione 
di Pp dovuta ad una variazione di Sm (cioè p x a) e/o la variazione di 
domanda indotta da Pp (cioè c3).
Il limite superiore al moltiplicatore è tipico di un modello che include 
un meccanismo di adeguamento dello stock di capitale; affinché il processo 
cumulativo per cui la domanda stimola gli investimenti e gli investimenti 
stimolano la domanda tenda ad affievolirsi, anziché ad esplodere, è necessa­
rio che il leakage del circuito del reddito sia sufficientemente grande in
relazione al valore assunto dai parametri y e /?.
Nella descrizione fatta nelle pagine precedenti sono stati tuttavia trala­
sciati gli effetti dell’aumento di spesa autonoma sul salario e sul prezzo dei 
beni manufatti; è giunto invece il momento di considerarli per riuscire a 
comprendere le condizioni 3.1b e 3 .le. Pm, come si vede dalla eq. 1.9, 
dipende dai costi, quindi dal prezzo del petrolio e dal saggio di salario; 
ambedue le variabili vengono influenzate positivamente dal livello dell’attivi­
tà produttiva, cosa che spinge verso l’alto il prezzo del bene manufatto. Tale 
aumento, da una parte fa aumentare P in quanto il prezzo del petrolio è 
indicizzato sul prezzo dei manufatti; dall’altra spinge i consumatori a sostitui­
re il bene manufatto con il petrolio per uso finale, provocando di conseguen­
za una riduzione di Cm e Sm ed esercitando un effetto negativo su P
Siamo ora in grado di comprendere il significato della condizione 3.1b, 
questa impone che l’effetto diretto, di segno positivo, di Pm su P tramite 
indicizzazione del prezzo del petrolio (cioè px p2) e 1 effetto indiretto, di 
segno negativo tramite domanda e produzione di beni manufatti (cioè -  c2 px 
aj{ \ -  Cl))( abbiano un effetto netto negativo. La conseguente riduzione di 
P , farà a sua volta calare anche Pm. In termini del diagramma, se la condi­
zione 3.1b è verificata, il circuito Pm -  Cm -  Sm -  Pp -  P„ è stabile.
Tuttavia gli aumenti di Sm danno luogo anche ad aumenti del salario 
monetario e del prezzo del bene manufatto; siamo giunti, quindi, alla descri­
zione di quel settore del diagramma che riguarda prezzi e salari dell’econo­
mia dei paesi industrializzati. Poiché, se sono verificate la 3 .la  e 3.1b, 
l’effetto netto di un aumento di Pm è una riduzione di Cm e Sm, w tenderà a 
diminuire e, prima o poi, ad agire negativamente su W  e Pm\ quindi il 
circuito Sm - W  - W  - P m - C m - S m contiene in sé un meccanismo 
equilibratore che non richiede ulteriori condizioni per la stabilità. Bisogna
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però ricordare che aumenti di W  fanno aumentare non solo il livello assolu­
to del prezzo del bene manufatto ma anche Pm, che, a sua volta, esercita un 
effetto positivo su W. La spirale tra W e Pm, se fosse esplosiva, porterebbe 
ad aumenti sempre maggiori di prezzi e salari; è qui che interviene la 
condizione 3 .le, la quale impone che il meccanismo di azione e reazione tra 
W e Pm non sia esplosivo; infatti la condizione 3 .le richiede che un incre­
mento di Pm produca, tramite 1^, un aumento di Pm stesso minore dell’incre­
mento iniziale.
Per completare le considerazioni sin qui fatte, facciamo alcune osserva­
zioni sulla validità delle condizioni di stabilità in corrispondenza di diversi 
valori di alcuni parametri di particolare interesse in quanto rappresentano i 
comportamenti degli agenti economici.
A parità degli altri parametri, quanto minore è c3 e quanto maggiore è 
c2, tanto più facilmente saranno verificate la 3 .la  e la 3.1b. Per quanto 
riguarda la propensione al consumo, si può ricavare dalla 3 .la  e 3.1b. 
l’intervallo in cui deve essere compresa:
1 -  c2 a/p2 <  cx <  1 +  yP v /(y  +  /?) -  Pi a
cioè un valore di cx troppo alto (una bassa propensione al risparmio) rende il 
“moltiplicatore” del reddito molto alto (se non addirittura negativo), mentre 
un valore troppo basso rende positivo l’effetto complessivo di Pm su Cm.
Passando ad esaminare i parametri della eq. 1.13, possiamo notare che 
quanto più alto è p { , tanto maggiore è l’aumento di prezzo che i produttori 
di petrolio richiedono per aumentare di una quantità data la materia prima 
offerta; quindi, per un valore elevato di p lt un aumento di Sm fa lievitare 
molto Pp e, di conseguenza Cm e rende elevato il valore del moltiplicatore. 
Più diffìcilmente quindi sarà soddisfatta la 3 .la.
Così, quanto maggiore p2, cioè quanto più i paesi produttori di petrolio 
aumentano il grado di indicizzazione del prezzo della materia prima rispetto 
al prezzo dei beni manufatti per evitare che la ragione di scambio peggiori, 
tanto più difficilmente la 3.1b sarà verificata; quindi la corsa a migliorare la 
ragione di scambio tende a rendere instabile il modello.
Infine veniamo ai parametri contenuti nella 3 .le, che sono i parametri 
relativi alla distribuzione del reddito nei paesi industrializzati, cioè il margi­
ne, m, applicato ai costi per ottenere il prezzo e il grado di indicizzazione dei 
salari g2 ; data la produttività del lavoro, quanto più elevate sono le richieste 
dei percettori di salario e di profitti, tanto piu difficilmente sara verificata la 
3 .le ; solo un più alto livello di produttività può consentire di soddisfare 
maggiori richieste senza porre in pericolo la stabilità del modello.
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4. Effetti di politiche di stabilizzazione
Esaminiamo il caso in cui la spesa pubblica anziché essere esogena, sia 
modificata dalle autorità economiche in funzione del raggiungimento di 
obiettivi di stabilizzazione interna.
Se nel breve periodo l’obiettivo da raggiungere è un livello desiderato 
di occupazione, le autorità possono prendere come segnale di una necessità 
di intervento il livello del prodotto 17 18; in tal caso abbiamo la seguente 
equazione per G che va sostituita alla 1.7:
4.1 G  =  - f  Sm dove f  >  0
Questo comportamento delle autorità rende più piccola la derivata 
parziale di Cm rispetto ad Sm, quindi lo si può studiare facendo riferimento 
agli effetti delle variazioni di c1.
Vediamo allora gli effetti delle possibili manovre di politica fiscale sul 
livello dei prezzi e sul livello della ragione di scambio dei paesi industrializ­
zati analizzando le seguenti relazioni che si ricavano dalle 2.9 e 2.10.
4.2 dPm/dc1 =*= [l/(c2 -  c3 pj p2)] &
4.3 dPp/dcl =  [pj p2/(c2 -  c} p 1 p2)] &
4.4 dPm/dci <| dPp/dc1 se 1 ^  Pi Pi
Dalle 4.2 si vede che una politica proporzionale di stabilizzazione dà 
luogo a più bassi livelli di equilibrio sia di Pm che di Pp ; infatti nell’equili­
brio di lungo periodo una riduzione della propensione marginale al consumo 
non altera né \  né le componenti autonome della domanda. Pertanto (fn 
deve rimanere immutato, il che implica che i prezzi devono ambedue dimi­
nuire per compensare la diminuzione del consumo indotto dal reddito 
Eventuali variazioni della ragione di scambio si avranno se l/p2 ^  p2. Per 
quanto riguarda le condizioni di stabilità, la politica proporzionale di stabiliz­
zazione rende più difficile che si verifichi la 3.1 b, mentre l’opposto avviene 
per la 3 .la.
17 Questo tipo di intervento può essere visto come a favore dell’occupazione se Sm 
diminuisce e a favore della stabilità dei prezzi se Sm aumenta. Tale politica viene definita come 
politica proporzionale di stabilizzazione: cfr. Phillips (1954, pp. 290-323).
18 Una diminuzione, ceteris paribus, di entrambi i prezzi fa aumentare Cm se sono 
verificate le condizioni di stabilità 3.la e 3.lb.
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5. Conclusioni
Abbiamo presentato uno schema macrodinamico, valido per l’insieme 
dei paesi industrializzati, la cui caratteristica è quella di aver analizzato i 
principali fattori da cui dipende il prezzo del petrolio che, pertanto, diviene 
una variabile endogena al modello, dipendente dalle interrelazioni esistenti 
tra paesi industrializzati e paesi produttori di petrolio.
È stato dimostrato che, sotto opportune ipotesi plausibili dal punto di 
vista economico, il modello è stabile. I principali risultati ai quali siamo 
pervenuti possono essere così riassunti:
1 ) Il livello di equilibrio del prodotto e, quindi, dell’occupazione dei 
paesi industrializzati dipende dalla posizione e dalla inclinazione della curva 
di Phillips nonché dal livello della produttività del lavoro.
2) I livelli di equilibrio del prezzo dei beni manufatti e del prezzo 
del petrolio non possono che determinarsi simultaneamente a causa dell’in­
terdipendenza che si stabilisce tra i due gruppi di paesi.
3 ) Nel lungo periodo, tuttavia, un tentativo di aumentare il grado di 
indicizzazione del prezzo del petrolio rispetto al prezzo dei beni manufatti 
può peggiorare la ragione di scambio dei paesi produttori di petrolio.
4) Il perseguimento di una politica proporzionale di stabilizzazione 
può risultare sia in un miglioramento che in un peggioramento della ragione 
di scambio dei paesi industrializzati, a seconda del comportamento scelto dai 
paesi produttori di petrolio.
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SOME EFFECTS OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN OIL PRO­
DUCING AND OIL CONSUMING COUNTRIES: A MACRODYNAMIC ANA­
LYSIS
A simplified dynamic model is set up in order to analyze some effects of the 
interdependence between oil producing and oil consuming countries.
One of the features of the model is the endogeneization of the price of oil in 
an oligopolistic context. Under plausible assumptions the model is shown to be 
stable and in equilibrium, the price of oil and the price of the commodity 
produced in the industrialized countries are determined simultaneously. Some 
effects of a simplified analysis of the economic policy are also reported.
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THE ECONOMICS OF STREET CRIME
by
Y asar M. G eyikdagi *  and N ecla V. G eyikdagi * *
Abstract
While street crime has been treated by some economists, their assump­
tions are at odds with the findings of law enforcers and social scientists as 
explained in this article which examines individual small time criminals rather 
than large scale organized crime.
The mathematical model used to describe a street robber (mugger)’s 
behavior is an ontological one which must eventually be further extended and 
adapted to individual cases. Using a Hamiltonian time derivative model of the 
convex variety, since muggers are heavy risk-takers, it is shown that these 
street criminals have a “win big or nothing” attitude.
Strong arm robbery is plaguing many cities in the world. This situation 
is especially evident in the major United States cities where forcible robbery 
is called mugging. Although the loot of the muggers is usually trivial, the 
indirect costs of mugging, such as increased policing costs and the feeling of 
insecurity and terror, are of a substantial magnitude. Hence, besides law 
enforcers and social scientists, economists, too, are beginning to explain this 
phenomenon from their own angle. Among them, Neher (1978), tries to 
establish an analogy between street criminals (muggers) and deep sea fish­
ermen. Just as deep sea fishermen try not to overcatch fish in order to 
leave a sufficient quantity of catch for the future, muggers, too, try not to 
overmug so as to have enough victims left for future strong arm robberies. 
However, such an explanation is at odds with the findings of law enforcers 
and social scientists who specialized and deal in these matters.
Hence, it would be appropriate to describe the findings of street crime 
experts and then to present a model which is more in line with the realities.
*  State University of New York, College at Old Westbury.
* *  Economic Consultant.
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I. Social Realities
Based on the experience of law enforcers, social workers and psycholo­
gists, one can readily accept the fact that muggers are not like risk-averse 
wealth maximizing businessmen or fishermen. They are risk-prone indivi­
duals who act on impulse (Dinitz, Dynes and Clarke, 1975, pp. 44-53).
The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 
states that violent robbery in United States cities is especially concentrated 
among youths between the ages of fifteen and twenty four (Dinitz et ah, 
1975, p. 45). The great majority of those committing muggery are low 
income black youths who live in ghetto slums. The report (Dinitz et ah, 
1975, p. 52) states:
... Believing they have no stake in the system, the ghetto young men see little 
gain by playing according to society’s rules and little to lose by not. They believe 
the odds against their success by legitimate means are greater than the odds 
against success by crime...
When he discusses the etiology of delinquency and street crime among 
lower class youth, W.B. Miller (1958) cites “trouble , toughness , 
“smartness”, “excitement”, “fate”, and “autonomy” as the focal concerns that 
lead to street crimes and, of course, muggery.
Trouble generally represents a situation or a kind of behavior which 
results in unwelcome or complicating involvement with official authorities 
or agencies of middle class society. Toughness in lower class culture has the 
important components of physical prowess evidenced by strength, endur­
ance, and athletic skill. Smartness is the capacity to outsmart, outfox, outwit, 
dupe, “take” or “con” others. Essentially, smartness means achieving a 
valued end like material goods or personal status with minimum physical 
effort. The smart person is represented by the card shark, the professional 
gambler or the “con” artist. Excitement involves elements of sought risk and 
danger like sexual adventuring, gambling and claims of physical prowess 
which may involve mugging. Fate or destiny is a set of forces over which 
the individuals have little control. Thus, if someone has no luck, no matter 
how hard he works for something, he will not achieve it. Autonomy basical­
ly means complete independence and refusal to take orders from others.
A very large proportion of muggers are teenagers who are not inclined 
to think about a relatively distant (2 or 3 months ahead) future. These 
factors make it very unlikely for them to think about a long-term optimiza­
tion of the amount of muggery. Even if some of the muggers thought about 
it, they would still not impose constraints upon themselves since they would
TH E ECONOMICS OF STREET CRIME 8 1 5
think that the other muggers would overwork anyway. As it is very unlikely 
to have collusion among them, individual muggers or a small group of them 
will be unaware of what the multitude of other muggers do. It is quite 
common that they kill people for quite trivial amounts and rape women 
even when they are in danger of being caught or killed. They are much 
more like the risk-prone gamblers than the rational and risk-averse fi­
shermen.
The model suggested by Neher (1978) may be partially applicable to 
high-level organized crime, which is likely to collude with rival gangs and 
divide up the area of operation. They are also likely to restrain their opera­
tions in order to make their presence tolerable among their “preys”. If they 
go too hard at it, the preys will take chances and create some sort of 
resistance such as having recourse to law enforcement authorities. Even 
though the predators will punish some of the preys, they will have a hard 
time themselves trying to cope with the agents of the law. Thus, they will 
normally restrain their catch at a reasonable level where the preys will put 
up with the “tax” or “protection money”. Hence, Neher’s model is more in 
line with organized crime than it is with muggery.
For a large number of participants, muggery is not only a livelihood, 
but also a means of impressing or punishing the society in which they feel 
alienated (Brown, 1984, p. 44). The typical mugger is a risk-taker who 
resembles the irrational, impulsive, risk-prone gambler more than the ration­
al risk-averting gambler who, if necessary, cheats by various means includ­
ing teaming with others in order to leave a lesser role to pure luck.
II. An Ontological Model
It could not be claimed that the following model is applicable to every 
type of mugger. Nor could it be claimed that it can explain the whole 
behavior of even some of the muggers. However, this ontological model 
takes a substantial part of the typical (as described in the section above) 
mugger’s behavior into account. It is similar to Sethi (1979)’s model for 
risk-prone pilferers.
Let us assume that we have a mugger who is continuously in quest of 
an “optimal” mugging policy. Obviously, optimal can mean different things 
to risk-averse, risk-indifferent or risk-prone individuals. In line with the 
explanations given in the section above, this mugger will be risk-prone. He 
will assume that there is a stochastic process leading to trouble such as his 
getting caught. F(t) shows the probability of his getting caught by time t. 
H(t) is the hazard rate (or, conditional probability of his getting caught at
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time t (provided that he has not yet been caught) associated with a unit 
mugging rate. Thus, suppressing the dependence of F with respect to t for 
notational convenience and D being the first time derivative,
( 1 ) DF/ (1 -  F) =  H
The mugger will normally assume that the real hazard rate increases, let us 
say linearly, as his mugging activity increases. Thus,
(2 ) DF =  hu(t) (1 -  F), F(O) =  O
where the mugger’s control variable u(t) is his mugging rate at time t, H  =  
hu(t) and h >  O is a constant.
When defining his objective function, the mugger will consider the 
following:
a) He estimates his remaining life to be T years, i.e., T <  ° ° . Of 
course, T  will take a value of ° °  for the risk-prone mugger.
b) He accepts r as the discount rate, r >  O.
c) His instantaneous utility for the amount of loot is C(u) with 
marginal utility dC/du =  Cu >  O and Cuu >  O. Given the utility function 
C(u) and the fact that (1 -  F) represent the probability that the mugger is 
still at large by time t, one can represent the present value of the total 
expected utility from the loot as,
(3) fr exp (— rt) (1 — F) C(u) dt
d ) There is a one-time (lump sum) penalty at the moment the 
mugger is caught. This penalty, K, will also include psychological costs such 
as embarrassment. The expected present value of the total penalty would be
(4) exp (— rt) KDF dt
e) Naturally, there is also a continuous punishment as opposed to a 
lump sum one. We can assume that once the mugger is caught, he is either 
imprisoned or put on probation. Moreover, the mugger will estimate the 
rate of punishment, emotional or otherwise, to be p  measured in the same 
units as that of utility. The expected present value of this continuous penal­
ty is:
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(5)
f
exp (— rt) p  F dt
(6 )
Using (3) — (5), the objective function becomes
J =  f  exp ( -  rt) [C(u) (1 -  F) -  KDF -  pF] dtJ n
The objective function is to be maximized subject to (2) and the control 
constraint.
(7) u e S2 =  [O u]
where u is the maximum possible rate at which the mugger is capable of 
mugging. For the sake of simplicity, the parameters h, K, p, and u are 
assumed to be constant.
(8) /  =  f  exp (-  rt) [C M  (1 -  F) -  Khu (1 -  F) -  pF] dt
"  O
It should be noted that due to the infinite horizon of the risk-prone 
mugger, T takes a value of ° ° . The optimal control problem is to maximize 
J in (8) subject to (2) and (7). To apply the maximum principle to this 
problem one could form the current-value Hamiltonian.
(9) H  =  [C M  -  Khu] (1 -  F) - p F  +  A [hu (1 -  F)], 
where the current-value adjoint variable X satisfies.
(10) DX =  (r +  hu) X +  C M  -  Khu
The maximum of the Hamiltonian will be an extreme point because of its 
convexity. Thus,
(ID
u, if C{ù) -  Khu +  X (t) hu >  O 
O, otherwise
With the independence of (11), the infiniteness of the horizon implies that 
the optimal control is either u or O all the way.
Thus, the optimal policy of the risk-prone mugger is given by,
C M  -  Khu <  O —» u* =  O, X* =  O,(12)
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C(«) -  Khü >  O -+  u* =  it, A* =  [C(«) -  Kbit] / (r +  £«)
III. Conclusion
After summarizing the basic findings of criminologists about street 
criminals, an ontological model describing the behavior of muggers was 
developed. The model purports to be a starting point from which further 
variations and refinements could be derived.
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L’ECONOMIA DEL BORSAIOLO
Negli Stati Uniti, come altrove, è diffusa l’arte del borseggiare, la quale oltre 
a determinare un diffuso sentimento di inquietudine e di insicurezza, è fonte di 
costi di polizia assai elevati. Gli economisti, hanno assunto un punto di vista 
differente rispetto a quello di altri studiosi (criminologi, legali, sociologi) che sono 
più direttamente a contatto col mondo dei borsaioli. Infatti, mentre costoro indica­
no i borsaioli quali soggetti altamente propensi al rischio, gli economisti tendono 
a trattarli come agenti avversi al rischio. In particolare un autore paragona i 
borsaioli ai pescatori subacquei che non eccedono nella pesca al fine di lasciare 
preda per future incursioni. Il lavoro esamina dapprima il comportamento e le 
aspettative del borsaiolo sulla base delle indagini criminologiche, facendo la distin­
zione tra il borseggiatore singolo e la grande organizzazione criminale, dove la 
logica di pianificazione e di assunzione di rischi è analoga a quella che si ha in 
una normale azienda.
La seconda parte del lavoro esamina un modello di comportamento del 
borsaiolo, assumendo elevata propensione al rischio (comportamento tutto o 
niente’).
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MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND 
THE COMECON COUNTRIES
by
S n e j a n a  F il ip o v iC *
Abstract
The East European countries gradually altered and rectified their original 
negative attitude towards multinational companies. A t the same time, those 
countries have in recent years achieved such a level of economic development 
and political flexibility as to become very interesting for multinational compa­
nies. The fact to be emphasized is that the process of establishing socialist 
multinational enterprises in the COMECON region is going on. Those enter­
prises represent the crucial factor in the process of integration of the East-Euro- 
pean countries. In the future, socialist multinational enterprises may very well 
become a powerful factor to reckon with.
As a matter of fact, the rise of socialist multinational enterprises in 
essence parallels a similar development initiated much earlier under different 
political and economic systems in industrially developed countries.
1. East-West Joint-Ventures
East European and most other socialist countries had for a long time 
maintained a critical and reserved attitude towards multinational companies 
and their activity. In those countries multinationals were regarded as bu­
siness organizations whose only aim was to carry out imperialist objectives 
all over the world and, in the first place, the objectives of the USA. In this, 
the critics in those countries did not concern themselves with a deeper 
analysis of their activities. When the East European countries started to
*  Foreign Trade Research Institute, Beograd (Yugoslavia).
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switch from an extensive to an intensive economic growth, and when they 
became increasingly aware of the need for modern technology, know-how, 
and certain modern products, they gradually altered and rectified their origi­
nal position towards multinational companies. This turn was partly due to 
détente between the USSR and the USA, involving declining restrictions on 
exchange of information between the East and the West, diminishing politi­
cal tensions, gradual remoulding of USA’s trade policy towards socialist 
countries, a more flexible economic behaviour of East European socialist 
countries, etc.; as a result, the general situation had undergone an almost 
radical change during 1973-74.
The presence of multinational companies and direct foreign invest­
ments in socialist countries is still limited, although it has become more 
apparent in recent times. Cooperation between multinational companies and 
socialist countries takes place in the form of production and trade coopera­
tion arrangements, transfer of technology and technical knowledge, thus 
supplementing traditional forms and volume of trade. These arrangements 
are a reflection of the general trends of planned-economy countries to open 
up to the world and to establish better cooperation with other countries, 
making use of certain advantages of international division of labour.
The main feature of the initial East-West cooperation agreements was 
a relatively small share of investments on behalf of multinational companies, 
especially those from the USA. The main reasons for this caution on both 
sides were the notorious ideological problems: the question of ownership of 
western partners in the socialist economy, the uncertain relations between 
the USSR and other socialist countries on the one hand, and the western 
countries on the other, and the question of US government control over 
trade with socialist countries.
The fact is that East European socialist countries have in recent years 
achieved such a level of economic development and political flexibility, that 
they are now in a position to interest multinational companies on various 
forms of cooperation. Those countries, above all, no longer maintain a rigid 
economic and political feature, certain differences among them are becoming 
apparent, and elements of independence are appearing, although their for­
eign policy is still in full agreement with the policy of the USSR. Those 
differences, such as variations in the national income, led to a new approach 
to cooperation with the West, the developed countries, and even multina­
tional companies. Socialist countries are becoming more interested in the 
transfer of technology through multinational companies, but on a long term 
basis, although this is not always in line with companies’ strategy. Those 
countries are of great interest to all partners, in view of the fact that they
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND TH E COMECON COUNTRIES 8 2 1
have a population of approximately 370 million people, a share of 12 
percent in the world trade, and an average per capita income of 4,600 
dollars.
The potentialities of individual multinational companies as compared 










Exxon (USA) 88.6 URSS 1,212
Royal Dutch Shell Poland 140
(Netherlands and the United Kingdom) 80.5 GDR 121
General Motors (USA) 74.6 Czechoslovakia 89
Mobil Oil (USA) 54.6 Rumania 52
British Petroleum (United Kingdom) 49.2 Hungary 45
Ford (USA) 44.5 Bulgaria 37
IBM (USA) 40.2
Texaco (USA) 40.1
Du Pont de Nemours (USA) 35.4
Reference-. “500 the Biggest”, Fortune, May 1984 and World Bank Atlas, Washington D.C., 
USA, 1983.
In spite of this positive change of attitude, there is still a certain degree 
of mistrust among individual multinational companies when investments 
into socialist countries are concerned. There is also a similar degree of 
mistrust on the other side, which certainly wields an influence on the rate of 
investments and cooperation in general. In spite of détente being on the 
agenda, the multinationals keep taking account of the fact that political 
systems of those countries are based on the ideology of destruction of 
capitalism, while, on the other hand, socialist countries regard those compa­
nies as typical representatives of capitalism, or imperialism, with the sole 
aim of obtaining maximum profit.
In spite of that, the initial experience has been mutually satisfactory, 
although neither side waived their principal outlooks on general issues. 
Multinational companies are objecting to the lack of flexibility of the eco­
nomic and administrative structures of socialist countries, and to a certain 
extent, to the planning of economic development and to a selective approach 
to industrial development, all of which involve strict limits on companies’ 
activities. At the same time, they are in favour of the stability of the
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economic and political system of those countries, which is an important 
incentive for their further and continuous commitment.
The first important study on multinational companies published in a 
socialist country appeared in Bulgaria in 1970 The author takes a critical 
position towards multinational companies, although within limits acceptable 
by economic analysis. This study regards the expansion of multinational 
companies mainly as an American phenomenon. The study also supports the 
economic principles of socialist countries maintaining that multinationals 
have reduced competition on the world market, thus hampering free supply 
and demand.
The position of economists and theorists of the German Democratic 
Republic towards multinational companies is very critical: they are regarded 
as a sole American phenomenon and they are a challenge to the world 
working class. One author, for example, claims that “with the development 
of those companies the imperialist system has created new possibilities for 
social manoeuvring and has altered the conditions under which it can use its 
economic, military and political power in the struggle against socialism and 
national liberation movements!” 1 2.
Polish economists are taking a more moderate attitude towards multina­
tional companies, although with an occasional critical note. They argue that 
there exist certain dangers from the activity of multinational companies in 
the developing countries, but they also think that an efficient international 
division of labour is vital and that in this process the multinationals can play 
a certain role. The negative effects of cooperation with those companies 
could be buffered through cooperation agreements in which socialist coun­
tries should provide for adequate control clauses, etc. It is also held that in 
planned economies with a strong central administration, as in East Euro­
pean socialist countries, multinational companies cannot be detrimental to 
socialism, as they are to the West. The general conclusion is that one should 
prepare for coexistence with multinational companies.
Rumania’s position towards multinational companies is vividly ex­
pressed in the statements of senior officials. For the first time in December 
1973, the public was officially informed that Rumania “like other countries” 
had decided to initiate the establishment of joint companies, bearing in 
mind the new circumstances of the world economy and the need for new 
forms of economic relations. Direct manufacturing cooperation with other 
countries would enable expansion and firmer economic relations with other 
countries, and at the same time, a speedier introduction of modern science 
and technology into national production. It was emphasized that the estab-
1 KalCev (1970).
2 N e h l s  (1977).
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lishment of joint companies was strictly related to the national industry 
development programme, and their number and size would have to match 
national requirements, while such companies would have to be located in 
regions where this was absolutely necessary.
The presence of multinational companies in socialist countries with a 
planned economy is at this moment important in sectors which technological­
ly depend upon imports (such as car and chemical industry). In addition, 
these companies are playing an important role in the exploitation of natural 
resources, e.g.: the U.S.S.R. project on copper exploitation in Siberia counts 
on investments by multinational companies of 1-2 billion dollars, with an 
equal participation of both sides in overall financing. For a long time the 
USSR has been entering into agreements on technical cooperation and assis­
tance with multinational companies, and on the construction of complete 
plants, mainly in extraction industry and power production; mutual purchase 
and sale arrangements are also quite common. It can be said that economic 
relations between the USSR and West European countries have already 
passed the stage of sporadic trade agreements and have entered into a new 
phase of planned and programmed economic cooperation on stable and long 
term foundations. Certain socialist countries (Hungary, Poland) have en­
tered into cooperation with large Western hotel concerns. This orientation 
was directly reflected in higher exports of socialist countries into industrially 
developed countries and in lower imports of certain items. It is noteworthy 
that about 600 cooperation agreements between East European socialist 
countries and market economy countries were registered in the first half of 
the seventies and almost 1000 agreements in the early eighties.
As far as it is known, Hungary and Rumania, in addition to Yugosla­
via, allow for a 49%  percent share of foreign capital in joint ventures. 
Companies are thus put in a position of a partner with a minority share, 
although this should not influence (and in practice it does not influence) 
their activity and efficiency in those countries. The same situation is in 
Poland, where the joint-ventures agreements were introduced in 1976. As 
far as Yugoslavia is concerned, the new legislation concerning joint ventures 
has been prepared, although not yet formally accepted, allowing more liber­
al and flexible negotiations with foreign companies.
In Rumania joint investments are allowed in industry and agriculture, 
civil engineering, tourism, transport, trade, scientific and technological re­
search, and in services. In contrast to Rumania, joint ventures in Hungary in 
the seventies were restricted to trade and tertiary activities including re­
search and development. The most recent legislation in Hungary allows for 
joint ventures in manufacturing, in addition to earlier restricted activities. In 
any case, however, only marketing organizations and companies willing to
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assign licences and patents are communicating with Hungarian enterprises.
Although joint investments, according to the Constitution, are formally 
not allowed on the national territory of Bulgaria, in the seventies, the 
Government started to induce industry to increase contacts with multination­
al companies, and certain organizational changes in the economy took place 
for this purpose. However, in a Decree issued in March 1980, the Bulgar­
ians permitted joint ventures, even with more than 50%  share, and a small 
number were registered, although not all of these are in direct manufac­
turing.
After examining other socialist countries, the motives of industrial and 
other types of cooperation between those countries and multinational compa­
nies could be outlined as follows:
— new trade opportunities,
— different costs of factors of production,
— transfer of technology,
— stability in the development of economic relations,
— specialization and economy of scale,
— outlet to foreign markets,
— balance of payments and currency balances,
— tariff and other administrative facilities,
— transport charges,
— other advantages related to special technology,
— market, goods manufactured by companies, etc.
2. Socialist Multinational Enterprises
In addition, there are signs that in planned economy socialist countries 
the idea of the formation of socialist multinational enterprises is being 
considered3. In fact, this idea originated during the early sixties in the 
COMECON, although unofficially. Three possible types of enterprises are 
being mentioned: 1) international economic association, 2) collective enter­
prise, 3) international economic company, and each one of these would be 
constituted by a separate contract. In contrast to western multinational 
companies, socialist multinational enterprises would be formed by state, 
national enterprises, and they would engage in trade and business coopera­
tion within the COMECON region.
This concept was carried further, and the possibility of contracts be­
5 VojnovkI (1984).
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tween socialist multinational enterprises and western multinational compa­
nies was put on the agenda. These considerations also included the forma­
tion of special zones in underdeveloped areas of specific COMECON coun­
tries which would have a special treatment, as regards legislative restrictions 
towards joint ventures and cooperation with foreign companies. This also 
shows a willingness to include in their activity the countries in which 
foreign investment is restricted, and consequently the presence of foreign 
companies is limited. Socialist multinational enterprises (or socialist com­
mon enterprises) provide important production facilities which in some 
industries may contribute to a considerable reduction of manufacturing 
costs. Furthermore, the commercial function of socialist multinational enter­
prises (SMEs) is very important, because SMEs as compared to individual 
national socialist firms command a much bigger and more diversified supply 
and help to establish very specific trademarks. This means that SMEs are 
able to develop large-scale marketing strategies, which put them in a posi­
tion comparable to that of western multinational companies. The potentiali­
ties of the numerous socialist multinational enterprises enable them to han­
dle and execute large scale and complex turnkey contracts, such as the 
construction of complete industrial plants, electric power supply stations, 
including nuclear power stations, hospitals or radio and TV broadcast sta­
tions etc. Plant sizes in European socialist states are, on the average, larger 
than those in western markets. This means that when producing at one 
hundred percent capacity and utilizing fully the economies of scale costs 
could be substantially reduced.
The concentration created by socialist common enterprises, creates sup­
plementary advantages by means of establishing efficient marketing and 
drawing on the technological expertise of all interested units. The further 
advantage of SMEs is the possibility to create a vertically concentrated 
organization which could make it easier to balance the internal relationships 
in the respective national economic plans of the socialist countries.
In the process of socialist integration, the role of SMEs is very impor­
tant. In the first stage predominantly bilateral socialist common enterprises 
were created, but in the future SMEs should acquire a multilateral form 
accounting for differences of the particular COMECON countries. All the 
bilateral solutions which do not result from objective economic premises 
must be considered suboptimal.
The importance and the role of socialist multinational enterprises in 
the process of integration is especially emphasized in the following official 
COMECON documents: The Comprehensive Programme for the Devel­
opment of Socialist Economic Integration and The Uniform Principles of
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Creation and Functioning of the International Economic Organizations, 
both worked out in 1976 4.
In the future, the SME should spread even more and take a more 
influential position in the socialist economy. Therefore, some guidelines at 
least referring to the legal status, measurement of efficiency and means of 
control of the socialist multinational enterprise, ought to be elaborated.
As a matter of fact, the recommendations of the Comprehensive Pro­
gramme referring to socialist common enterprises are not very precise and 
can be treated very flexibly. Their fundamental requirement is that the 
activity of socialist common enterprises be compatible with the national 
economic plan and the targets of the economic policy of participating
countries. , ,
At the same time, socialist common enterprises should be treated as the
piloting units which may speed up the introduction into the economies of 
the COMECON countries those changes which help to harmonize or adopt 
a uniform economic system and contribute to the equalization of the level of 
development of individual member states. From the point of view of state 
control and financing, socialist multinational enterprises fall into two types. 
The first type includes those enterprises which have a “Governing Council” 
consisting of the ministers of the member countries responsible for the 
branch of economic activity concerned, and financed directly by the state 
budgets of the member countries (and their income also forms part of the 
state budgets). The other type embraces entities directly controlled by the 
member enterprises, run on a more or less commercial accounting basis. 
Accordingly, the freedom of operation of the different categories of these 
socialist multinational enterprises varies widely. Some are little more than 
agencies making recommendations to the government departments con­
cerned or the affiliated entities, whilst others are largely independent and 
integrated enterprises primarily (but not exclusively) guided by profit. There
is a clear trend in favour of the latter type 5.
Generally speaking, the conclusion on the significance and importance 
of socialist multinational enterprises is that they are regarded in the COME­
CON region as a progressive step -  from economic cooperation to more 
advanced integration. In addition to their activities intra the COMECON 
region, they are meant to appear in capitalist markets as strong partners and 
deal with western multinational companies on a reasonably equal footing.
The point to emphasize is that the trend towards the internationaliza­
tion of economic processes in COMECON countries has two significant
4 Z u r a w ic k i  (1979).
5 WlLCZYNSKI (1979).
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implications. First, in spite of the different social system, the rise of multina­
tional enterprises under developed socialism in essence parallels a similar 
development initiated much earlier under the capitalism system in devel­
oped economies. Second, although in the past the COMECON multination­
al enterprises were of very little relevance to developed markets, in the 
future they may very well become a powerful factor to reckon with.
MULTINATIONALLY-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN COMECON REGION
Name
(with headquarters and year of 
foundation in brackets)
Field of Operation
Agromash (Budapest, 1965) Horticultural machinery
Assofoto (Moscow, 1973) Photochemical products
Friendship Cotton Spinning Mill (Zawiercie,
Poland, 1973) Spinning
Haldex (Katowice, Poland, 1959) Coal waste extraction
Interatomenergo (Moscow, 1973) Nuclear power equipment
Interatominstrument (Warsaw, 1972) Atomic appliances
Interchim (Halle, GDR, 1969) Light chemicals
Interchimvolokno (Bucharest, 1974) Chemical fibres
Interelektro (Moscow, 1973) Electrical equipment
Intermetal (Budapest, 1964) Iron and steel
International Bank for Economic Cooperation
(Moscow, 1964) Clearing and short-term credits
International Investment Bank
(Moscow, 1970) Long-term financing
Interpodshypnik (Warsaw, 1964) Bearings
Interport (Szczecin, 1974) Major seaports
Intersputnik (Moscow, 1972) Satellite telecommunications
Intertextilmash (Moscow, 1973) Textile machinery
Intransmash (Sofia, 1965) Intra-factory transport
Kingisep Potash Mining (Kingisep, USSR,
1963) Potash exploitation
Kiyembayev Asbestos Concentration Plant
(Kiyembayev, USSR, 1973) Asbestos extraction
Komi Timber Cutting (Komi, USSR, 1969) Timber exploitation
“Peace” Power Grid (Prague, 1962) Central electricity transmission
Rail Freight Car Pool (Prague, 1962) Rail freight transport
Uniafrika (Szczecin, 1961) Baltic-West Africa shipping
Ust-Ilim Pulp Plant (Ust-Ilim, USSR,
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IMPRESE MULTINAZIONALI E PAESI DEL COMECON
I paesi dell’Europa Orientale e degli altri paesi socialisti hanno a lungo 
conservato un atteggiamento di riserva critica nei confronti delle imprese multina­
zionali e della loro attività. L’atteggiamento si è modificato ed è divenuto più 
flessibile recentemente. Al tempo stesso quei paesi hanno ormai raggiunto un tale 
grado di sviluppo economico e di flessibilità politica da trovarsi nella condizione 
di suscitare l’interesse delle imprese multinazionali a scopo di cooperazione sotto 
diverse forme. La presenza delle imprese multinazionali nei paesi socialisti a 
economia pianificata ha in questo momento maggior peso in quei settori che 
dipendono tecnologicamente dalle importazioni, come l’industria delle automobili, 
l’industria chimica e altre. Tali imprese stanno anche svolgendo un ruolo significa­
tivo nello sfruttamento delle risorse naturali. Inoltre le relazioni economiche tra i 
paesi socialisti hanno superato, per la maggior parte, il carattere di rapporti 
sporadici basati su accordi conclusi caso per caso e sono entrate in una fase nuova 
di cooperazione stabile a lungo termine.
Vi sono inoltre segnali di avanzamento del processo di formazione delle 
imprese multinazionali socialiste nella regione del Comecon. Attualmente tale 
processo di formazione non dipende più soltanto dall’azione degli agenti di gover­
no di quei paesi, ma avviene soprattutto attraverso accordi contrattuali con impre­
se multinazionali occidentali, con risultati assai significativi ai fini della integrazio­
ne tra gli stessi paesi dell’Europa orientale.
In certi paesi inoltre la politica economica favorisce i processi indicati consen­
tendo la formazione di accordi con imprese del mondo occidentale per zone 
specifiche a carattere meno sviluppato all’interno del paese stesso.
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buona sensibilità.
Se intendete investire o finanziare, volete 
essere certi che la vostra banca vi garan­
tisca la massima diligenza e che il suo 
motto sia quindi: Precisione assoluta nei 
minimi dettagli.
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La struttura organizzativa del Gruppo ENI è 
basata su una holding, I ENI, che detiene 
attualmente la totalità, o la quasi totalità, del 
capitale di 13 principali Società Caposettore, 
alle quali fanno capo un insieme di oltre 300 
Società, delle quali oltre un terzo ubicate all'estero. 
Le Società operative sono soggette alla stessa 
regolamentazione ed hanno la stessa natura 
di impresa prevista, sia in Italia sia all'estero, 
per le Società per Azioni il cui capitale sia 
nelle mani di privati Azionisti. Tale struttura 
organizzativa consente un elevato grado di 
flessibilità operativa e gestionale, ed è in 
grado di evolversi, in modo autonomo, 
secondo le esigenze poste dalla situazione 
economica ed industriale dei vàri settori e 
mercati nei quali l'ENI si trova ad operare. Nei 
confronti delle Società operative l'ENI svolge 
funzioni di direzione e coordinamento nelle 
attività di programmazione e controllo, nelle 
attività all'estero, nelle politiche del 
personale e dei rapporti con la realtà esterna.
Particolarmente significative sono le funzioni 
dell'ENI in campo finanziario; l'ENI, infatti, 
oltre a svolgere una funzione di 
coordinamento nei rapporti con gli operatori 
finanziari nazionali ed internazionali, propone 
le politiche ed i piani di copertura finanziaria 
del Gruppo, sovraintende alla loro attuazione 
e controllo, e pianifica e coordina le 
operazioni finanziarie di Gruppo. Tali funzioni 
vengono esercitate, oltre che in accordo con le 
strutture delle Società Caposettore, 
attraverso una rete di Società finanziarie 









Ricerca, produzione e approvvigionamento di 
idrocarburi; ciclo del combustibile nucleare; sviluppo 
ed impiego delle fonti di energie rinnovabili 
(geotermia, solare, biogas).
@Snamprogetti
Studio, progettazione e realizzazione di impianti 
chimici e petrolchimici, di raffinazione, di 
trattamento gas, condotte in terra e in mare, 
tecnologia offshùre, impianti industriali, impianti 
per l'ecologia e grandi infrastrutture.
©AgiipPetrollii
Raffinazione e distribuzione di prodotti petroliferi. 
Fornitura di servizi per il risparmio dell'energia, per 
la razionalizzazione dei consumi e l'uso di fonti 
energetiche diverse dal petrolio.
©Smani
Approvvigionamento, trasporto, distribuzione e 
vendita di gas naturale. 
Trasporto di idrocarburi liquidi.
Saipem
Perforazioni e posa di condotte in terra e in mare; 
montaggio di impianti .industriali.
©NuovoPignone
Produzione e fornitura di macchine, di 
apparecchiature, di strumenti di misura, 
regolazione e controllo per l'industria petrolifera, 
petrolchimica e nucleare, di telai per l'industria 
tessile.
©AgipCarbone
Ciclo integrato del carbone: ricerca e coltivazione 
mineraria, logistica e trasporto, trasformazione, 
commercializzazione su scala internazionale, 
ricerca scientifica e tecnologica per sviluppare e 
diversificare l'utilizzo del carbone e dei derivati.
©Sairram
Ricerca, estrazione*, trattamento e 
commercializzazione di minerali e derivati.
©Enichimica
Petrolchimica di base, materie plastiche, gomma 
sintetica, prodotti chimici per l'agricoltura, fibre 
sintetiche, materie prime per detergenti, 
tecnopolimeri, chimica fine, prodotti farmaceutici.
©Savio
Produzione e fornitura di macchine per l'industria 
tessile.
@ Laimeirossii
Industria tessile e dell'abbigliamento.
©S©fiidl
Finanziamento di attività industriali e commerciali 
del gruppo ENI.
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Compravendita e gestione di partecipazioni e titoli; 
finanziamento delle attività del gruppo ENI all'estero.
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TREVISO ASCOLI PICENO RAGUSA
VENEZIA PERUGIA SIRACUSA
VERONA LATINA TRAPANI
OLTRE 300 SPORTELLI ABILITATI 
ALLO SVOLGIMENTO DI TUTTI I SERVIZI 
DI BANCA. DI BORSA E DI CAMBIO
FILIALI:
FRANCOFORTE, LONDRA, LOS ANGELES, 
NEW  YORK E PARIGI
UFFICI DI RAPPRESENTANZA:
BRUXELLES, BUDAPEST,
CHICAGO, MONACO DI BAVERA, 
SINGAPORE E ZURIGO
Banco di Sicilia
AMMINISTRAZIONE CENTRALE IN PALERMO ■
M
VC
NCR 5068. IL PERSONAL BANCARIO CHE METTE! 
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Cassala, 22 - Tel. 02-83874.1 (20 linee) - 7 #  
320395 - NCR è sulle Pagine Gialle di tutta Italia.
M
Ricordate il filrrtffWar Games"? Se è 
ipotizzabile che qualcuno con un personal 
possa manipolare i missili, figuriamoci i corti 
in banca! Oggi laNCR, grazie alla sua espe­
rienza nel settore bancario, offre la giusta 
soluzione al problema della sicurezza negli 
istituti di credito: il PC 5068, stazione intelli- 
bancéna.
sull'architettura del PC 6 NCR, 
in più di un sistemo di sicu- 
rendere leggibili gli archivi solo 
macchine che li hanno generati. 
Un operatore non autorizzato non 
può accedere al software e un software 
non autorizzato non può essere fatto 
funzionare. A queste sofisticate tecni­
che di protezione interne dei dati, il 
PC 5068 associa il dispositivo di cifratura 
standard NBS/DES che rende inaccessibili 
anche le trasmissioni da e verso Host, attua­
bili nei più diffusi protocolli. In questo modo, 
si chiude il cerchio della sicurezza.
Per concludere, con il nuovo PC banca­
rio 5068 della NCR, tutti gli istituti di credito 
possono -  ad un costo estremamente com­
petitivo -  mantenere i massimi livelli di sicu­
rezza e mettere i propri clienti al riparo da 
possibili “curiosi" e “ladri di computer".
Consiglicontanti.
Un problema, spesso, lo si risolve semplicemente parlando.
Al Credito Italiano trovi sempre chi ti sa ascoltare, chi sa valutare e 
discutere le tue esigenze per proporti le soluzioni più vantaggiose
Per i tuoi interessi e il futuro sviluppo della tua attività.er te e la tua famiglia, per il commercio, l’artigianato, 
l’agricoltura, la piccola e media impresa, il Credito 
Italiano può fare molto. Perchè i suoi servizi 
sono specifici e completi. Cosi ampi da 
assicurare le risposte più concrete 
ad ogni tua domanda; in ogni 
genere di operazione bancaria.
Sono consigli che valgono 
denaro contante.
Credito Italiano: 
la grande banca con oltre 
450 sportelli in Italia,
4 filiali e 12 rappresentanti 
all’estero,
3000 banche corrispondenti 
in tutto il mondo.
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Un nuovo tipo di 
cliente bancario 
sta emergendo 
in questi anni. 
Chiede consulenze finanziarie, 
assicurative, consigli per nuove 
forme di investimento
ed un rapporto 
personalizzato e 
specialistico.
La Banca Nazionale delle 
Comunicazioni va incontro 
alle richieste di questo nuovo 
tipo di cliente.
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